



# **TRADOC Generating Force Study**

**Innovation and Adaptation in  
Support to Operations**

**17 May 2010**

(This page intentionally left blank.)

## Foreword

### From the Director U.S. Army Capabilities Integration Center

The generating force consists of a wide array of Army organizations whose primary mission is to generate and sustain the operational Army's capabilities for employment by joint force commanders. However, extended operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other parts of the globe since 2001 have led to a significant and growing reliance on the generating force to support directly operations, either through reachback or by deploying generating force assets into theaters of operations. This is because generating force organizations have inherent capabilities based on performing their primary missions that are also operationally useful, particularly during our current conflicts, which are based on full-spectrum operations that rely heavily on such unique capabilities. This trend is expected to continue. The fundamental issue is how should the Army better leverage generating force capabilities in support of operations without interfering with the conduct of generating force primary missions.

Only in the last 2 years has the Army formally articulated the realities of this increased reliance by the operating force on the generating force, with the publication of Field Manual 1-01, *Generating Force Support to Operations*. This doctrinal publication presents a comprehensive overview of how the generating force has responded to the current needs of the operating force. The purpose of TRADOC Pam 525-8-1 is to follow up with an expanded view that-


- Takes the next step in reviewing generating force support, including the latest ongoing efforts.
- Examines desired ways and means to expand, improve, or develop new capabilities, organizational efficiencies, and improved processes that will enable more effective employment of generating force capabilities in support of future joint operations.
- Presents meaningful observations and implications based on this research.
- Makes recommendations on initiatives and areas of further study to improve the effectiveness of generating force support.

Despite 8 years of evolving support to operations by generating force assets, research has shown that responses to validated or perceived requirements by the operating force were generally reactive as opposed to anticipatory, ad hoc in nature, and often slower than desired. Generating force organizations have demonstrated innovation, adaptability, and a willingness to reprogram internally in order to provide the best support, but have often done so in spite of – or because of – shortfalls in Army, Department of Defense, and congressionally mandated policies and processes that do not foster needed flexibility in quickly resourcing manpower and funding. The Army's challenge is in determining how to address realistically such concerns.

This study focused specifically on generating force support to operations and not on the conduct of their primary missions, although the two areas are inextricably linked. In addition, the line between the generating force and operating force is not a fixed one, as the Army adapts organizations to the evolving demands of today's operations. To better utilize generating force

capabilities, these realities must be addressed. Other challenges include that no single approach can be applied to the wide diversity of generating force organizations; that joint and Army generating forces increasingly overlap; and that generating force support will be expected to enable full-spectrum operations from crisis response and expeditionary efforts to enduring operations and support to civil authorities.

This study provides a framework to move forward, both in the near term and for the future of 2016-2028, to develop more flexible, anticipatory, and institutionally enabled ways and means to ensure more effective generating force support, without damaging the primary missions of these assets. It will also help leaders, planners, and Soldiers to better understand the opportunities and challenges presented by generating force support. It is appropriate that this study is subtitled "Innovation and Adaptation in Support to Operations," as generating force organizations have shown the greatest initiative in providing such support to operating forces in peace and war.

  
MICHAEL A. VANE  
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army  
Director, Army Capabilities  
Integration Center

## Executive Summary

The generating force (GF) consists of a wide array of Army organizations whose primary mission is to generate and sustain the operational Army's capabilities for employment by joint force commanders. Because of capabilities inherent in performing this primary mission, GF organizations also possess operationally useful capabilities for employment by or in direct support of joint force commanders, either through reachback or by deploying GF assets into theaters of operations. The demands of Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom (OIF) led to a major change in the way the Army now leverages the abilities of GF organizations to support operations, resulting in a significant increase in requirements both in capabilities and capacities. This expanded reliance on GF support has established an expectation for such support in future operations.

This expanded support to operations by GF organizations evolved over time through a variety of processes, many of them informal and stovepiped. Because there is no homogeneous entity called the "generating force," oversight of this increasing support by a widely diverse array of organizations has been a challenge. Only in April 2008, with the publication of Field Manual (FM) 1-01, *Generating Force Support to Operations*, did the Army for the first time aggregate the broad range of ongoing support by GF assets. FM 1-01 delineated three capability areas where the GF provides support to operations:

- Adapting to the operational environment.
- Enabling strategic reach.
- Developing multinational partner capability and capacity.

FM 1-01 remains the single major comprehensive resource for the operational Army to understand how the GF has responded to the current needs of the operating force, but the FM is not meant to determine the way ahead. The purpose of this GF study is to take the next step in reviewing GF support, including the latest ongoing efforts; examine desired ways and means to expand, improve, or develop new capabilities, organizational efficiencies, and improved processes that will enable more effective employment of GF capabilities in support of future joint operations; present meaningful observations and implications based on this research; and make recommendations on initiatives and areas of further study to improve the effectiveness of GF support.

What this study does *not* do is to review or assess the primary mission sets of the various GF organizations. This study strictly focuses on GF support to operations, but it is mindful that such support has normally been at the expense of the ability of the GF to carry out these primary missions. Balancing these demands and prioritizing resources is a fundamental issue for GF organizations. Despite this, the inherent capabilities that are derived from primary mission support will necessarily be drawn from in the future, as it will normally be difficult to replicate them in the operational Army. In some cases, in fact, the operational Army has provided assets to carry out GF tasks because of a shortfall in resources, or because of unique considerations in matching capabilities against tasks. This blurring of the lines between the GF and operational Army is another phenomenon of recent operations, and one that will continue. As the Army builds enterprises to provide seamless, global support to operations, we will continue to see

layering of GFs and operating forces under command and control constructs charged with worldwide functional integration, such as logistics, intelligence, and networked communications.

The GF study researched seven themes:

- Improving the expeditionary quality of the GF.
- GF reachback support to operations.
- GF roles in building partner capacity in support of operations.
- GF support to improvements in strategic responsiveness of operating forces.
- Accelerated materiel development and equipping the force.
- Incorporating GF capabilities into the joint global force management process.
- Mitigating strategies to reduce the impact on GF primary missions.

The study methodology comprised four main lines of effort. The start point and foundation for the GF study was FM 1-01. With the complexity and diversity of the GF, the study relied upon close collaboration with subject matter experts from each of the GF organizations making significant contributions to ongoing operational requirements, with an integrated concept team as the framework for teamwork. A comprehensive research effort focused on three perspectives: relevant historical experience; the recent operational experience of GF elements in support of OEF and OIF; and in-depth investigation into the innovation introduced within specific GF organizations to respond to operational requirements. Finally, the study effort employed the Unified Quest 2009 series of seminars as a means of collaboration and concentrated examination of specific study issues and themes.

Despite 8 years of evolving support to operations by GF assets, research has shown that responses to validated or perceived requirements by the operating force were generally reactive as opposed to anticipatory, ad hoc in nature, and sometimes slower than desired. GF organizations have demonstrated innovation, adaptability, and a willingness to reprogram internally in order to provide the best support, but have often done so in spite of – or because of – shortfalls in Army, Department of Defense (DOD), and congressionally-mandated policies and processes that do not foster needed flexibility in quickly resourcing manpower and funding. The Army's challenge is in determining how to address realistically such concerns. Highlights of the observations and conclusions made by this study include the following.

- Capacity shortfalls within GF organizations to accomplish their mandated primary missions *and* to support operating forces represent the main challenge to expanding and improving GF support to operations. Most often, critical capabilities for both mission sets must come from the same source of personnel and resources.
- Capacity shortfalls within the GF will likely be exacerbated in the future by the diminishing volume of supplemental funding as deployed forces are drawn down, as well as by the current Grow the Army strategy, which projects reductions in the size of the GF.
- Because of the absence of a surge capacity in GF organizations, ad hoc measures that were based largely on redirecting resources from primary missions characterized the great majority of GF initiatives to adapt to requirements to support operations. Reliance on ad hoc solutions was the default approach due to the lack of anticipation that exists within the overall Army regarding requirements for GF support.

- Decisions and effective action to institutionalize change to GF organizations in order to place them on a firm, sustainable foundation to support recurring requirements for support to operations almost always require an inordinate period of time, owing to the requirement to establish force design updates (FDU), manpower authorizations, and funding lines. This is a prime example of fundamental policy issues that must be reexamined.
- The long-term existence of expeditionary capability created in the GF to meet operational requirements remains in question, especially once the pressures of OEF and OIF diminish. This suggests the need for an approach that is scalable, permitting the maintenance at least of skeletal or cadre-like organizations, on-the-shelf organizational documents, and standing contract mechanisms that can be quickly activated or expanded as needs increase.
- The commitment of GF capabilities to support operating forces suffers from a lack of visibility, with concomitant negative impacts on resourcing and management of the requirements.
- Committing operating forces to execute GF tasks, notably in the conduct of training, will remain an unavoidable response to GF capacity constraints.
- The Army's ability to employ contractors, notably through supplemental funding, to accomplish GF activities in theater continues to be an indispensable component of operational success. It is the most flexible means to support rapid response, adaptation, and termination in theater, and to maintain the viability of GF organizations at home station to perform primary missions.
- The Army has not been able to exploit fully its large contingent of general service civilians effectively in expeditionary operations. Current initiatives to establish a civilian expeditionary workforce are moving slowly.
- Interoperability and support requirements must be captured for deployed GF assets.
- The Army's current approach to building partner capacity and security force assistance is incomplete and does not account for all the variations of GF support that will be required in these areas in the future.
- There is a critical need to institutionalize fully processes for accelerated capability development and equipping.

Because GF organizations differ significantly from each other in mission, design, and oversight, single solutions cannot be applied to them in a wholesale fashion. Initiatives must be deliberate and measured, focused on specific components of the GF, and balance risk to GF primary missions and resource demands against operational utility. With these caveats in mind, the following recommendations are presented, in no order of priority.

- The Army and DOD should evolve the integrating authority and processes to improve visibility, oversight, management, and tasking of GF capabilities, including incorporation of GF capabilities in the global force management process.
- Assess a tiered approach to generating responsive capabilities, with a balance between standing assets institutionalized by approved tables of distribution and allowances (TDA) and by ad hoc measures.
- Improve the expeditionary quality of GF assets, including a surge capacity for support to no-notice and short-notice contingency operations, development of a civilian expeditionary workforce, and the ability to provide tailored exportable assets.

- Better enable the capacity to provide reachback support to operations, including resourced operations centers fully enabled by the global network.
- Better leverage GF capabilities for support to building capability and capacity in partner nations, with a focus on reconstruction and security force assistance.
- Institutionalize the capability for accelerated materiel development and equipping in response to urgent operational needs.
- Identify options to mitigate the negative effects of diverting capabilities normally committed to GF primary mission performance, as well as developing metrics to determine readiness of GF organizations.

In addition, possible means to enhance the ability of GF organizations to support operations are presented, organized under seven the themes used in this study. Due to the critical link between GF primary missions and support to operations, a TRADOC concept for GF support to operations is not recommended at this time. Because Headquarters (HQ), Department of the Army (DA) is the HQ that oversees the GF, an alternate could be an Army-level strategy. Recommendations for further investigation are below and not in any order of priority.

- Explore expanding the capability within the reserve components (RC) to function as an "operational reserve" to GF organizations, to include the idea of deliberately building more GF capability into the RCs in order to respond directly to requests for GF capability or expanded capacity to support operating forces. The overarching goal would be to achieve the optimum balance between the active Army and RC in this regard.
- Examine solutions to the command, control, and support challenges that occasionally complicate the effectiveness of the employment of GF elements deployed in support of operating forces.
- Assess the utility of incorporating a more deliberate regional orientation within GF organizations beyond what already exists with respect to theater committed forces under GF parent commands.
- Analysis of the long-term effect on GF organizations in meeting the surge of requirements for support to ongoing operations.
- Examine capacity shortfalls that may arise within the GF with the current "Grow the Army" strategy, which projects the reduction in size of the GF, this despite the expectation for continued or even expanded support to operations by the GF, and at the same time that primary mission capacity must increase to meet the needs of a larger Army. This includes consideration of expected long-term, uninterrupted demands for stability operations, and the impact of diminished supplemental funding that has sourced expanded contractor support to the GF.
- Assess in greater detail how GF organizations in all components of the Army support homeland defense and provide direct support to civil authorities, as well as future opportunities and challenges for such support.
- Explore how the Army can better leverage joint GF capabilities that reside outside of the service.
- Determine specific emerging GF capabilities that may be required for future operational requirements for 2016 and beyond.

Additional applications of GF study results are: (1) inform the proponent for FM 1-01 on the latest initiatives for GF support to operations; (2) provide a perspective to the HQDA Enterprise Task Force on this aspect of GF organizations; (3) support the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) leads for the warfighting functions in the conduct of their capabilities-based assessments (CBA); and (4) support TRADOC in determining required capabilities for the capabilities needs analysis (CNA) process for FY2014-19 and beyond.

(This page intentionally left blank.)

Department of the Army  
Headquarters, United States Army  
Training and Doctrine Command  
Fort Monroe, VA 23651-1047

\*TRADOC Pam 525-8-1

17 May 2010


**Military Operations**  
**TRADOC GENERATING FORCE STUDY**

---

FOR THE COMMANDER:

OFFICIAL:

JOHN E. STERLING, JR.  
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army  
Deputy Commanding General/  
Chief of Staff



LUCIOUS B. MORTON  
Colonel, GS  
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-6

**History.** TRADOC Pam 525-8-1 is the result of a Commanding General (CG) TRADOC, directive to develop a generating force (GF) concept that moved beyond Field Manual 1-01, *Generating Force Support to Operations*, and to examine how the GF might transform itself further to expand its capability to support future operations in the 2020-2030 timeframe. The study will serve as an underpinning for other documents within the Army Concept Framework.

**Summary.** TRADOC Pam 525-8-1 addresses the next step in reviewing GF support, including the latest ongoing efforts. It examines desired ways and means to expand, improve, or develop new capabilities, organizational efficiencies, and improved processes that will enable more effective employment of GF capabilities in support of future joint operations. The study presents meaningful observations and implications based on this research; and makes recommendations on initiatives and areas of further study to improve the effectiveness of GF support. This study does not review or assess the primary mission sets of the various GF organizations. This study strictly focuses on GF support to operations, but it is mindful that such support has normally been at the expense of the ability of the GF to carry out these primary missions.

**Applicability.** This study is part of future force development and subsequent developments of supporting concepts, concept capability plans, and the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) process. It supports experimentation described in the Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) Campaign Plan and functions as a basis for developing

solutions related to the future force within the doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) domains. This concept applies to all TRADOC, DA, and Army Reserve component activities that develop DOTMLPF requirements.

**Proponent and supplementation authority.** The proponent of this pamphlet is the TRADOC Headquarters, Director, ARCIC. The proponent has the authority to approve exceptions or waivers to this pamphlet that are consistent with controlling law and regulations. Do not supplement this pamphlet without prior approval from Director, TRADOC ARCIC (ATFC-ED), 33 Ingalls Road, Fort Monroe, Virginia 23651-1061.

