


Expeditionary Command for Regional Expertise

Guides Across Strategic Landpower

Regional Guides; A corps of military and civilian personnel who receive language, culture, regional, security, governance and development training for deployment to specified regions in support of the Combatant Command. Guides works as staff officers or teams engaging directly with Host Nation officials and the population. They build and maintain networks within their region to guide forces forward in navigating through the joint, interagency, international and multi-national operational environment. For Army, Marines and Special Operations, Regional Guides are experts in Strategic Landpower, expediting maneuver strategically to prevent and shape, then leveraging regional networks to gain and maintain relative advantage, assure understanding and enable expeditionary maneuver to win



REGIONAL GUIDES

Leveraging regional networks to gain positional advantage, assure understanding and enable expeditionary maneuver to win.

LTC Adrian T. Bogart III, LTC William J. Duggan III, and
CDR Chad M. Larges

REGIONAL EXPERTS

REGIONAL GUIDES ACROSS STRATEGIC LANDPOWER

by

**Lieutenant Colonel Adrian T. Bogart III, Lieutenant Colonel William J. Duggan III and
Commander Chad M. Larges**

Retrospect

In all honesty, the Afghanistan - Pakistan Hands Program had glimmers of success. With hindsight being 20/20, there were certainly many administrative, logistical and employment issues which could have been done better. But in retrospect, the Afghanistan - Pakistan Hands Program achieved its overarching objective. The Hands became regional experts, were inserted inside the host nation structure and facilitated common goal achievement. The three of us know this very well. We served as Afghan Hands in the Special Operations Joint Task Force - Afghanistan and have invaluable insight on the potential of the program.

Understand

There is a great deal of senior leader guidance stating the importance of the Afghanistan - Pakistan Hands (APH) Program. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mullen instructed in CJCSI 1630.01, dated 3 September 2010 that "Each Service will closely manage APH participation and professional; development, and take appropriate actions to prevent the APH from being disadvantaged for serving outside of its common Service career paths." Recently, on 5 December 2011, current Chairman General Dempsey implored the Service Chiefs to expand the Hands program to the Pacific. General Dempsey seeks to "build regionally attuned command-line officers" that future commanders of our force may possess "regional understanding to execute their missions" and "arm our operators at all levels with deep personal and professional regional expertise."

*Capabilities Gap - Army and Joint Forces in support of Building Partnership WfF , do not have a dedicated trained, organized and equipped capability to engage directly with Host Nation officials and the population for coordination and deconfliction of security cooperation or combined operations. **Insufficient.***

Yet with senior military leader direction, the program has not gained traction. According to Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Hands have not done well in promotion, command assignment or education. Recently, out of the 45 Army Hands considered for Battalion Command, one was selected. No Army Hands were selected for Senior Service College out of 53 considered, and none promoted to Colonel out of the eligible 6 Hands.

The root cause is definable, Hands lacked command oversight and a command lead advocate. A dedicated commander has not been appointed to ensure; quality, career mentorship, good order and disciplined and that Hands and their families are taken care of. To realize senior leader guidance and more importantly solve a looming problem for regional engagement, we recommend *Joint and Service staffs manage the programming, planning and budget system responsibilities for regional engagement with a command established to train, organize, equip and employ teams of Regional Experts delivering a superior capability to Combatant Commands (CCMD) for regional engagement and global responsiveness.*

Visualize

The 1st Battalion is deploying to conduct a Security Force Assistance mission in Host Nation Y. For the past three months, a team of Guides has been under the operational control of the Battalion conducting unit language, culture and regional training. The Guides team has been advising Battalion leaders with program of instruction development, rehearsals and deployment preparation. A Guide has been assigned to the Division G-3 tackling the regional issues for all of the Division's RAF missions. Forward in Host Nation Y is another Guides team working with the partner unit coordinating the instruction, communicating the operational environment, coordinating RSOI and ensuring Host nation and U.S. Country team expectations are managed. The unit closes, bone fides exchanged and mission employment commences. Without this detailed level of coordination concluded and trust established, the 1st Battalion employs unguided.

Describe

There are approximately 600 or so Afghanistan - Pakistan Hands assembled into three Cohorts. This number of course is going to vary as officers, government civilians and non-commissioned officers come in and out of the program. But across the Services there exists a cadre with regional training, in-depth operational expertise, a demonstrated propensity to learn language and culture, able to work in complex ambiguous civil-military environments. They have great potential and solve a bigger problem.

We believe that the APH program has a continued and larger application worldwide and especially for engagement. The original APH Program was established to create greater continuity, focus, and persistent engagement on Afghanistan and Pakistan. As the International Security Assistance Force mission completes and a greater demand to have regional experts in other areas exists, the APH program can be deliberately tailored to meet Strategic Landpower requirements and fill operational shortfalls in key regions across the world. Here's how.

The first part of our proposal moves beyond Afghanistan/Pakistan Hands and the Asia -Pacific expansion to African, Latin American and Middle-East Hands. We suggest reorienting the Hands to regional experts who guide employing U.S. forces to meet theatre security cooperation, humanitarian assistance, combat operations and regional engagement. Guides are forward networkers interfacing directly with the Host Nation and the U.S. Country Team. They are professional guides within the forward joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multi-national environment. Guides facilitate maneuvering strategically through regional engagement, relationship building and partnership. Guides use their networks and influence to support expeditionary maneuver as an interlocker between partners to enable unity of combined effort.

The second is to optimize management of Guides through an Executive Agent who manages the Title X functions for the Guides program on behalf of the other Services. For example, instead of four entities purchasing force protection equipment, coordinating training - working the mechanics, the Executive is responsible. Just makes good business sense after all.

In close order to executive agency is the third part of our proposal to establish command oversight over the Guides. A single command is desperately needed centralizing the training, organization, equipping, caring, deploying and redeploying Guides. The command serves as the single authority to enhance Guides' survivability, combat effectiveness, language proficiency and regional expertise. The command readies Guides teams for deployment, monitors the unit during deployment, and then receives the Guides upon redeployment. A single command gains standardization and interoperability, manages the life cycle of the Guide and all the details therein. In establishing this command, we seek to use APH authorizations for a streamlined headquarters, the three operational formations and subordinate regional teams. We also will review individual language skills or conduct further training to realign Guides to new regional assignments.

To ensure flexibility, Guides are employed as teams or staff officers. When deployed as an individual, the Guide is assigned or attached to the gaining command. When deploying as a team, they will fall under the operational control of the gaining command as a unit attachment.

We see the command being populated by the current 3 cohorts of approximately 200 APH each. The *new* 600 Regional Guides formation continues to come from all four services, as well as the Civilian Expeditionary Workforce. As the command reaches a full operational capability, U.S. Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, Allied and Coalition nations are invited to join. Will a central command solve all the problems with the Hands program and be able to surmount future issues? Yes, our collective experience attests to this.

The fourth part of our proposal is to reorient the program to meet current capabilities gap for servicing CCMD requirements for civil and military expertise to directly engage Host Nation officials to facilitate operations in the Host Nation/Region. We see the Guide serving as the essential linkage between U.S. forces, U.S. Country Team and the Host Nation leveraging the security, governance and development network to achieve the designated end-state for operations in the region or area of operation.

Finally, we propose a rotational balancing for the Regional Guides. After looking at several options, we see one Guides team forward, one back as optimal. Specifically, one Regional Guide team would be forward deployed on mission with the other at the mission hub preparing to redeploy or with the supported deploying unit. The two Guide teams serve the same area becoming interchangeable. They pursue a rotational scheme consisting of an initial 5 months of pre-deployment combat skills, culture, language and mission-specific training. A 6 to 9 month in-theater deployment, one month overlap followed by an approximately 12 months back at the command is optimal.

In order to maintain a constant fill for both the deployed, home station requirements and to allow for an adequate turnover period, three cohorts are required. Command, senior-service college or resident professional military education is tailored to the individual, as the command manages its Regional Guides talent. Civilian Guides complete an initial 10 month deployment, followed by 12 months back at their parent agency, then an additional round of language and combat skills training prior to a second 9 month deployment.

As an option to this effort, the Human Terrain System can be placed under the command. By doing so, Guides gain social scientists for a research, analysis and situational understanding. Guides and social scientist have the ability to assimilate into the host nation structure and culture and leverage their civil and military network on behalf of the deployed force. Officers, non-commissioned officers and specialists coupled with social scientists build trust, confidence and loyalty at levels, inside-out, outside-in, optimizing engagement and partnership. The potential of this construct is very positive.

Conclusion

A revamped program is warranted. Regional aligned operational demands justify fielding a cadre of military and civilian experts, who speak the local language, are culturally attuned, and focused on tactical issues for an extended duration. They know the culture, are immersed in it, have built their networks and can navigate the nuisances of the societal fabric, at all levels. Guides give traction to the application of Strategic Landpower. Guides are a corps for engagement.

Unless some reversal of our course comes, by December 2014, the long war ends, yet this is not an end to conflict and war. What we learned in Afghanistan, as well as in Iraq, must not be lost.

Understanding and operating within the operational environment is a lesson not discarded. It is not just about conversing in another language or being respectful to another culture. It is about working inside - out, bottom-up to top-down, to obtain common outcomes. What we learned from Afghanistan - Pakistan Hands can springboard to a better product, a readily advanced engagement capability for other regions of the world where U.S. forces are now, or will be.

Your Authors

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Lieutenant Colonel William J. Duggan III was commissioned in May 1994 at Canisius College with a BA in History. He received his Master of Arts in National Security Studies from the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA. He is a Middle East Foreign Area Officer, who in 2012-2013 served as the Village Stability Coordination Center Chief for Task Force Balkh then Sub-National Governance Director at the Special Operations National Civil-Military Operations Center. LTC Duggan is currently serving as an Assistant Army Attaché at US Embassy Baghdad. LTC Duggan speaks Arabic and Dari. He has served in a variety of positions in Infantry and Armor units as well as a Political-Military planner at U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill AFB, FL.

CDR Chad Larges is a Naval Flight Officer who just completed a 51-month tour in the AFPAK Hands Program. He was recruited into the original cohort of AFPAK Hands in October, 2009, following his action officer tour on the Joint Staff. During his first deployment in 2010, he was the IJC advisor to the Afghan Chief of Plans at the Ministry of Interior, helping develop Afghan National Police planning and readiness competencies. During his second deployment in 2013, he served as the Director of the National Civil Military Operations Center for the Special Operations Joint Task Force in Afghanistan, where he coordinated the command's governance and development lines of operation. In between his two deployments, he earned his degree in National Security Strategy from the National War College, as part of the Afghanistan/Pakistan Fellowship.