**Suggested improvements.** Users are invited to submit comments and suggested improvements via The Army Suggestion Program online at <https://armysuggestions.army.mil> (Army Knowledge Online account required) or via DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to Director, TRADOC ARCIC (ATFC-ED), 33 Ingalls Road, Fort Monroe, Virginia 23651-1061. Suggested improvements may also be submitted using DA Form 1045 (Army Ideas for Excellence Program Proposal).

**Availability.** This regulation is available on the TRADOC homepage at <http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/regndx.htm>.

---

**Contents**

	<b>Page</b>
Foreword.....	i
Executive Summary .....	iii
Chapter 1 Introduction .....	6
1-1. Background.....	6
1-2. Purpose .....	6
1-3. Scope .....	6
1-4. Defining the GF.....	7
1-5. Operational problem statement.....	10
1-6. Methodology.....	10
1-7. Record of activities.....	10
Chapter 2 Improving the Expeditionary Quality of the Generating Force .....	12
2-1. Synopsis.....	12
2-2. Introduction .....	13
2-3. GF organizations .....	14
2-4. Expeditionary mindset.....	35
2-5. Lessons learned .....	35
Chapter 3 Generating Force Reachback Support to Operations .....	37
3-1. Synopsis.....	37
3-2. Introduction .....	37
3-3. GF knowledge and analysis centers .....	38
3-4. Conclusion.....	47
Chapter 4 Generating Force Roles in Building Partner Capacity in Support of Operations .....	48
4-1. Synopsis.....	48
4-2. Introduction .....	48
4-3. Reconstruction and infrastructure development.....	51
4-4. Observations, conclusions, and recommendations.....	63
Chapter 5 GF Support to Improvement in Strategic Responsiveness of the Operational Army ..	66
5-1. Synopsis.....	66
5-2. Introduction .....	66
5-3. Study constraints .....	67
5-4. Conclusion.....	71
Chapter 6 Accelerating Materiel Development and Equipping.....	72
6-1. Synopsis.....	72
6-2. Introduction .....	72
6-3. Definitions .....	72
6-4. Historical perspective .....	73
6-5. GF adaptation from 2002 to 2008 .....	75

**Contents, continued**

	<b>Page</b>
6-6. Institutionalizing rapid equipping functions within the GF .....	86
6-7. Principles and guidelines for execution.....	89
6-8. Budgeting and programming principles .....	92
6-9. Concluding caveat .....	93
6-10. Related future studies .....	93
Chapter 7 Integrating GF Capabilities within the Joint Global Force Management Process .....	93
7-1. Synopsis.....	93
7-2. Introduction .....	94
7-3. Projected benefits .....	95
7-4. The JCRM .....	96
7-5. Challenges to implementation .....	97
7-6. Conclusion.....	99
Chapter 8 Mitigating Strategies .....	99
8-1. Synopsis.....	99
8-2. Introduction .....	99
8-3. Strategies .....	99
8-4. Conclusion.....	104
Chapter 9 Observations, Conclusions, and Recommendations .....	105
9-1. Overview .....	105
9-2. Observations and conclusions .....	105
9-3. Recommendations .....	109
9-4. Suggestions for further study.....	110
Appendix A References .....	113
Appendix B Principles of Employment of GF Capabilities in Support of Operations .....	119
Appendix C Assumptions .....	121
C-1. Introduction.....	121
C-2. DOD and joint strategic level .....	121
C-3. Army Level .....	121
C-4. Generating force .....	122
Appendix D Review of Means to Enhance GF Support to Operations .....	123
D-1. Introduction .....	123
D-2. Enhancing GF support .....	123
Appendix E Glossary .....	128

**Contents, continued**

	<b>Page</b>
<b>Table List</b>	
Table 3-1. Category 1: Adapting to the operational environment (OE) .....	45
Table 3-2. Category 2: Enabling strategic reach.....	46
Table 3-3. Category 3: Developing multinational partner capability and capacity .....	47
 <b>Figure List</b>	
Figure 2-2. Agribusiness development team conducting an assessment at a produce market in Afghanistan (October 2009) .....	33
Figure 4-1. Core task organization for U.S. PRT in Afghanistan.....	54
Figure 6-1. The REF model (2004).....	78
Figure 6-2. REF organizational chart with command relations (2004) .....	78
Figure 6-3. JIEDDO organization (2008) .....	79
 Endnotes.....	 134

## **Chapter 1 Introduction**

### **1-1. Background**

a. One of the distinctive features of the first 5 years of Army operations in OEF and OIF was the increasing employment of GF capabilities in direct support of operations. The operational significance of this support, as well as the realization that the lines that traditionally separated activities of the GF from those of operating forces were blurring together, informed a 2007 decision by the CG, TRADOC, to originate capstone doctrine to address GF support to operations. As this effort culminated in early 2008 in the form of Army FM 1-01, *Generating Force Support to Operations*, the CG approved a program directive on 29 January 2008, that instructed Director, ARCIC to develop a GF concept that moved beyond FM 1-01 to examine how the GF might transform further to improve and expand capability to support future operations in the 2020-2030 timeframe.<sup>1</sup>

b. The ARCIC Director assigned responsibility for the project to the Joint and Army Concepts Division (JACD). JACD rapidly initiated collaboration with representatives of GF organizations in order to clarify the scope of the project and shape the effort. Subsequently, however, the decision to develop a concept was reconsidered on the grounds of uncertain need. Instead, the ARCIC Director redirected JACD to conduct a GF study as a means of determining whether or not substantive grounds exist to write a formal concept.

### **1-2. Purpose**

TRADOC Pam 525-8-1 examines the ways and means of developing new capabilities, organizational efficiencies, and improved processes that will enable more effective employment of GF capabilities in support of future joint operations.<sup>2</sup>

### **1-3. Scope**

a. GF functions and capabilities extend across an extraordinarily broad range. They encompass all of the DOTMLPF domains and are applicable to the entire range of military operations and all phases of joint campaigns. Thus, establishing the appropriate scope for this concept was a fundamental start-point for an effective, manageable effort. From the beginning of collaboration with the community of GF experts, it became clear that many GF representatives preferred a scope that would encompass primary missions as well as support to operations.

b. The primary driver of this perspective was a widely shared concern that the commitment of GF capabilities in support of operations had introduced demands on their organizations that directly competed with, and possibly interfered with, the conduct of their primary GF missions due to resulting capacity shortfalls. Concentrating only on GF support to operations might divert attention away from the primary missions of GF organizations, the basis for the establishment of these organizations in the first place. Ultimately ARCIC concluded that such a scope was far too broad, would require a large effort and a great deal of time, and deviated too far from the intent expressed in the program directive. Thus, in April 2008, the concept scope (and subsequently the study) approved at TRADOC excluded consideration of GF primary missions and directed

that the project "... focus on those components of the GF that have the greatest potential to enable more effective land force contributions in support to joint operations."

#### **1-4. Defining the GF**

a. The GF consists of Army organizations whose primary mission is to generate and sustain the operational Army's capabilities for employment by joint force commanders. GF organizations perform functions which are defined or implied by law (most notably, Title 10) and addressed in Army regulations and DA pamphlets.<sup>3</sup> Because of its performance of functions specified and implied by law, the GF also possesses operationally useful capabilities for employment by or in direct support of joint force commanders.<sup>4</sup>

b. HQDA categorizes organizations as part of the GF based on this basic definition, but it has already been noted that the line between the GF and operational Army continues to blur. Thus HQDA does reassess how it categorizes organizations in terms of formal oversight, and will realign an organization between the GF and the operational Army when deemed appropriate. At the start of the GF Study, the GF included the following organizations:

(1) HQDA.

(2) Three Army commands (ACOM): TRADOC, U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), and U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC).

(3) Eleven direct reporting units (DRU):

(a) HQ, U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC).

(b) U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE).

(c) U.S. Army Installation Management Command (IMCOM).

(d) U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM).

(e) U.S. Army Medical Command (MEDCOM).

(f) U.S. Army Network Enterprise Technology Command/9<sup>th</sup> Signal Command (Army) (Network Enterprise Technology Command (NETCOM)/9<sup>th</sup> Signal Command (Army) (SC(A))).

(g) U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC).

(h) U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (CIDC).

(i) Military District of Washington (MDW).<sup>5</sup>

(j) United States Military Academy (USMA).

(k) U.S. Army Acquisition Support Center (USAASC).

(4) Non-ACOM and non-DRU: HQ, Army National Guard (ARNG).

c. Field operating agencies (FOA) such as the Center for Army Analysis and the U.S. Army Force Management Support Activity also fall within the GF. In addition, HQDA force management rules include Army service component commands (ASCC) as GF organizations, but ASCCs do not comprise part of this study because they are theater-committed organizations whose primary missions encompass support to operations. As of 5 May 2009, GF personnel numbered 95,373 Soldiers and 235,161 civilians, excluding contractors.<sup>6</sup>

d. The increasing complexity in differentiating GF and operating force organizations is highlighted with the HQDA effort to formally categorize Army forces.<sup>7</sup>

(1) While the terms institutional Army and operational Army continue to be used, HQDA identifies assets as GF or operating force, with a range of subcategories for each. Operating forces are also grouped under the Army global force pool construct to enable Army force generation (ARFORGEN) to integrate into the global force management process. FM 1-01's definition of "generating force" is applied in identifying GF organizations. The possible overlap of the two categories comes with the desire to explicitly identify as "available as required" those Army capabilities and forces within the GF that are not intended to deploy or rotate through the ARFORGEN cycle. These forces can be made available to deploy as needed (but these cannot be committed without HQDA approval, underscoring that HQDA remains the overseer and integrator of GF support to operations). In this way, some aspects of the GF can be linked to the global force management process.

(2) GF assets are further identified as generating force, theater committed (GFTC), which are organizations whose sole purpose is to sustain an ACOM, ASCC, or DRU by continuing to support operational capabilities. They are also identified as, generating force, globally available (GFGA), which serves the role of available as required; and generating force, strategic asset (GFSA), which are Army capabilities and forces that do not deploy, but do, however, provide support with reachback capability. The operating force categories are more complicated, and include operating force, theater committed (OFTC), which are authorized primarily to meet enduring theater requirements. The operating force, globally available (OFGA), established for the primary purpose of fulfilling global operational requirements; and operational force, globally available low density (OFGL) rotational assets that exist in quantities that preclude them from being rotated at rates prescribed in the steady state rotational policy. Note that the parent ACOM, ASCC, or DRU retains administrative control of these forces, and is responsible for unit readiness. Such categorization has implications on asset visibility, readiness reporting, application of the ARFORGEN process, and resourcing.

(3) The total Army analysis (TAA) process had already been expanded to include both modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) and (TDA organizations (including augmentation TDAs), and in fiscal year (FY) 2010 is transitioning from a focus on MTOE and TDA categories to a focus on operating force and GF categories. Ultimately, resourcing issues

for the GF, especially in organizational designs and personnel authorizations, must be resolved through the TAA process.

(4) As noted earlier, forces can be recategorized by HQDA through reassessments based on application of these definitions and the evolution of force designs and missions.

(5) Finally, the complexities of chains of command applied to GF organizations must be acknowledged. Administrative control and operational control of assets may often involve different chains of command, particularly for GF assets aligned with ASCCs or are deployed. In reality, policy, doctrine, and actual practice do not always match, and each GF organization must operate under unique alignments.

e. Three observations from the description of the GF are particularly noteworthy. First, the use of the term "generating force" is inherently misleading because it tends to create the image of a homogenous organization when, in fact, the opposite is true. The diversity within the GF is one of its most striking features. Unlike operating forces, every GF organization varies significantly from others in size and structure and performs unique, complex functions across a broad expanse of activities not duplicated elsewhere (with minor exceptions). As a result of this diversity, the GF is generally not subject to "one size fits all" kinds of change, except at the highest level, where common policy and procedures govern all Army organizations. Initiatives introduced in one GF organization to generate effective change, therefore, may not be meaningful for other GF elements.

f. Second, there are few "pure" GF organizations. Most major GF parent commands include subordinate organizations that are officially categorized as operating forces by HQDA. For example, AMC, INSCOM, and NETCOM all include theater-committed brigades or theater commands that are numbered operating forces, deliberately created and resourced to actively support operations as a primary mission. This is an important distinction to keep in mind during the course of this study, although the study will demonstrate examples of how the creation of MTOE-based units under GF parent command is one means of extending GF capability and functionality in support of operations. An illustrative example, described in greater detail in [chapter 2](#), is the Expeditionary Contracting Command (ECC) under AMC. Subordinate MTOE contracting units in the ECC were established as operating force units created and resourced by the Army specifically to deploy in support of Army and joint forces. These units perform contracting missions as part of their training when not deployed, but the Army established this force structure to support deployed forces and not to perform enduring garrison contracting workload. The ARNG and the Army Reserve field similar MTOE contingency contracting force structure. Informally, this evolution of echeloned GF and operating force assets has been termed "hybrid" or "blended" organizations.<sup>8</sup>

g. Third, no single voice represents the GF. Although the Army Enterprise initiative will eventually group most GF organizations into four core enterprises,<sup>9</sup> at the present time each GF organization functions as an independent advocate for its own interests with respect to size, structure, and resourcing.

### **1-5. Operational problem statement<sup>10</sup>**

a. The study poses the following statements to describe the problem in the relevant operational context: The operational environment and challenges of the 21st century will continue to drive a high Army tempo, including an increasing demand for the commitment of GF capabilities in support of operations. However, given its primary mission to train, equip, and sustain the Army, the GF is not organized effectively to support operating forces in theater.

b. Although the GF has responded in creative ways to provide its capabilities in support of recent operations, with a few exceptions the response has been reactive (vice anticipatory), ad hoc in nature, and not as responsive as desirable. To increase operational effectiveness in future conflict, the Army needs to improve its ability to fully leverage GF capabilities in support of all phases of operations and simultaneously evolve the integrating authority and processes to improve visibility, oversight, management, and tasking of GF capabilities, including both reachback capabilities and those identified for employment in theater.

### **1-6. Methodology**

a. The study methodology comprises four main lines of effort. First, the start-point and foundation for the GF study is FM 1-01. Close examination of this manual helps to distill fundamental implications of how best to leverage the functionally discrete but organizationally integrated entities known as the operational Army and GF.

b. Next, because of the complexity and diversity of the GF, the study must rely on close collaboration with and participation from subject matter experts from each of the GF organizations that are making significant contributions to operational requirements.

c. Third, the study requires a comprehensive research effort from three perspectives: relevant historical experience; the recent operational experience of GF elements in support of OEF and OIF; and in-depth investigation into the innovations introduced within specific GF organizations to respond to operational requirements.

d. Finally, the study effort employed the Unified Quest (UQ) 2009 series of seminars as a means of collaboration and concentrated examination of specific study issues and themes.

### **1-7. Record of activities**

a. Immediately following the approval of the GF concept program directive, JACD formed an integrated concept team (ICT) of GF representatives to support concept development.<sup>11</sup> The ICT initially met and participated in a kick-off seminar in March 2008. The seminar produced a common understanding of FM 1-01 and the goal of the project, reviewed the GF capabilities available to support operations, identified important areas of investigation, and considered initial proposals with respect to the scope of the concept, principles of employment, assumptions, and possible conceptual themes. This event also reinforced the issue of capacity shortfalls as a central concern common to all GF organizations.

b. In May 2008, the study team attended the UQ 2008 capstone wargame as a means of in-depth collaboration with subject matter experts from FORSCOM, USACE, ARNG, and members of the intelligence community. The primary outcomes of this event were the development of an operational problem statement for the concept and the collection of detailed information on the organizational experiences of the organizations named above.

c. In June 2008, JACD developed, distributed, and obtained concurrence from the ICT on three important elements of the project: identification of six main themes; principles of employment; and assumptions regarding the conditions that would affect GF activities in support of operations in the future. In addition, numerous members of the ICT attended a conference hosted by ARCIC-Forward in Arlington, Virginia, on 30 June 2008, to determine if sufficient grounds existed to expand GF doctrine beyond FM 1-01. After considerable deliberation, the conferees concluded that no additional doctrine is needed because each GF organization already governs its own activities through internally developed handbooks, pamphlets, operating procedures, and regulations.

d. In July 2008, the Deputy Director, ARCIC approved the six main conceptual themes during an in-progress review. In addition, the GF concept was approved by Director, ARCIC, as one of the seven primary learning objectives for the FY09 ARCIC Campaign Plan. In the course of that process, a seventh theme was incorporated into the project.

e. In September 2008, after a brief hiatus in which the need for the GF concept was being reconsidered, the ARCIC Director approved the change in direction of the concept to a study.

f. From October 2008 through May 2009, research and collaboration continued, including participation by the study proponent and ICT members in several UQ 2009 seminars. The unity of effort seminar in November 2008 raised a potential option for increasing greater participation by government civilians in expeditionary requirements and illuminated the growing significance of military participation in building partner capacity. In March 2009, the GF seminar investigated most of the major themes in the GF Study through the simultaneous deliberations of three panels involving more than 70 people. GF representatives made numerous, valuable presentations that contributed to the study knowledge base.

g. As a result of the GF Seminar, four specific issues were identified for in-depth refinement at the April 2009 UQ Staff Exercise.

(1) GF implications regarding Army conduct of security force assistance, informally led by the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA) and co-sponsored by the Army and U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) Counterinsurgency Center.

(2) Incorporation of GF capabilities in the global force management process, led by HQDA G-3/5/7.

(3) Development of a civilian expeditionary workforce, sponsored by HQDA G-1.

(4) The Army enterprise initiative, supported by the Army enterprise task force.

h. After development at the staff exercise, the four issues above were also introduced on the agenda for consideration by the global security panel at the UQ 2009 capstone wargame event at the Center for Strategic Leadership, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, May 2009. Although the panel displayed a clear interest in these issues, it did not endorse any of them for discussion at the senior leaders' seminar that culminated the event.

i. Organization of the study. The study report is organized based on the seven main themes that have guided the research effort.

(1) [Chapter 2](#) addresses the improvement of the expeditionary quality of the GF.

(2) [Chapter 3](#) examines the capability of the GF to provide reachback support to operations.

(3) [Chapter 4](#) is concerned with GF roles in support of building capacity in partner nations, and focuses on reconstruction and security force assistance.

(4) [Chapter 5](#) concerns how GF initiatives may improve the strategic responsiveness of operating forces.

(5) [Chapter 6](#) is focused on how the GF can institutionalize capability for accelerated materiel development and equipping in response to urgent operational needs.

(6) [Chapter 7](#) addresses the important issue of incorporation of GF capabilities into the joint global force management process.

(7) [Chapter 8](#) addresses options available to GF organizations to mitigate the negative effects of diverting capabilities normally committed to primary mission performance to support of operations.

(8) [Chapter 9](#) enumerates observations, conclusions, and recommendations for action or further study.

j. The aim of this study is to provide the most current information available, but it is not realistic to apply a uniform "information cutoff date" to its many diverse entries. Since this study highlights that innovation and adaptation are hallmarks of the GF's support to operations, it recognizes that some entries could be out-of-date even by the time of publication.

---

## **Chapter 2**

### **Improving the Expeditionary Quality of the Generating Force**

#### **2-1. Synopsis**

The ways and means by which GF organizations have and are adapting to operational requirements through the expansion of their expeditionary capabilities are as diverse as the GF

itself. The organizational initiatives described in this chapter generated significant benefits on behalf of the supported commands. However, many of these initiatives likely would not have been undertaken without the availability of supplemental funding. Questions remain regarding to what degree the improvements in expeditionary quality of the GF will be institutionalized and made permanent.

## 2-2. Introduction

a. For the purposes of this chapter, the term "expeditionary quality" is used somewhat narrowly to mean the capability of GF organizations to readily (and, when necessary, rapidly) deploy and employ elements in direct support of operating forces in theaters of active operations in response to requests for forces or capabilities, or to meet other requirements for in-theater support that may emerge from either internal assessments or other sources, such as HQDA. In most cases, these expeditionary direct support elements are deployed for fixed periods of time sufficient to meet specific requirements. In some cases, the requirement is enduring, often resulting in a rotational approach, managed internally by each GF organization, to maintain the capability in-theater.<sup>12</sup>

b. The capability of operating forces to reach back to GF organizations for specific kinds of support not requiring in-theater presence could also be considered to be a component of expeditionary quality. A strong historical record exists regarding the value and utility of reachback support from the GF, but it is also true that reachback support is often best facilitated by the in-theater presence of deployed support teams or forward liaison elements from the GF organizations. Many GF organizations that deploy forces and individuals establish dedicated reachback support for them in order to maximize their efficiency and effectiveness. (This also highlights a trend with many GF parent organizations to create a seamless capability from national to tactical levels that spans from the homeland to forward-deployed assets; in some cases, parent GF HQs retain command and control of their deployed units). In many other cases, reachback support often occurs outside the visibility of a formal requirements process through direct, but often undocumented, contact between deployed operating forces and GF organizations. For these reasons, the question of reachback support is addressed below when it is a specific function of GF expeditionary elements deployed in direct support of operations, while the second form of reachback support will be examined separately in [chapter 3](#).

c. In the context of the discussion in this chapter, it is prudent to recall that many GF organizations maintain a permanent presence outside the continental U.S. (OCONUS) in support of combatant commands by virtue of their OFTC, which are normally assigned to ASCCs. They also retain operating forces that are identified by HQDA as globally available (OFGA) for deployment to meet validated requirements. The USAR and ARNG are the most conspicuous examples of these mixed organizations. Other GF organizations also have subordinate operating forces, including AMC (37 OFTC and 70 OFGA units), USACE (10 OFGA units), INSCOM (118 OFTC and 4 OFGA units), NETCOM (26 OFTC and 9 OFGA units), and CIDC (2 OFTC and 37 OFGA units).<sup>13</sup> In contrast, TRADOC has no OFTC or OFGA units, while MEDCOM only has two and one, respectively. These numbers are illustrative for FY2009, but regularly change as GF assets are altered to meet evolving requirements or are recategorized. For example, in FY2010 USACE will have assets designated as OFTC, OFGA, and OFGL.

d. GFTC forces inherently represent an expeditionary quality in the execution of their primary missions in support of ASCCs. However, because they are designated as operating forces and their support to ASCCs is defined as their primary mission, GFTC organizations generally fall outside the scope of this study. The exception to this point are those GFTC that have been specifically created during the course of recent operations to address operational needs, since they can be viewed legitimately as examples of organizational innovation that expands GF expeditionary quality.

e. Deployed OFGA units from parent GF commands, in contrast, often represent a temporary or semipermanent expeditionary response to emergent operational requirements, including an inherent reachback connection. In some cases, they also involve organizational innovation, including the deployment of new organizations created for the express purpose of addressing in-theater capability shortfalls.

f. Because of the diversity of the GF, there is no single approach to how the GF writ large has become more expeditionary in the past, nor how the GF can expand its expeditionary quality in the future. Accordingly, the remainder of this chapter focuses on a number of specific initiatives undertaken by GF organizations to expand expeditionary capability and quality in concert with the caveats stated above. Because it is neither feasible nor desirable to document every instance of such initiatives, the chapter illuminates those that are particularly noteworthy or significant. GF organizations covered below include USACE, IMCOM, AMC, MEDCOM, the Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC), and TRADOC. Each of the examples can be viewed as a specific case study that ultimately defines a collective set of experiences, from which some common elements can be derived in the conclusion in the chapter.

### **2-3. GF organizations**

a. USACE. The USACE has demonstrated a high degree of innovation, adaptability, and responsiveness in its efforts to meet the operational requirements for both OIF and OEF. Notable among these efforts are the establishment of forward engineer support teams (FEST) as resourced MTOE units vice TDA organizations, the proposed (re)establishment of the Corps of Engineers Transatlantic Division (CETAD), and the stand-up of its own deployment center to facilitate the Corps' support to operations.<sup>14</sup> These initiatives are discussed in sequence below.

(1) Field force engineering (FFE): FEST-advance and -main (FEST-A, -M).<sup>15</sup>

(a) Background. As was clearly demonstrated in both OIF and OEF, the initiation of large-scale contingency operations typically generates a large volume of requirements for engineering support that exceeds both the capacity and capability of tactical engineer units, particularly throughout the stabilization period. In fact, for long-term stability operations, non-tactical engineering requirements often build to a huge volume in support of U.S. and coalition forces and the host nation, to address such needs as:

- Construction of roads and airfields.
- Base camp design, construction, protection, and survivability.
- Base camp close-out.

- Infrastructure assessment, repair, and reconstruction (bridges, waterways, utilities, and so on).
- Force protection engineering.
- Environmental assessments and baseline surveys.
- Geospatial engineering.
- Real estate acquisition and disposal.
- Military hydrology.
- Construction contracting support.

(b) Although much of the work involved in these areas is contracted out, a comprehensive demand exists for USACE expertise for project management, oversight, planning, and assessment. USACE's FFE program, approved in May 2003 by HQDA, established an initial framework for expanding capacity to respond to theater requirements, but lack of resourcing and other obstacles continued to create significant gaps in implementation. Two years later, the Army's Task Force for Stability and Reconstruction Operations, directed by the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) to assess Armywide capability gaps in planning for and conducting stability operations, developed 25 specific initiatives. One of these initiatives called for HQDA to "Designate the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Director of Military Programs, to lead efforts to institutionalize and improve the responsiveness and readiness of civilian capabilities to mobilize in support of ASCCs." In compliance with this approved directive, USACE proposed to expand its FFE program substantially. The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (VCSA) approved the USACE proposal on 4 January 2007; since that time, USACE has ardently been pursuing both the resourcing and force design approvals necessary for it to succeed.

(c) The basic concept underpinning the FFE program was to employ deployable, modular engineering support teams in theater and dedicated planning teams stateside to enable reachback and ready access to the vast capabilities resident with USACE districts, divisions, laboratories, and centers distributed throughout the U.S. However, these new, small teams were largely unresourced and only organized on an ad hoc basis. The FFE program included the establishment of dedicated base development teams (BDT), the USACE Reachback Operations Center (UROC) in the continental U.S. (CONUS), and four forms of deployable support teams: FEST-A and FEST-M, contingency real estate support teams (CREST), and environmental support teams (EnvST). Lacking manning authorizations, all of the support teams deployed prior to 2009 were manned by civilian volunteers from various engineer district TDA units. Thus, the critical element within the expanded FFE program is the transformation of the ad hoc teams into MTOE units with organic mobility and communications capability.

(d) A major component of the expanded FFE program is the establishment of active component FEST-A and FEST-M. The FEST-A is intended to provide support at brigade and division levels. Comprised of seven officers, including an O-4 (major) commander, each possessing specific engineering specialties, and one senior noncommissioned officer (NCO) construction supervisor, the FEST-A has the capability to support operating forces and attain regional objectives in the areas of engineer planning and design, real estate acquisition and disposal, contracting, infrastructure assessments, and technical assistance. The much larger FEST-M operates at theater level in support of the ASCC or Engineer Command. FEST-M

provides command and control of all USACE support teams within the theater of operations and can provide liaison officers, as required, to subordinate commands. Commanded by an engineer O-6 (colonel), the full-up FEST-M is a flexible, self-sustaining organization with 37 personnel (25 officers and 12 enlisted), encompassing engineer specialties that cover the full range of engineering requirements within the supported command. Both types of FEST depend on supported organizations for security and life support, as do the deployable CREST and EnvST. The expanded FFE program includes:

- 2 FEST-M (37 personnel each).
- 8 FEST-A (8 personnel each).
- 8 EnvST (4 personnel each).
- 8 CREST (4 personnel each).
- 8 BDT (12 personnel each).
- 1 UROC (8 personnel).<sup>16</sup>

(e) Current status. All FEST-A and FEST-M have been formally identified as numbered Engineer Detachments. Additional full-time USACE cadre will also likely be required to train and support the expanded program and finalize design requirements. Interim funding was required in 2009 to employ the support teams. Programmed funding has been requested in program objective memorandum (POM) years 2010-15.

(2) CETAD<sup>17</sup>

(a) Background. The CETAD was originally established in 1991 to support the comprehensive reconstruction activities that emerged following the Gulf War of 1990-91. When requirements for reconstruction support declined, the original CETAD was reduced in size to a general officer-led Corps of Engineers Transatlantic Programs Center (CETAC). This was a project-funded activity that was sized to support DOD military construction requirements within the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR) (minus the Horn of Africa) and in support of CENTCOM foreign military sales (FMS) and theater security cooperation programs. However, the volume of support requirements generated during OIF and OEF exceeded the capacity of CETAC, driving the creation of two new "requirements only" organizations in 2004: the Corps of Engineers Gulf Region Division (CEGRD), consisting of three subordinate districts and the general officer-level HQ in Iraq; and the Corps of Engineers Afghanistan Engineer District (CEAED).

(b) Under this structure from 2004 to present, both the CEGRD and CEAED report to USACE HQ. Personnel fill is primarily satisfied through a USACE civilian volunteer program based on temporary duty orders from other USACE commands. Military personnel requirements are satisfied for the CEGRD through a CENTCOM joint manning document, and the CEAED by various USACE active Army and RC sources.

(c) Current challenge. After 5 years of operations, USACE has determined the need to transition from this essentially ad hoc organization to a single institutionalized command with authorizations to hire additional USACE government civilians. Major benefits in such hiring authority are simplifying management and reducing the impact on USACE commands that are

currently dealing with the absence of over 500 personnel serving in 6- to 12-month deployment rotations. USACE districts are mainly nondeployable engineer organizations that have area responsibility and are sized based upon labor funding allocated against specific projects. Although these districts can respond effectively to short-duration emergencies, such as disaster relief and recovery operations in CONUS, they do not have the capacity or organizational flexibility to surge rapidly for long-duration OCONUS contingency operations without severely degrading their ongoing military construction and civil works missions. Simultaneously, engineer organizations within operating forces do not have the capacity, capability, or structure to satisfy large-scale construction and reconstruction operations in-theater. Thus, USACE requires an expanded, institutionalized capability and adaptive organizational structure to allow formal integration of USACE capabilities into long-term stability operations, as well as to enable response to unforeseen future requirements.

(d) CETAD concept. Given the challenge and conditions described above, USACE proposed the consolidation of the three existing, but separate, USACE commands in the CENTCOM AOR (CETAC, CEGRD, and CEAED) into a single command – the CETAD. The CETAD would coordinate and synchronize nontactical engineer services within the CENTCOM AORs in support of U.S. and coalition forces and of host nations in the following areas:

- Construction contracting.
- Construction project management.
- Environmental assessments.
- Water resource initiatives.
- Real estate management.
- Base camp construction.
- Other security cooperation requirements.

(e) The CETAD must provide focused, operations-driven support in Iraq and Afghanistan and traditional enduring support to the remainder of the CENTCOM AOR. Therefore, USACE proposed that the CETAD structure include three active engineer districts, three unresourced districts, and a division forward HQ and staff augmentation team to meet unexpected surges in requirements within the Iraq and Afghanistan theaters of operations. Two active districts would be structured for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, with the third support district organized to maximize reachback support to USACE in the areas of design, general administration, and contract processing. The division forward HQ and staff augmentation team would allow the CETAD to deploy a forward command and control element when needed in order to provide oversight of two or more deployed engineer districts.

(f) Theater engineer commands (TEC). The proposed establishment of the CETAD would also take into account another enduring challenge in the CENTCOM AOR – the absence of a TEC in a theater of operations characterized by a significant level of both tactical and non-tactical (notably construction) engineering operations. Although the CEGRD de facto executes this synchronizing function, it is designed primarily to carry out contract construction, not oversee tactical engineer units, or conduct theater engineer management. Instead, engineer commands were designed to perform the latter functions, and action has been taken at HQDA to convert the engineer command to a TEC, with two deployable command posts (DCP). Thus a

possible action could have been to deploy a DCP to replace the CEGRD HQ in order to assume the TEC role for Iraq, as well as to provide oversight of the nontactical USACE missions performed by CEGRD districts.

(g) Transition plan. USACE developed a three-phased transition plan to convert the three existing, but separate, USACE commands into the CETAD-level command over several years, without negatively affecting ongoing support operations. In the first phase, the CEAED and CETAC organization would be aligned under the CETAD HQ at an initial operating capacity. The second phase would draw down the CEGRD HQ, less the program management capability. This element and the three CEGRD districts would also move under the CETAD, while an Engineer Command would deploy a general officer-led DCP to assume the TEC role in Iraq and assume tactical control of the CETAC elements, the remaining HQ element, and the three districts. In the third phase, the former CEGRD districts would reduce their assigned strength as requirements diminished and combine missions into a single enduring district, the Baghdad Engineer District. Throughout the transition and thereafter, HQ USACE would retain the documentation for the two requirements only districts as a means of rapid expansion for any future contingencies that require district-level contract support.

(3) Combining this proposed CETAD structure with the FEST capability described earlier would create an overall capability for an effective, enduring, scalable response to meet both short- and long term requirements in multiple AORs, during the course of long-duration, simultaneous campaigns, while also mitigating the risk to the performance of CONUS military construction and civil works missions. If the CETAD were not implemented, USACE would have been compelled to continue the ad hoc, reactive approach relied upon with the expansion of OIF and OEF support, retaining risk in its capability to both support current and emerging OCONUS operational requirements and the execution of primary CONUS missions.

(4) On 29 September 2009, the CETAD was activated and aligned with the CENTCOM AOR, and replaced three major USACE organizations operating within that AOR: the Gulf Region Division in Baghdad, the Afghanistan Engineer District in Kabul, and the Transatlantic Programs Center in Winchester, Virginia. TAD's mission is to provide design and construction services and related engineering services on behalf of USACE to establish conditions for regional security, stability, and prosperity. To accomplish these functions, TAD is organized into five districts: in Iraq, the Gulf Region District in Baghdad and the Gulf Region South District in Tallil; in Afghanistan, the Afghanistan Engineer District-North in Kabul and the newly formed Afghanistan Engineer District-South in Kandahar; and the Middle East District (also stationed at Winchester). While the majority of the TAD staff is based in Winchester, the forward-deployed element of the HQ is in Iraq, where the TAD commander is dual-hatted as the senior engineer on the Multinational Force–Iraq (MNF-I) staff. TAD HQ was staffed at about 30 people at activation, with the expectation to double personnel after a few months. The division is expected to manage a \$4 billion annual program of military construction and interagency and international support missions. The chief of engineers has stated that activating TAD helps to fulfill a longstanding plan to align a USACE engineer division with each of the geographic combatant commands.<sup>18</sup>

b. IMCOM – Expeditionary base operations (BASOPS) concept<sup>19</sup>

(1) The proliferation of base camps, forward operating bases, forward operating sites and locations, and other forms of fixed installations of varying size is a notable characteristic of long-term stability operations, fully borne out by the U.S. experience in OEF and OIF. This constellation of installations can be expected to continue at a significant scale for years to come in current active theaters of operations, and to expand to other parts of the globe in the projected era of persistent conflict. Despite support costs and security challenges associated with operating forward-deployed fixed sites, the requirement to enable enduring landpower presence for the foreseeable future will be met with such bases, ranging in purpose, scale, and population. Over the past 6 years, the establishment and operation of these installations have largely been handled by two primary means: comprehensive contracted support for larger installations; and, for smaller bases, ad hoc detailing of operating force elements from the parent commands in charge of those bases. In the latter case, the dedication of operating force elements to run installations has two fundamental drawbacks. First, it represents a reduction in available operating force capabilities that could be employed in accordance with their more traditional operational missions. Second, operating force elements generally lack the skills and expertise for installation management.

(2) In 2006, in response to a formal memorandum from the commanding general, FORSCOM to the CSA, IMCOM initiated examination of an expeditionary BASOPS concept for application in specific circumstances. The FORSCOM memorandum addressed the issue of management of the Soto Cano installation in the U.S. Army South (USARSO) AOR (specifically, in Honduras). Noting that BASOPS is not a core competency for USARSO, the memorandum requested IMCOM and the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management (ACSIM) to consider assuming responsibility for BASOPS at Soto Cano. On 5 July 2006, the CSA directed ACSIM to review the ability of IMCOM to provide expeditionary BASOPS support to the joint task force BASOPS at the installation. Over the following 15 months, ACSIM and IMCOM developed an approach and deployed an expeditionary BASOPS organization with initial operational capability on 1 October 2008, subsequently achieving full operational capability in April 2009.

(3) The Soto Cano initiative essentially represents a pilot program for the institutionalization of an expeditionary BASOPS capability, the need for which became more apparent in 2008 as reports of accidental deaths of service personnel by electrocution surfaced in the news media, with strong political interest that rose to the level of Congressional inquiry. As a result of this scrutiny, the Undersecretary of the Army directed an effort be undertaken to examine how the Army might form and employ an expeditionary capability to provide standardized base operations management and services worldwide, including improved oversight of contractor-operated facilities.

(4) Although not yet approved at HQDA for implementation, the expeditionary BASOPS concept was developed through a collaborative effort between IMCOM, ARNG, USARC, FORSCOM, TRADOC, U.S. Army Central (ARCENT), USARSO, and HQDA G-3/5/7. The concept begins with definitions and a deliberate approach to apply a practical scope to the overall requirement. The concept identifies two basic kinds of OCONUS installations. Enduring bases are defined as facilities, outside the U.S. and U.S. territories, with stationed operating forces and robust infrastructure and further characterized by command and control structures, permanent

support facilities, and strengthened force protection measures. Examples cited by IMCOM are Soto Cano and permanent U.S. bases located in Kuwait and Kosovo. Non-enduring bases, in contrast, are scalable locations outside the U.S. intended for rotational use by operating forces. Locations may have prepositioned equipment and modest permanent support facilities. Non-enduring bases include the capability to sustain security cooperation, training, deployment, and employment operations on short notice (for example, Camp Victory, Baghdad).

(5) The concept proposes that enduring bases adopt an IMCOM TDA per a standard garrison organization (SGO) model and under the command of an IMCOM garrison commander, with technical command and control exercised by HQ IMCOM. A site visit to Area Support Group-Kuwait and Area Support Group-Qatar completed in January 2009, affirmed that an IMCOM SGO, per the Soto Cano model, is feasible and desirable at those locations. The visit report notes four specific benefits from this approach: it separates mission and base operations support functions; it enables standardized TDA development; it enables civilian staffing based on current IMCOM garrison job descriptions; and it enables delivery of common levels of support in accordance with IMCOM guidelines.

(6) For the non-enduring bases, the concept is more complex in that it is founded on the incorporation of IMCOM TDA positions within regional support groups (RSG), which are assigned to ASCCs and operated by RC forces under the command of the RSG commander, with technical command and control of IMCOM elements exercised by HQ IMCOM. The concept further proposes a rule of allocation that would limit the application of the latter to base camps of 6,000 personnel or more.

(7) Originated in 2006, the mission of the RSG is to deploy as a command and control HQ to provide oversight of contingency and expeditionary BASOPS support, with responsibilities for managing facilities, providing administrative and logistical support of Soldier services, and ensuring the security of personnel and facilities on a base camp.<sup>20</sup> When not deployed or committed to homeland security, homeland defense, or civil support missions, the RSG provides command and control for training, readiness, and oversight of mobilization of assigned forces. Currently, an RSG is authorized 63 personnel, although a force design update being staffed would increase personnel to 84. Pending decision in Total Army Analysis 2010-15, there are 42 RSGs in the force – 17 ARNG and 25 USAR. The rule of allocation for RSGs is one per base camp without an existing base command structure and with a population of 6,000 or greater. It requires co-location with one or more operational force commands (brigade or higher) to meet its dependency requirements.

(8) As noted, the IMCOM concept proposes the augmentation of the RSG with a tailored IMCOM TDA, scaled to the requirement and based on the SGO model. The IMCOM TDA is intended to address BASOPS capability gaps within the RSG and enable reachback for technical expertise and services.

(9) Although the fit between IMCOM and the RSG appears to be both reasonable and natural, implementation of the concept in each instance will require the synchronization of training and deployment activities. IMCOM assesses that those training requirements can be planned for execution in accordance with the ARFORGEN process and would include such

activities as: RSG training partnerships with IMCOM garrison staffs; RSG staff attendance at IMCOM training courses; RSG commander attendance at pre-command courses; and employment of IMCOM mobile training teams to RSGs identified for deployment. Implementation will further require a pilot program as proof of principle and organizational adaptation at IMCOM HQ to manage this new expeditionary capability. Work continues to further refine the concept, including deliberate collaboration with the U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center (MANSCEN) base camp integrated concept development team, as force design update requests move through the force management process and resourcing requirements are prepared for POM 2012-17. IMCOM is also examining how a similar augmentation approach might be feasible with respect to emergent USAR and ARNG functional support brigades or other similar command and control HQs of comparable capability.

(10) Overall, the implementation of the expeditionary BASOPS concept is envisioned to generate the following benefits and efficiencies:

- (a) Reduced burden on operating forces for BASOPS functions.
- (b) Improved standardization of BASOPS management and services.
- (c) Expanded employment of a trained, core competencies-based workforce.
- (d) Establishment of a single coordinating agency to assure component systems interoperability.
- (e) Capability to better utilize IMCOM management skills and centers of excellence (such as the safety center).
- (f) Expanded capability for reachback for technical resources.
- (g) Reduction in the contracted workforce.

(11) Additional operational aspects of establishing nonenduring bases need to be considered. For example, expeditionary BASOPS that start with Army expeditionary theater opening capabilities as part of the theater opening mission may be integrated early on with RSG and IMCOM assets to ensure seamless BASOPS planning and execution, handoff of command and control of these facilities, and the management, storage, distribution, and movement of materiel to support BASOPS.

c. AMC. In addition to its life cycle management commands (LCMC), which provide expeditionary support to operating forces via temporary and rotational forward liaison elements and support teams, as well as through LCMC-directed depots such as Red River, Anniston, and Tobyhanna, AMC has three major subordinate commands that have adapted significantly during the course of current operations to improve and expand support to operations – the Army Sustainment Command (ASC), the SDDC, and the new Army Contracting Command (ACC).

- (1) ASC expeditionary initiatives.

(a) Established on 22 September 2006, the ASC provides sustainment-level logistics from the strategic through the operational to tactical level by synchronizing acquisition, logistics, and technology support. As described by the then AMC commanding general, "The ASC is AMC's face to the field, designed to better support the operational Army both in CONUS and forward deployed around the world. We've incorporated lessons learned from Iraq, Afghanistan, Germany, Korea, and within the U.S. to build an organization which incorporates maintenance, acquisition, research and development, contingency contracting, and materiel management ... all incorporating logistical support."<sup>21</sup> The ASC also serves as the Army's operational logistics organization responsible for integrating logistics support with joint and strategic partners, and is the linchpin that links the national sustainment base with the expeditionary Army. For the first time in one command, AMC created a direct line to the strategic capabilities of the life cycle management commands, program managers, research agencies, and manufacturers. ASC functions encompass the entire sequence of activities that characterize the operational tempo of the current force: predeployment, deployment, sustainment in theater, redeployment, and home station reset. Major service areas include: contracting services, logistics synchronization in support of ARFORGEN, Army prepositioned stocks (APS), field support, materiel management, and the logistics civil augmentation program (LOGCAP). As of March 2009, the command included 532 military, 1512 civilians, and over 10,000 contractors operating in 8 countries and 25 states.<sup>22</sup> This study highlights the command's expeditionary initiatives in two areas: field support and expeditionary contracting in support of ongoing operations.

(b) Field support. ASC field support is executed through a comprehensive network of its own operating forces organized in modular, tailorable units. These include Army field support brigades (AFSB), Army field support battalions (AFSBn), logistic support elements (LSE), battalion logistics support teams (BLST), and logistics support teams, most of which are categorized within the Army force structure as theater committed (such as the AFSBs) or globally available forces. Almost all of the logistics elements described below are numbered, MTOE-based, operating forces, that fall under a GF parent command, the ASC, itself under AMC. ASC has deliberately elected to organize them as small, modular, tailorable units, with personnel top-heavy in terms of seniority and expertise. Their organizational characteristics enable them to be deployed quickly and be combined in ways to optimize support to operations. Moreover, they inherently possess the capability to adapt organization and/or location to meet the changing requirements of deployed Army operating forces, and with proper approvals, can even be shifted from one region to another. This entire organizational scheme strongly enhances the command's expeditionary quality and provides the high degree of flexibility and agility required in the current operational environment. While all of the AFSBs are numbered, MTOE units, they have a very small MTOE structure, relying on an organic augmentation TDA. The subordinate AFSBn themselves are TDA organizations. All of these organizations are scalable.

(c) Seven deployable AFSBs provide the ASC with a single command structure in strategic locations around the world, including Iraq, Kuwait, Korea, and Europe, as well as in the U.S. at Forts Bragg, Lewis, and Hood. The AFSBs serve to integrate and synchronize acquisition, logistics, and technology support to Army forces. In combatant command (COCOM) AORs, an AFSB is the AMC regional center of gravity and the single face of AMC to the warfighter. It is responsible for integrating, balancing, and providing global reachback to the LCMCs and AMC's Research, Development and Engineering Command (RDECOM). The goal

of each AFSB is to have one AMC person in charge with one focus – effective, timely, responsive support to the tactical level. Deployed AFSBs typically are augmented with additional staff to meet expanded and/or unique operational requirements, particularly in a distributed, rapidly changing operational environment.

(d) LSE<sup>23</sup> and AFSBn are assigned to AFSBs and perform a role similar to that of the AFSB at the corps (at home station) and division level, respectively. They also provide area support to division and corps brigades. They may operate AMC forward field maintenance and repair facilities, and be augmented with additional AMC elements, such as from the Army Contracting Command or LOGCAP.<sup>24</sup> Manning for these units varies, both in number and expertise, depending on the organizations that they support.<sup>25</sup> The battalion logistics support team has four different configurations – aviation, heavy, infantry, and Stryker – that align to the deployed brigades they are normally assigned to support.

(e) All the support elements assigned to AFSBs include logistics assistance representatives (LARs), which are DA civilian representatives of the LCMCs or of ASC. The LARs are the foot Soldiers and tactical scouts for AMC, the de facto eyes and ears of the command. LARs are highly respected LCMC solution-oriented technical experts who bring unparalleled added value to their supported units as sources of information and as combat enablers in their respective areas of expertise.

(f) Each AFSB is organized with a variable mix of assigned forces, tailored to the region or the warfighting command that they support, and widely distributed within their respective region. Depending on the assigned support mission and operational area, an AFSB can include a number of AFSBns, an LSE (at the home station of a corps HQ), logistics support teams, and APS units. For example, the 401<sup>st</sup> AFSB headquartered in Kuwait oversees logistics operations in three countries – Kuwait, Qatar, and Afghanistan – and includes three AFSBns (one each in Kuwait, Qatar, and Afghanistan), four logistics support teams (two in Afghanistan), and an Army watercraft equipment site at Kuwait Naval Base. In contrast, the 402<sup>d</sup> AFSB is considerably larger and distributed at about 35 sites throughout Iraq. Note that the AFSBn-Afghanistan executes joint operational area-wide logistics operations in support of all U.S. forces in theater. The size of AFSBn-Afghanistan and the two logistics support teams in Afghanistan are also unusually large. As of March 2009, ASC had 572 forward-deployed personnel supporting operations in that country.

(g) LOGCAP (and the LOGCAP support unit at Fort Belvoir, Virginia). The LOGCAP's mission is to support global contingencies, current forces, and future force development by leveraging corporate assets to augment current and programmed combat support and combat service support force structure.<sup>26</sup> The first LOGCAP contract was awarded by CETAD in 1992 to KBR, Incorporated (formerly Kellogg, Brown & Root). This cost-plus-award-fee contract was first used in Rwanda, Somalia, and Haiti. Although LOGCAP has historically been used to provide logistical support to contingencies, it was supplemented by autonomous contingency contracting officers as early as 1995.

(h) Expeditionary contracting. AMC has also exercised significant initiative and innovation with respect to providing expeditionary contracting support to deployed operating

forces. This form of expeditionary quality is manifested in the new ACC established under ASC. The creation of the ACC encompassed lessons learned over many years, including experiences using LOGCAP to perform contracting functions in deployed theaters.

(i) The extensive contracting requirements in support of operations that quickly expanded in Iraq after the major combat operations phase, as well as in Afghanistan in conjunction with the establishment of the U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) base and support infrastructure, were largely handled by the LOGCAP. Initially established under the auspices of HQDA and USACE, LOGCAP moved under AMC in 1997 and is now in its fourth iteration (LOGCAP IV) of execution. LOGCAP has transitioned to a very broad umbrella contract mechanism – an indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity contract construct.<sup>27</sup> Because LOGCAP is now an indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity, it requires no solicitations to establish support, relying instead on the more streamlined task-order process. The fact that virtually any funded requirement can be accommodated through the contract, plus the large group of subcontractors available to augment the prime awardees, ensures a very flexible vehicle for rapid contracting response. It also facilitates logistical planning, enabling the deliberate incorporation of contractor capabilities to support contingency operations. The contract further permits the prime contractor to maintain an initial-response capability on standby, thereby mitigating the delays that are inherent to a contracting approach for which a team of contractors has to be assembled. LOGCAP is also used by joint forces, non-DOD U.S. government (USG) agencies, coalition partners, NATO members, and the United Nations (for the United Nations, LOGCAP was first used in direct support of the United Nations mission in Haiti).<sup>28</sup>

(j) Although LOGCAP is viewed overall as a global capability, the AMC LOGCAP organization has the flexibility to tailor itself to regional requirements. Its contingency mission is executed primarily through the integrated activities of the LOGCAP support unit, in collaboration with AFSBs and ACC contracting support brigades, under the direction of regional deputy directors who lead the LOGCAP-forward elements in theater. Currently, LOGCAP includes four regional deputy directors, serving in Afghanistan, Iraq, Kuwait, and Europe. The deployed LOGCAP-forward team typically includes operational planners from the LOGCAP support unit, a primary contracting officer from ACC, an administrative contracting officer from the Defense Contracting Management Agency (DCMA), and a construction engineering representative from USACE. This matrix approach meets legal and regulatory requirements while ensuring collaboration with other organizations in-theater that are involved in contracting support to operating forces.

(k) LOGCAP maintains habitual relationships with its operating force customers through an exercise program and through its planning capability. The latter is particularly important to fostering expeditionary preparedness, since it sets conditions through pre-existing plans for a rapid contracting response that has already been matched up with anticipated requirements that cannot be met by assigned forces. Such plans exist today in all five geographic combatant commands and cover a wide range of contingencies and functional areas. They include such standing requirements as the construction of extensively designed 5,000-person base camps and pre-agreed-upon contractor internal management procedures. In addition, responsibilities of the supported unit customer in using LOGCAP are clarified through these interactions and reinforced by the Team LOGCAP Forward.

(l) A rapid response requirement for LOGCAP is based on an official notice to proceed (NTP) and includes four demanding metrics for contractor response:<sup>29</sup>

- Advance team deployment by NTP + 3 days.
- Capability to receive and support up to 1,500 persons a day by NTP + 15 days.
- Capability to receive 3,000 persons a day and bed-down of 25,000 persons by NTP + 30 days.
- Capability to bed-down and support up to 50,000 persons by NTP + 180 days.

(m) The volume of work enabled through LOGCAP in Iraq and Afghanistan totaled almost \$35.5 billion between December 2002 and April 2008, involving the commitment of over 67,000 contractor personnel in support of operational requirements. Despite this huge effort, by 2006 it had become quite apparent that LOGCAP alone was insufficient to meet all the expeditionary contracting requirements emerging in current operations. In addition, increasing evidence began to mount of significant waste and fraud within the overall OCONUS contracting effort. Both corrective action and more capability were required to meet all the emerging demands while simultaneously ensuring full, effective oversight.


(n) Although these shortfalls existed across the entire joint force, the Army independently recognized them and began to take corrective action. In particular, the Army realized that it lacked the numbers and quality of contracting staff that the current operational environment requires. Thus, near simultaneously with the establishment of the ASC in 2006, HQDA issued activation orders on 28 July 2006 to establish two contingency contracting battalions and 14 contingency contracting teams (CCT) as part of ASC. The 72 Soldiers assigned to the battalions and teams at that time represented 30 percent of the Army's contingency uniformed contracting force structure.

(o) These activation orders represented only the initial increase in capability projected under a wider plan for much broader expansion. Overall, the concept for expanding contingency contracting was based on a modular construct involving four echelons of capability:

- At the lowest level, five-person CCTs of three officers and two NCOs formed to provide brigade-level contracting support. In the active Army, there is an O-4 (major) in charge, and in the RC (both ARNG and USAR), there is an O-5 (lieutenant colonel) in charge.
- Next, senior contingency contracting teams (SCCT), also five-person teams, were envisioned as aligning with operating forces at the corps or division level. In the active Army, there is an O-4 in charge, and in the RC, there is an O-5 in charge.
- The 13-person contingency contracting battalions (CCBn) also aligned at the corps level, with the mission to provide planning support, C2, and management of a variable number of CCTs and SCCTs to the corps. A recent FDU adds 5 enlisted Soldiers to the CCBn, increasing the total number of personnel from 8 to 13 per CCBn.
- At the top of the hierarchy, the contracting support brigade (CSB) was established to align alongside the ASC's AFSB at the ASCC echelon, again to provide C2 and management of all of the ASC contracting elements in theater, and to provide planning support to the ASCC. The CSB is a 24-person multicomponent (COMPO) organization

(active Army and USAR only), comprised of 10 commissioned officers, 1 warrant officer, and 13 enlisted Soldiers. The by-component breakdown is: 10/1/13 = (active Army 9/1/12) + (USAR 1/0/1). The next FDU will add one warrant officer and four enlisted Soldiers.

(p) The overall plan envisioned an expansion over time in concert with Total Army Analysis 2008-15, to include USAR and ARNG organizations, as depicted in figure 2-1. (As will be seen in the next section, the Army has now fully separated out contracting assets from the ASC in order to establish a separate Army Contracting Command [ACC] directly under AMC. The entire structure shown in this figure is now realigned under the ACC.)



**Figure 2-1. Future contingency contracting structure<sup>30</sup>**

(q) As of early 2008, four CSBs were established under ASC as numbered, MTOE operating force units, each oriented regionally in accordance with the original intent that units align with the ASC's existing AFSBs located around the world.<sup>31</sup> Each CSB is commanded by a colonel, dual-hatted as the principal assistant responsible for contracting for one of four Army contracting agency operations outside of the U.S., which include Europe, Korea, Southwest Asia, and the Americas.<sup>32</sup> The CSB commander is responsible for executing the Army's contracting mission to support local installations, CONUS commands and subordinate commands, and Army service component commands. When deployed, the CSB commander commands all of the

deployed contingency contracting teams and battalions in a theater, in concert with the AFSB, to ensure seamless contracting support to the combatant commander.<sup>33</sup>

(r) The efforts within AMC to grow contracting capability and stand up the MTOE organizations described above demonstrated significant initiative by a major GF organization to address seriously under-resourced, in-theater requirements.<sup>34</sup> Under normal circumstances, creating the new array of contracting teams and management structures would have taken 3 to 4 years. However, new circumstances soon intervened to expand the scope of the program and the oversight structure intended to direct its activities. In 2007, the Secretary of Defense commissioned the former Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)), to lead a panel charged with reviewing Army expeditionary contracting. Based on extensive research and more than 100 interviews, the commission released its report on 2 November 2007 after briefing the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of the Army. Overall, the commission concluded that extensive reform was urgently needed to ensure that future in-theater contracts would be effective, efficient, and transparent. In concert with a comprehensive set of specific findings, the commission summarized its 40 recommendations into four major areas for immediate action:<sup>35</sup>

- Increase the stature, quantity, and career development of military and civilian contracting personnel, especially for expeditionary operations.
- Restructure organization and restore responsibility to facilitate contracting and contract management in expeditionary and CONUS operations.
- Provide training and tools for overall contracting activities in expeditionary operations.
- Obtain legislative, regulatory, and policy assistance to enable contracting effectiveness in expeditionary operations (Office of the Secretary of Defense in the lead, with Army support).

(s) The USD(AT&L) assessed personnel reforms as the most important of the four, stating that, "Contracting – from requirements definition through contract management – is not an Army core competence, but it should be."

(t) Despite the explosive expansion in contracting during OEF and OIF, the report found that the civilian and military contracting workforce was stagnant or declining. It noted that only 3 percent of the Army's contracting personnel were active-duty military, a group which also included no general officers.<sup>36</sup> While the problem of insufficient contracting personnel was a concern for all of DOD, the commission judged that it was particularly pronounced in the Army.

(u) In contrast, the Air Force had a significantly larger military acquisition workforce than the Army, despite far fewer procurement actions. The Air Force staffed 67 percent of the Joint Contracting Command in Iraq and Afghanistan, according to the USD(AT&L) commission report, and the Air Force handled many of the most complex contracts. The report recommended that the Army augment its contracting workforce by 400 military and 1,000 civilian personnel, representing about a 25 percent increase. The report also advised a 583-person increase in Army personnel at the DCMA specifically to support Army contracting operations.

(v) While adding people was crucial, the commission stated that career development is as important to ensure that the contracting workforce is qualified and competent. The report recommended that Army military personnel – both officers and enlisted – start their contracting careers significantly earlier than they did at the time, and that there be higher-level positions to ensure promising career opportunities. Moreover, since future conflicts are likely to be similarly expeditionary and dependent on contractors, the report asserted that the role and importance of contractors should be taught in military courses and colleges.<sup>37</sup>

(w) In addition to personnel changes, the commission advocated creating a single Army contracting command, to be responsible for the transformation of Army contracting into a "high-quality core competence." The report acknowledged that this change likely would not come about quickly, but said it is crucial to addressing both the in-theater acquisition problems that have plagued the Army recently, as well as effectively supporting contracting and Army-wide materiel acquisition.

(2) The ACC.

(a) Following a few months of evaluation of the USD(AT&L) commission report, then-Secretary of the Army took Army contingency contracting a major step forward in February 2009 by announcing the Army's intent to move the Army Contracting Agency<sup>38</sup> under AMC, and combine it with the emergent ASC contracting directorate into a new major subordinate command – the ACC. The AMC deputy commanding general, stated, "By consolidating the contingency contracting mission into AMC, we can provide a full range of contracted combat support and combat service support needed by our deployed forces."<sup>39</sup>

(b) This decision was motivated in large part by the recognized needs to expand Army contracting capabilities beyond those contemplated in the initial ASC-based approach. At the same time, operational experience in Iraq and Afghanistan also required an approach to expeditionary contracting that was more responsive to warfighter requirements. "One of the things we're learning in Iraq and Afghanistan, especially with doing reconstruction and stabilization work, is that contracting is a lot more complex than just buying gravel. We need to get the contracting people to have much deeper analytical skills and contracting skills. That's one of the reasons we're looking at bringing this [the Army Contracting Agency] into AMC, because the complexity of contracting we do in AMC associated with weapons, large services, even some large installation-type services, will give these military new training opportunities."<sup>40</sup>

(c) Moving quickly, the ACC (provisional) stand-up ceremony was held on 3 March 2008.<sup>41</sup> On 8 October 2009, the ACC was declared fully operationally capable, about a year after the ACC was formally established. The ACC now executes over 60 percent of the Army's contract dollars. ACC is moving forward on all 22 actions recommended in the commission report. ACC will continue to increase in workforce size, with the expectation to reach about 1,400 military and civilian personnel by 2013.

(d) The ACC is a two-star-level command with two one-star-level subordinate commands. The first subordinate command is the ECC, focused on contracting support to forward-deployed and forward-stationed forces. The second is the Mission and Installation Contracting Command

(MICC), focused on contracting support for CONUS installations. The ACC commander is charged with directive authority over all Army contracting capabilities and provides a single source for status and readiness of the Armywide contracting force.

(e) The ACC commands the contingency contracting organizations previously commanded by the ASC. The recent VCSA approval of a contracting FDU package expands Army contracting numbers considerably to comprise 7 CSBs, 8 CCBns, 14 SCCTs, and 69 CCTs, totaling 673 active Army contracting Soldiers assigned to the ECC. This FDU also fields an additional 3 CCBns and 83 SCCTs or CCTs to provide RC surge capability. CSB force structure includes contract planners for routine collaboration with supported force planners. Policy changes to accelerate the accession of officers and NCOs by 2 to 3 years (at the 5 to 6-year career mark) are now in place. Internal estimates project that the ACC will reach full strength in 2013, when all recently-approved contracting force structure authorizations are in place. The ECC is an example of establishing a deployable MTOE contingency contracting force structure to support OCONUS operations, further enabled by expertise from HQ ACC and MICC, either through augmentation or reachback. These units perform contracting missions as part of their training when not deployed, but the Army established this force structure to support deployed forces and not to perform enduring garrison contracting workload. The RCs field similar MTOE contingency contracting force structure.

(f) The ACC identified requirements for 594 additional civilian TDA authorizations to carry out the enduring contract administration workload. Army staff validated ACC's workload and manpower analyses, and continues working a resourcing plan. The ACC's TDA workforce in the ACC contracting centers, the ECC, and the MICC also provide reachback contracting support to deployed ECC contracting units and joint contracting commands, as required. This ACC initiative to fully resource contract administration staffing addresses a recognized Army weakness, as well as better supports the increasing role of ACC TDA force structure in providing reachback contracting support to deployed operating forces.

d. U.S. Army Reserve sustainment command (ARSC).

(1) In parallel with the formal establishment of the ASC, the USAR initiated the ARSC, an organization capable of augmenting the ASC and other sustainment, contracting, and acquisition GF assets when surge capabilities are required in the conduct of their Title 10 missions and/or in support of operations worldwide. The ARSC is designed as a set of modular packages with separate derivative unit identification codes (UIC) and that are permanently aligned with a wide range of organizations. The mission of ARSC is to provide an immediate, available pool of trained and ready operational teams and detachments or individual personnel, which are aligned with the organizations they augment and can perform assigned tasks during surge requirements and exercises, contingencies, and deployments. In peacetime, these ARSC elements provide part-time support to their supported organizations (and are colocated with them, where possible), with a focus on training and skills development. ARSC HQ is an administrative entity responsible for oversight of day-to-day readiness of these modular assets.

(2) The strength of the ARSC concept is that it can focus on certain specialties (notably the acquisition career field, including program management, contracting, research and engineering,

and systems automation), creating capability synergy amongst its teams and capable of rapid cross-leveling of personnel, if necessary. Establishing the ARSC replaced the requirement for individual RC augmentees and for mobilization TDAs to the organizations it is designed to support.

(3) Despite its title, ARSC provides augmentation to a wide range of generating force assets outside of ASC, to include not just other AMC major subordinate commands, but also organizations outside of AMC. This array of formally supported assets includes the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology (ASA(ALT)); DCMA at four locations; DLA; and for AMC – HQ AMC G-3, RDECOM, logistics support activity, U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency (CMA), Joint Munitions Command, U.S. Army Security Assistance Command (USASAC), Aviation and Missile Life Cycle Management Command and two of its depots, Communications-Electronics Life Cycle Management Command, Tank-Automotive and Armament Life Cycle Management Command, LOGCAP and the LOGCAP support unit, ACC, and, the ASC. Of particulate note is support to ACC and ASC, where Soldiers are aligned in augmenting teams across a wide range of MTOE units, to include a number of CCTs, CCBns, AFSB HQs, LSEs, and BLSTs, some forward deployed. While authorizations are sourced by AMC, ASA(ALT), and DCMA, HQ AMC provides direction on missions and utilization. ARSC assumed command and control of all subordinate elements on 31 January 2009.

(4) ARSC has faced several challenges in its activation that can be expected with other RC initiatives similar to this one. A two-year cycle had to be accommodated from the date the concept was approved to the effective date of the unit; acquiring Soldiers, both officer and enlisted, in critical specialties and able to rapidly deploy took time; mission creep occurred, as additional augmentation missions were assigned over the course of the ARSC's stand-up; supported organizations themselves went through transformations due to the requirements of supporting a U.S. military on extended deployment; and the ability to enable deployments of Soldiers was hampered because of Army organizational policies. While in carrier status prior to its effective date, ARSC was unable because of policy restrictions to directly mobilize its Soldiers, relying instead on still-standing mobilization TDAs and on the individual mobilization augmentation process.

e. SDDC joint task force-port opening (JTF-PO).

(1) JTF-PO is a joint organization construct initiated by the U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) in 2006 to address a set of recurring shortfalls in force deployment. SDDC, the ASCC to USTRANSCOM, plays a major role in the organizational structure, activities, and success of the JTF-PO. Prior to the creation of JTF-PO, port opening operations had posed a number of challenges to U.S. forces over the past 20 years of expeditionary operations. In essence, port opening operations were not sufficiently institutionalized within the force. After action reports describe an ad hoc approach that compromised sustainment flows and failed to ensure that logistics-enabling forces arrived early enough in the force flow. Specific shortfalls included the lack of adequate joint command and control at the port, clogging the port with excess cargo awaiting directed onward movement, and lack of the in-transit visibility capability needed to track cargo by radio frequency identification or other means.

(2) In response to these recurring shortfalls, USTRANSCOM developed a concept for an on-call port opening organization. This was initially oriented on aerial ports of debarkation (APOD), but was subsequently expanded to include sea ports of debarkation (SPOD). Tested and certified in 2006, JTF-PO is intended to open and establish PODs and initial distribution networks for joint distribution operations in contingency situations.

(3) In the past, the mission of port opening and initial distribution resided with the geographic combatant commander. Situations may dictate where the geographic combatant commander continues to utilize and control traditional port opening forces. However, with the establishment of JTF-PO, USTRANSCOM assumed authority and responsibility for providing the ability to rapidly open and establish PODs and initial distribution networks for joint distribution operations supporting humanitarian, disaster relief, and limited contingency efforts. This includes the authority to employ its internal assets to deploy the JTF-PO outside the constraints of the time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD), a key factor that enables a rapid and flexible response to particular conditions and under specified military operations. While the services continue to retain port opening capabilities, the initial deployment of the JTF-PO is conducted under the authority of USTRANSCOM in support of the requesting combatant command/joint force command. There are two basic configurations of the JTF-PO.

(4) JTF-PO APOD is commanded by an Air Force colonel and consists of an air element from U.S. Air Force's Air Mobility Command and a surface element from SDDC. A joint assessment team deploys first to assess port capabilities, and also includes members from both components. The entire team numbers approximately 130 persons, with potential augmentation of 60 more personnel to carry out air traffic control, airfield management, and security functions. The SDDC element numbers 55 persons, sourced from the rapid port opening element (RPOE), which is assigned to the 597<sup>th</sup> Terminal Transportation Group within SDDC, and carries out functions connected to cargo transfer and movement control. Both Air Force and Army elements are equipped with mobility, communications, logistics automation, command and control, and radio frequency identification capabilities. The latter suite of technology enablers for automated identification provides the means to establish and maintain in-transit visibility for both the JTF-PO commander and the COCOM staff.

(5) JTF-PO SPOD requires two surface elements, one provided by the Army through SDDC, and the other provided by the Navy through the Military Sealift Command. The current sourcing solution for the SPOD JTF-PO is to dual-qualify the RPOE for both air and sea port operations. To manage effectively port operations during an SPOD mission, SDDC augments the RPOE with elements from a regional terminal transportation group's deployment and distribution support team (DDST) and a contracting officer from the appropriate contracting support brigade. The JTF-PO SPOD is commanded by a regional SDDC transportation battalion commander lieutenant colonel (usually the commander of the sourcing DDST) or an SDDC-designated colonel. The size of the SPOD operation – to include members from the RPOE, DDST, and the Military Sealift Command – is scenario dependent. Both Army and Navy elements are equipped with the required capabilities to accomplish the assigned mission.

(6) JTF-PO is viewed as an extraordinarily flexible capability that enhances the overall expeditionary quality of the deploying force. The combination of the employment of the joint

assessment team for immediate assessments, rapid assembly of the air and surface elements and their enabling capabilities, and USTRANSCOM's authority to use its own assets to rapidly move the JTF-PO, collectively creates a highly responsive, expeditionary capability that directly addresses operational needs.

f. TRADOC human terrain system (HTS).

(1) The establishment of the HTS, to include human terrain teams (HHTs) deployed in support of current operations, is another example of how GF organizations act to improve expeditionary quality. Among the principal challenges that emerged during OEF and OIF was the recognition of the absence of significant capability within the force to develop a comprehensive understanding of the human environment in which U.S. forces have been operating. This environment includes political, social, cultural, and demographic factors. Historically, the absence of this kind of understanding led to major errors in the planning and conduct of military operations, as well as the generation of unforeseen second- and third-order consequences with local populations and governments that fueled major operational setbacks. An important initiative to correct this capability gap, and one that has drawn a great deal of positive and negative attention, is the creation of HTT's by TRADOC. The initiative took root in 2006 within the broader context of a HTS as a means of improving cultural and social knowledge with concomitant positive effects on operational effectiveness. HTS is based on seven key pillars: the HTTs, reachback research cells, subject matter expert networks, a data management toolkit, human terrain information, techniques, and specialized training.

(2) The basic building block of the HTS is the HTT, which is a five-person team comprised of three military personnel (team leader, research manager, and intelligence analyst/ and/or debriefer) and two civilian experts from the fields of anthropology, regional studies, sociology, linguistics, and like disciplines.<sup>42</sup> The teams are intended for attachment at the brigade combat team (BCT) level to advise commanders and staff, interpret the local environment for its implications on BCT planning and operations, and assess the outcomes and effects of military operations. The intent is for the HTT to serve as fully integrated members of the BCT staff. However, in practice, manning a sufficient number of teams to support all deployed BCTs has not yet proved feasible; team composition has also varied considerably.<sup>43</sup> Team deployments are intended to overlap unit deployments in order to ensure continuity and to cement lessons learned from one unit rotation to the next. In addition, human terrain and analysis teams (HTAT) are provided to division, corps, and combined joint task force (CJTF) staffs. In 2009, at least 27 HTTs and HTATs were deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq.<sup>44</sup>

(3) The Research Reachback Center supports the deployed teams with research and analysis through access to a large network of knowledge centers, references, databases, and on-call subject matter experts inside and outside DOD. The reachback center is split into two cells; the Afghanistan cell is colocated with the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center's (CAC) Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and the Iraq cell is colocated with the HTS HQ at Newport News, Virginia. HTT and HTAT personnel may rotate between field assignments and duty with the Research Reachback Center.

(4) The data management toolkit employed by HTT and HTATs is the mapping the human terrain (MAP-HT) toolkit, an integrated suite of hardware and software designed and developed specifically to support HTS operations. MAP-HT facilitates research, analysis, storage, archiving, sharing, and other applications of socio-cultural information relevant to the unit commander's operational decisionmaking processes. The MAP-HT toolkit is updated constantly with feedback, but the degree to which it has been successfully applied in field conditions is not clear at present. The MAP-HT toolkit includes maps (for example, spatial distribution of tribes and related social entities), link charts (for example, power structures and social networks in informal economies), timelines (for example, time sequence of key religious holidays), visualization (for example, topographic views of Iraqi infrastructure), and reports (such as the role of ethnicity in Iraqi power sharing).

(5) While reports from supported BCTs confirm the utility and value of the HTT effort, this particular program has received negative comments from parts of the academic community, decrying its impact on "academic purity," since some civilian HTT members are drawn from academia. This underscores the reality that some innovative concepts developed to support operating forces will garner sometimes unexpected attention from outside DOD, to include the news media.

g. ARNG agribusiness development teams (ADT). These task-organized TDA organizations leverage civilian-acquired education and skills to improve local agricultural practices in Afghanistan (see figure 2-2). Use of these specialized assets has implications for security and stability in Afghanistan, as local welfare is improved through increased agronomy production and reduction of reliance on heroin poppies to support the economy. The success of ADTs in Afghanistan has opened the door to examining the development and use of other types of non-traditional organizations that address capability gaps. (In many ways, this is reminiscent of civil affairs force designs in the 1970s and 1980s, with small modular teams made up of subject matter experts devoted to a specific function in an area of governance or reconstruction.)



**Figure 2-2. Agribusiness development team conducting an assessment at a produce market in Afghanistan (October 2009)**

h. MEDCOM. Special medical augmentation response teams are an example of applying an innovative expeditionary mindset in providing increased consultation and advice to operating force medical personnel and organizations in the following areas: Trauma and critical care; nuclear, biological, and chemical incidents; stress management; medical command, control, communications, and telemedicine; pastoral care; preventive medicine and disease surveillance; burn; veterinary; health systems assessment and assistance; aeromedical isolation; and, occupational and environmental health surveillance.

(1) MEDCOM also has the capability to field special logistics medical response teams to assist deploying forces. In addition, MEDCOM medical treatment facilities and dental treatment facilities support the Soldier readiness process by ensuring that deploying Soldiers are fit to deploy and are in the best possible medical condition prior to deployment.

(2) MEDCOM has a variety of health service support assets available in the generating force to augment operating force medical capability. Preventive medicine assets available through the U.S. Army Public Health Command<sup>45</sup> conduct health risk assessment for environmental and occupational health threats. They also provide technical reachback for medical and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear staffs. These assets can be deployed to collect, analyze, and communicate health risk data.

(3) The medical community's GF also assists operating forces in identifying, responding to, and countering unique threats encountered in the joint operations area (JOA). AMC develops medical technologies, including new investigational drugs that may be useful in responding to such threats. AMC's subordinate command, the U.S. Army Medical Materiel Agency, supports medical operational needs by procuring and fielding commercial off-the-shelf medical equipment solutions to assist in meeting emerging, unanticipated medical threats that develop in the JOA.

(4) Military treatment facilities provide critical logistical support to deploying units. Military treatment facilities at home station serve as installation medical support activities and provide medical supplies (class VIII) to deploying units.

(5) The U.S. Army Medical Department Center and School develops exportable or web-based training products to bridge identified training gaps based on lessons learned and after action reports. Its personnel perform site visits with units deploying to or redeploying from the JOA to ensure unit personnel have necessary capabilities. New equipment training teams and new organization training teams facilitate the integration of new medical equipment into the force.

i. The Office of The Surgeon General (OTSG). The OTSG leverages capabilities resident in the joint Military Health System and, when necessary, the civilian medical community. The purpose is to enhance care provided to deployed forces and to reduce morbidity and mortality among U.S. forces.

j. CIDC. The CIDC deploys individuals and teams to support the operating force in theater. The law enforcement professional program embeds experienced former law enforcement professionals at all echelons from corps to company in order to assist commanders with

enhanced expertise and methodology to understand, identify, penetrate, interdict, and suppress a criminalized insurgency and criminal-like network enterprises and their employment of improvised explosive devices (IED). They also advise the commander on the role of forensic and biometric science and their relevance to battlefield information and intelligence. The U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Laboratory (USACIL) deploys joint expeditionary forensic facilities (JEFF) into theater to process and disseminate forensic information from the battlefield and facilitate reachback to the USACIL. The CIDC deploys a reinforced battalion HQ into theater to assume responsibilities as a forensic exploitation battalion. This HQ integrates battlefield forensics and JEFF information into the operations and intelligence organizations within the theater. The criminal investigation task force (CITF) deploys teams into theater to facilitate the integration of intelligence and criminal investigations in order to develop evidence to prosecute terrorists, insurgents, and war criminals. The CITF develops investigative products for prosecution by different legal systems; that is, international courts through such law enforcement organizations as the International Criminal Police Organization, U.S. attorneys for U.S. prosecution, and host nation prosecutors for prosecution within the host nation. The Major Procurement Fraud Unit deploys teams into theater to investigate and develop criminal investigations involving contracting fraud.

#### **2-4. Expeditionary mindset**

a. The term expeditionary mindset emerged during the course of the GF seminar, 3-6 March 2009, one in a series of learning events under the UQ 2009 program. The term refers to a desirable culturally-based outlook within GF organizations characterized by a well-developed sense of sensitivity and responsiveness to the needs of operating forces in ongoing operations, including adapting to rapidly changing conditions. In addition, responsive support to no-notice or short-notice crisis response in CONUS or to areas outside the U.S. requires such a mindset. Certainly, the innovation and adaptation described within the chapter both represent and help to institutionalize an expeditionary mindset, as does the development and promulgation of FM 1-01 and the manner in which the GF has molded itself and responded to the requirements of ARFORGEN.

b. To these drivers, it is also possible to add the beneficiary effects of the assignment of operationally experienced personnel to GF organizations, particularly at the more senior levels, and the influence of GF personnel returning to parent organizations following temporary assignments as individual augmentees to operating forces. It has become clear that many GF senior leaders have been and are continuing to take their organizations in that direction, demonstrating institutional commitment to GF support to operations.

#### **2-5. Lessons learned**

a. As noted earlier, the ways and means by which GF organizations have and are adapting to operational requirements through the expansion of their expeditionary capabilities is as diverse as the GF itself. The examples cited in this chapter are significant and representative of similar initiatives by other GF organizations, including some described elsewhere in this study.<sup>46</sup> Nevertheless, the following common elements can be derived from the collective experience of the GF organizations discussed above.

b. The vast majority of organizational initiatives described in this chapter would likely not have been undertaken without the availability of supplemental funding – enduring innovation and organizational adaptation cannot be produced without costs in personnel and funding. In short, significant initiatives that enable GF organizations to deploy and maintain capabilities in theater require flexible and readily available resourcing.

c. The current force design and resourcing process is time-consuming and adds significant delay to the establishment of new organizations, both in staffing of proposed initiatives, and then in execution once they have been approved by decisionmakers. During those extended delays, manning and equipping expeditionary capabilities out of the GF inevitably winds up assuming an ad hoc character, dependent on volunteers, taskings, and reprogramming of funds. This obstacle appears to be one that could be mitigated with a concerted effort at HQDA. The timelines depicted in the discussions above further raise the question of whether or not Army culture will accommodate other ways and means to address these kinds of delays, such as deliberate, purposeful identification of possible initiatives and earlier initiation of innovative change within the GF. The historical experience of OEF and OIF is that the Army seldom anticipates an operational need prior to its actual appearance in the conflict environment.

d. Deployable GF capabilities will most often benefit from having organic mobility and communications equipment, pointing toward the development or modification of MTOE organizations as the most effective organizational solution. Although life support and security can generally be obtained from supported operating forces without imposing a significant burden, removing the requirement for supported organizations to provide mobility and communications gear is significant. Communications interoperability is an imperative. As such, it will often create a requirement for GF government agency elements to have training on systems that they routinely do not operate.

e. The practice of maintaining force design update documentation on hand in anticipation of future requirements of a nature similar to those described above appears to be a prudent and non-resource intensive means of shortening timelines and being better prepared for future contingencies.

f. Adaptable, tailored, GF subordinate operating force units can provide a useful baseline for rapid adaptation. This "blended" organizational model also supports improved integration of major functional capabilities and offers direct links from national strategic to tactical levels for more efficient and rapid response, more capable reachback, and clear identification of responsible agencies along such functional lines. The evolution of sustainment management and support in the Army and joint forces is a prime example.

g. The RSG structure intended to accommodate the IMCOM expeditionary BASOPS concept may prove to be a feasible candidate as a means to provide support and services to similar GF initiatives that are deployed on a regional basis (and based out of expeditionary installations).

h. The long-term existence of expeditionary capability created to meet operational requirements remains an open question. Historical experience suggests that organizations

created or adapted significantly in some fashion to meet even long-enduring operational requirements normally suffer inactivation soon after a conflict ends.

---

### **Chapter 3**

## **Generating Force Reachback Support to Operations**

### **3-1. Synopsis**

a. The entire GF appears to be well-postured to provide comprehensive reachback support to operations in support of deployed joint and Army forces, as well as to other U.S. government agencies and partner nations. The depth, breadth, and responsiveness of reachback capabilities have expanded during the course of recent operations and have been enhanced by the development of an expeditionary mindset within GF organizations. However, because there is no mandated requirement or uniform mechanism for tracking reachback support, the Army lacks the capability to measure either the demand signal, the work performed, or the resource cost to the GF in this area.

b. Reachback is an approach to providing major support to operating forces, and is not a formal system in the Army or DOD. Individual organizations devise the means to establish reachback for the functions that they oversee or contribute to, adhering to internally developed standards. This complicates the means to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of reachback efforts across the force, as well as cost versus benefit.

### **3-2. Introduction**

a. One of the many success stories associated with GF support to operations during the current conflicts is the scope and responsiveness of GF organizations to requests for support from operating forces that could be effectively met through reachback rather than direct support in theater. Virtually every GF organization can claim a substantial track record of experience in this area. In addition, although significant capability existed at the beginning of OEF in 2002 and OIF in 2003, GF organizations have taken deliberate action to expand and improve their capability to provide reachback support, such as the establishment of operations cells or reachback centers to handle and record requests.

b. The majority of reachback support tends to flow through Army analytical and knowledge centers which have an inherent capability to provide such support. However, because of the robustness of the Army's global network, operating forces also have the capability to make direct contact with GF staff elements and individual subject matter experts in order to forward requests for such support. The emergence of multiple informal Internet Web-logs (blogs) on unclassified and classified networks also represents another well-used set of sources for reachback information and advice on operational matters. In addition, civilian educational institutions are an expanding source of direct support through reachback; ADTs, HTTs, and other GF entities leverage research and scholarly products from civilian universities to support operations. Clearly it is not possible to track all such requests, particularly those that are informal.

c. FM 1-01 defines most of the sources and kinds of reachback support that have been effective. This chapter draws heavily from FM 1-01 to depict those capabilities and includes additional examples not mentioned in the manual, or that emerged during or after its publication. The chapter first identifies the analytic and knowledge centers within the GF available for exploitation by operating forces, and then describes the specific reachback functions that the GF can provide across the three main doctrinal categories of support.

### 3-3. GF knowledge and analysis centers

a. The organizations briefly described below all are available to operating forces for reachback support to operations. In some cases, these organizations also have experience in providing "virtual staff" support to deployed forces to meet specific planning requirements.

#### b. HQDA

(1) HQDA is the Army's policy making and executive body. Staff capabilities germane to support to operations are enumerated in numerous documents, including the *How the Army Runs* handbook updated every 2 years by the U.S. Army War College. They are also summarized in FM 1-01, appendix A, so they will not be reiterated here. However, there are two field operating agencies directly subordinate to HQDA that are important reachback knowledge and analysis centers for deployed forces.

(2) The Center for Army Analysis (CAA), located at Fort Belvoir and under the direction of HQDA G-8, is the Army's premier analytical center for operations analysis and decision support analysis. CAA has been tasked to conduct analyses in support of operations.

(3) The U.S. Army Force Management Support Activity (USAFMSA), under the direction of the HQDA G-3/7 FM, is available to support force development and integration activities carried out by operating forces charged with conducting security force assistance with partner nations.

(4) Two other HQDA elements that provide substantial reachback support, the Asymmetric Warfare Office and the rapid equipping force (REF), are discussed in [chapter 6](#).

#### c. TRADOC

(1) TRADOC's centers and schools all provide reachback services in their areas of expertise for information, specific products (for example, doctrinal, training, and education products), advice, and analysis across the DOTMLPF domains. (These include the six centers aligned with the Army's warfighting functions – mission command, maneuver, fires, intelligence, maneuver support, and sustainment – and the various centers of excellence designated to focus on specific areas of expertise.)<sup>47</sup> In most cases, they have also established unique networks with industry, academia, and other external sources that can be tapped to respond to reachback requests. Several of the centers now staff internal reachback offices specifically to respond to requests for support from operating forces and some, such as MANSCEN and the Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOM), maintain their own subordinate lessons learned

capabilities that are relevant and available to support ongoing operations. TRADOC HQ and its subordinate commands also participate in numerous joint warfighter forums that are reachback resources.

(2) The TRADOC Analysis Center (TRAC) has conducted operations analysis in support of operating forces.

(3) The primary mission of the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) at the CAC is to collect information, collaborate with joint and other service lessons learned organizations, conduct analyses, and write products to support operating forces in the conduct of their assigned missions. CALL often deploys collection teams to theater in the course of this mission.

(4) The University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies (UFMCS), under the TRADOC G-2, conducts the Red Team training courses at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and is a repository of information on foreign cultures and military capabilities. The UFMCS includes the FMSO as a subordinate organization.

(5) The TRADOC Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA), under the TRADOC G-2, provides reachback support and expertise to the Army training community regarding the representation of opposing force capabilities.

(6) The TRADOC Culture Center established at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, in 2006 is a repository of information and analyses regarding foreign cultures, enables expansion of cultural awareness, and develops products available to individuals and operating forces.

(7) ARCIC's Force Design Directorate, serving as TRADOC's force development staff, located at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, has the capability to provide subject matter expertise and related products to deployed forces involved in security force assistance.

(8) The JCISFA at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas is an initiative established by mutual agreement of the Army and U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) to develop concepts and capabilities in the area of security force assistance (SFA). Although JCISFA is a Joint Chiefs of Staff organization, the commander of CAC serves as the JCISFA Director. A valuable resource to deployed joint and Army forces, JCISFA performs the following:

(a) Provides operational planning and analytical support regarding SFA requirements and reachback links to information or resources.

(b) Conceptualizes future SFA requirements and translates them to stakeholders in the SFA community in the interests of common understanding.

(c) Develops products and recommendations with respect to best practices, identifies capability and capacity gaps regarding SFA, and proposes possible solutions.<sup>48</sup>

(9) The U.S. Army/USMC Counterinsurgency Center, located at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas was established to help develop robust U.S. military counterinsurgency (COIN)

capabilities. It is a collaborative "land service" activity that reports directly to its co-chairs, the commanders of CAC and the U.S. Marine Corps Combat Development Command. The COIN center provides assistance to Army/USMC components in application of the body of thought contained in FM 3-24 in order to improve U.S. ground forces' capability to operate in a full-spectrum COIN environment. It is also the focal point for CAC matters involving COIN operations. The COIN center is staffed with a cadre of Army and Marine Corps subject matter experts who have operational experience and academic education in counterinsurgency operations. It discharges its role using six lines of effort: doctrine implementation and best-practice tactics, techniques, and procedures; integration of COIN; research; advise leaders and organizations; improve education; and outreach (reachback is a major means to accomplish these tasks, so visits to theaters of operation are also conducted). The COIN center has expanded its focus to other services, interagency, and coalition partners dealing with COIN and broader COIN-like threats.

(10) The U.S. Army Stability Operations Proponency Office and the U.S. Army SFA Proponency Office were established to support CAC in providing focus on these expanding mission areas. They also serve roles as TRADOC GF reachback centers. The links between these offices and the COIN center continue to grow.

(11) The U.S. Army Accessions Command can assist host nations in designing and implementing indigenous recruiting and initial military training programs.

(12) The Army Security Assistance Training Management Office, attached to the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, deploys security assistance teams worldwide and provides reachback support through and to those deployed teams.

(13) The U.S. Army War College is the Army's senior service school focused on strategy and strategic leadership. It has the capability to provide reachback support to combatant commanders and operating forces with respect to the development of strategic education programs and strategic leader capabilities for partner nations. Within the war college, the Strategic Studies Institute is a research organization that produces analytical and historical reports with utility for the conduct of current operations.

(14) The Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) located at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania and assigned to the Army War College, "serves as the U.S. military's center of excellence for mastering stability and peace operations at the strategic and operational levels in order to improve military, civilian agency, international, and multinational capabilities and execution." PKSOI's activities with respect to research, publications, training, education, concept and doctrine development, lessons learned, after action reviews, civil-military integration, and operational integration comprise a body of knowledge and action relevant to support of operations through reachback. The institute actively advises and assists deployed commands in these areas. Its stability operations lessons learned information management system is designed to allow U.S. military, USG civilian agencies, multinational military and civilian organizations, international organizations, nongovernment organizations (NGO), and private sector organizations to engage in a collaborative process for the collection, analysis, dissemination, and integration of lessons learned for peace and stability operations. PKSOI also

administers three unclassified online blogs. (PKSOI sends personnel or sponsored individuals into theaters of operations to advise and to carry out first-hand assessments.)

(15) The Joint Training Counter-IED Operations Integration Center (JTCOIC), under the TRADOC G-2, is a cooperative effort between TRADOC and the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) to ensure counter-IED reachback is trained and imbedded at division and higher elements of the operating force.

(a) JTCOIC provides training support to ensure that troops receive the proper exposure to the center and counter-IED resources, such as online tools, and to requests for support.

(b) The JTCOIC Systems Integration and Modeling and Simulation Directorate, transforms a report of an actual IED event in Iraq or Afghanistan into a three-dimensional interactive visualization in approximately 4 days.

(c) The JTCOIC central training brain transforms real-world information to generate realistic and operationally-relevant training environments.

(d) The comprehensive look team works with the JIEDDO's own Counter-IED Operations Integration Center (COIC) to provide analytic reachback support to operating forces engaged in attacking IED networks.

(16) TRADOC capability managers (TCM). In 2006 TRADOC transitioned from the TRADOC systems manager construct to the TCM. System managers were systems-focused and tied to the fielding of specific assigned systems, while TCMs have a broader perspective. They serve as the Army's centralized manager for all combat developments user activities associated with assigned capability areas and associated systems, coordinating with applicable combat developers, training developers, material developers, testers, major Army commands), and HQDA staff on issues impacting capabilities documentation and development, funding, test and evaluation, training, fielding, and integration of DOTMLPF solutions. The TCM is the user advocate and counterpart to the acquisition community's program managers and program executive officers. Most striking with this transition was the establishment of TCMs for the heavy BCT, Stryker BCT, and infantry BCT. These TCMs can provide an integrated perspective on these modular formations, enhanced by the BCT warfighter forums oriented on each type BCT, where the TCMs work directly with FORSCOM and the corps commander who leads each BCT warfighter forum. This ensures direct interaction with deployed, deploying, and returning forces to develop integrated lessons learned and assess required capabilities.

d. AMC

(1) All four of AMC's LCMCs provide reachback support to operations in their areas of technical expertise, primarily through their deployed LARs.

(2) RDECOM and its subordinate research and development centers comprise the principal source of reachback support with respect to advanced science and technology solutions to operational needs. Deployed RDECOM elements attached to supported AFSBs and to most

major joint and Army commands are the conduits through which most such requests surface and are satisfied. Within RDECOM, the Army Materiel Systems Analysis Agency (AMSAA) conducts systems and engineering analyses to support decisions on technology, materiel acquisitions, and the designing, developing, and sustaining of Army weapon systems.

(3) The USASAC provides total program management, in conjunction with HQDA, of Army security assistance materiel and services programs and FMS, and provides reachback support through overseas security assistance offices.

(4) The ASC provides reachback support to operating forces through its theater committed forces and its comprehensive network of support elements reaching down to the brigade and the forward operating base level.

(5) The ACC provides advice, assistance, and guidance to operating forces through its theater committed contracting support brigades, and in response to requests for support in the area of contracting for services outside of CONUS.

(6) The CMA is a reachback resource in the area of secure storage and disposal of chemical warfare and hazardous materials.

(7) The logistics support activity provides logistics information to deployed forces in the areas of equipment readiness, analysis of distribution pipeline performance, and asset visibility.

e. FORSCOM. As the Army force provider in the global force management process, FORSCOM is permanently engaged in daily support of the Army's deployed commands through reachback to meet global requirements for forces required for operations, training, and exercises.

f. USACE.

(1) The USACE possesses a vast storehouse of technical expertise and analytical capability available through reachback to the agencies described below. Reachback is accomplished through USACE deployed elements, including FEST-A and FEST M, CREST, EnvST, and BDT teams (see [chapter 2](#) for more complete descriptions), as well as overseas districts and field offices.

(2) The U.S. Army Engineer Research and Development Center (ERDC), headquartered at Vicksburg, Mississippi, is USACE's distributed research and development command. ERDC consists of seven laboratories which collectively constitute an excellent capability of expertise across a broad range of engineering disciplines that are relevant to support of operations, as well as to building partner capacity with respect to infrastructure development and reconstruction.

(3) The U.S. Army Engineering and Support Center in Huntsville, Alabama, provides reachback and direct support for major specialized programs, such as chemical demilitarization and the removal and disposal of unexploded ordnance.

(4) The establishment of the URO created a dedicated conduit that enables USACE HQ to manage and respond effectively to reachback support of operations.

g. MEDCOM. MEDCOM and the Army Medical Department (AMEDD) include a wide range of organizations to provide health care for Soldiers, at home and deployed, and their families. This entry highlights a number of those activities to demonstrate adaptation and innovation of GF assets to provide direct support to operations, to include expanded reachback. Besides those organizations specifically detailed below, reachback is also provided by the U.S. Army Medical Materiel Development Agency for combat medical systems and products; the U.S. Army Aeromedical Research Laboratory for health hazards of Army aviation, tactical combat vehicles, and weapons systems; the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases for medical protection from biological threats; the U.S. Army Research Institute of Environmental Medicine; the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research for biomedical research; the U.S. Army Health Facility Planning Agency; and the U.S. Army Medical Materiel Agency for medical logistics and medical materiel life cycle management.

(1) Medical treatment facilities such as medical centers and medical department activities, as well as the other services' facilities, the military health system TRICARE partners, and the Department of Veterans Affairs, are among the reachback sources that provide worldwide telemedicine support. Telemedicine is the use of information and telecommunications technologies to transmit electronic medical patient information and digital images between a medical provider and a medical specialist located in a GF hospital for the purpose of obtaining an expert opinion and/or diagnostic treatment and/or evacuation recommendations to support patient care. The creation, routing, viewing, tracking, storage, retrieval, and reporting of telemedicine consultations are essential for the delivery of patient care in a theater of operations. NETCOM provides the communications and network capabilities that enable telemedicine between operating forces and GF treatment facilities. An example of enabling telemedicine capabilities through the demonstration and exploitation of emerging information technology was the development and deployment of the joint telemedicine network, which serves as the primary means to transfer digital radiographs and other very large imagery files.

(2) In addition to its inherent capability to field special medical logistics augmentation response teams to provide assistance to deployed forces, MEDCOM provides reachback support through the following subordinate organizations:

(a) The U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command is a knowledge center for emerging medical solutions and medical materiel improvements, and includes a worldwide network of laboratories, medical logistics organizations, and contracting activities.

(b) The U.S. Public Health Command (USAPHC) provides worldwide scientific expertise and services in clinical and field preventive medicine, occupational and environmental health, health promotion and wellness, epidemiology and disease surveillance, toxicology, and related laboratory sciences.

(c) The U.S. Army Institute of Surgical Research provides requirements-driven medical solutions and products for combat casualty care, including state-of-the-art care for trauma, burns, and critical injuries, ranging from self-aid through definitive care, across the full spectrum of

military operations to Soldiers, DOD beneficiaries, and civilians worldwide. The institute also provides burn special medical augmentation response teams as needed.

(d) The U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense provides expert analytical and consultative services related to medical chemical defense research and to the medical management of chemical casualties.

(e) The Telemedicine and Advanced Technologies Research Center manages Congressional special interest extramural research programs encompassing technology research areas. The emergency medical services component tests interactive telemedicine technologies to treat patients in both urban and rural settings.

(f) The U.S. Army Medical Information Technology Center provides the infrastructure for a single Army medical network operating environment that enables corporate information sharing and centralized management.

h. IMCOM. IMCOM is the Army's worldwide manager of installations and provides capabilities in support of joint and Army force commanders, including reachback support. Two subordinate IMCOM commands also provide reachback and direct support as required.

(1) The Army Environmental Command (AEC) advises commanders in support of operations in environmentally constrained conditions and provides expertise with respect to environmental regulatory requirements regarding conservation, restoration, compliance, and pollution prevention programs. The command also oversees a collection of services associated with environment hazards and Army environmental programs in foreign countries.

(2) The U.S. Army Family and Morale, Welfare, and Recreation Command enables Soldier and family readiness at garrisons around the world. It has been active in creating morale, welfare, and recreation resources to support OEF and OIF and responds to reachback requests for advice, assistance, and planning support.

i. INSCOM. HQ INSCOM synchronizes the operations of all INSCOM units to produce intelligence in support of the Army, COCOMs, and the national intelligence community, and is the parent command for theater-committed military intelligence brigades (MIB). As a knowledge and analysis center, HQ INSCOM responds to taskings for support to operations that cannot be met by the MIBs in the areas of counterintelligence, signal intelligence, human intelligence, image intelligence, signature intelligence, technical intelligence, electronic warfare, and information operations. In most instances, these requests can be satisfied through reachback activities.

j. National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC). NGIC produces and disseminates all-source integrated intelligence on foreign ground forces (conventional and irregular) and related military technologies and systems to ensure that U.S. forces have a decisive edge in current and future military operations. NGIC produces scientific and technical intelligence and military capabilities analysis on foreign ground forces required by warfighting commanders, the force modernization and research and development communities, DOD, and national policymakers.

k. NETCOM. NETCOM operates and defends the Network Enterprise to enable information superiority, execute full-spectrum cyber operations, and ensure that operating and generating forces have freedom of access to the network in all phases of joint, interagency, and multinational operations. To carry this out, the commander of NETCOM is dual-hatted as commander of the 9<sup>th</sup> SC(A) and oversees the theater signal commands and signal brigades, as well as other enabling assets. Theater signal commands and brigades are operating forces aligned with ASCCs and CJTFs.

l. ATEC. ATEC teams with the REF and other rapid equipping organizations to provide direct test and evaluation support for those functions. It does not appear to be a significant provider of reachback support.

m. CIDC. The CIDC deploys elements in support of operations, attaches representatives to contracting support brigades, and provides theater committed forces to perform its mission of investigative support. Its deployed elements have the capability to reach back to the parent command for support in any of its specific areas of expertise.

n. USMA. USMA is a knowledge center that is occasionally tapped for research and scholarly products to support operations.

o. Reachback contributions to doctrinal categories of GF support to operations are summarized here; these are certainly not all-inclusive. The means to enable reachback continues to rely most heavily on Internet-based communications over various unclassified and classified networks to provide the most rapid submission of requests for support and dissemination of responses/products, access to databases, and interaction on blogs and bulletin boards.<sup>49</sup> Tables 3-1 through 3-3 identify the reachback functions performed and the primary organizations involved in their accomplishment.

**Table 3-1.**

**Category 1: Adapting to the operational environment (OE)**

Reachback Function	GF Agent
<p><i>Understanding the OE</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Direct collaboration with operational forces on OE</li> <li>Updates to OE and operational considerations</li> <li>OE analysis, handbooks, and assessments</li> <li>OE databases</li> <li>Campaign plan modeling and analysis</li> <li>Global medical threat assessment</li> <li>Legal advice and assistance</li> </ul> <p>Forensics</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>NGIC, TRADOC G-2, TRISA</li> <li>NGIC, PKSOI, CALL,</li> <li>NGIC, UFMCS, FMSO</li> <li>Multiple sources</li> <li>CAA, TRAC, NGIC</li> <li>MEDCOM, USAPHC</li> <li>The Judge Advocate General's</li> <li>Legal Center and School</li> <li>USACIL/CIDC</li> </ul>

**Table 3-1.**  
**Category 1: Adapting to the operational environment (OE), continued**

<p>Infrastructure and Environmental Analysis          Geospatial and terrain analysis          Base camp/infrastructure master planning</p> <p>Hydrologic analysis          Force protection          Environmental compliance          Flood control          Chemical demilitarization</p> <p>Environmental hazard</p>	<p>USACE, ERDC, CMA          AEC, MANSCEN, NGIC          USACE, ERDC, U.S. Army          Engineer School (USAES),          MANSCEN          USACE, ERDC          USACE, ERDC, MANSCEN          USACE, USAES          USACE, ERDC          Chemical-Biological Activity,          CMA          USACE, ERDC, USAES</p>
<p>Intelligence and Information Support          Broad intelligence support, data mining          Threat templates for specific OEs          Opposing force analysis and studies          Area studies          Sensitive site exploitation          Predictive analysis          Technical analysis of enemy systems          Forensic analysis</p> <p>Computer forensic analysis          Specified research projects and products</p>	<p>INSCOM, NGIC          TRISA, NGIC          NGIC          FMSO (UFMCS), NGIC          CAC, CIDC, RDECOM          CAA, TRAC, NGIC          RDECOM, NGIC          Biometric Task Force,          JEFF/CIDC,          NGIC          INSCOM          CALL, PKSOI, NGIC,          USMA, Strategic Studies Institute,          TRADOC Culture          Center, others</p>
<p>Operations Research/Systems Analysis Support          Economic forecasting          Force on force analysis          Weapons systems analysis          Date collection and U.S. equipment analysis</p>	<p>CAA, TRAC</p> <p>RDECOM, NGIC          ATEC, AMSAA</p>

**Table 3-2.**  
**Category 2: Enabling strategic reach**

<p>Reachback Function  <i>Deployment Planning and Asset Visibility</i>          Redeployment planning and support          Facilities planning, base development          Technical reachback maintenance, system contractor support          Campaign plan modeling and analysis</p>	<p>GF Agent          SDDC          SDDC, AMC          USACE, IMCOM          ASC, LCMCs          CAC, TRAC</p>
---	---

**Table 3-3.**  
**Category 3: Developing multinational partner capability and capacity**

Reachback Function <i>Force Development Support to Partner Security Forces</i>	GF Agent USAFMSA, TRADOC (including AMEDD Center and School)
Assessments	"
Doctrine	"
Organizational designs	"
Equipment distribution plans	"
Risk analysis	"
Ministerial level advice and assistance	"
Recruiting and manning	Accessions Command
Career progression models	Human Resources Command
<i>Security Force Assistance</i>	JCISFA, TRADOC
Training products and curricula	Schools and Centers, TRADOC G-3/5/7
Training infrastructure	162 <sup>d</sup> Infantry Brigade/Joint Readiness Training Center
Advise and assist products	USACE
<i>Reconstruction and Infrastructure Development</i>	
Construction planning	
Infrastructure assessments	
<i>City Management</i>	IMCOM

**3-4. Conclusion**

a. The entire GF appears to be well-postured to provide comprehensive reachback support to operations in support of deployed joint and Army forces, as well as to other USG agencies and partner nations. The depth, breadth, and responsiveness of reachback capabilities have expanded during the course of recent operations and have been enhanced by the development of an expeditionary mindset within GF organizations. Operating forces have multiple means of accessing reachback capabilities without difficulty. Improvement and expansion of reachback support are achievable if the need arises, but at present no significant capability gaps appear to exist with respect to providing such support. In some instances, capacity gaps undoubtedly exist, and further gaps may arise depending on the volume of requests for support.

b. Because reachback requests fall outside the global force management process, no uniform mechanism exists for tracking requests for reachback support, as well as other mechanisms to support reachback, such as administering databases and blogs; the ability of GF organizations to do so on an individual basis is not clear. As a result, the Army is not able to quantify or assess either the demand signal for reachback support or the resource costs of providing the support. This issue is developed further in [chapter 7](#).

## **Chapter 4**

### **Generating Force Roles in Building Partner Capacity in Support of Operations**

#### **4-1. Synopsis**

a. The Army routinely engages in activities that contribute to building partner capacity (BPC) with its allies and partners on a global basis. However, the demands of OEF and OIF significantly expanded Army requirements in this area, generating a comprehensive response that has largely been ad hoc in nature until recently. In both conflicts, deployed operating forces have accomplished the great majority of BPC tasks.

b. Conversely, GF organizations have played only a small role with respect to support of such operations in theater (with a few exceptions). However, substantial additional capacity and new capabilities have been created within the GF in the course of their conducting their primary missions to generate operating forces, but with the improved capability to perform capacity building activities. Reliance on general purpose forces (GPF) for building partner capacity, particularly with respect to security force assistance, is now being institutionalized as Army policy. As a result, direct support by the GF to BPC is not likely to grow significantly.<sup>50</sup>

#### **4-2. Introduction**

a. This chapter focuses on GF roles in building partner capacity in support of ongoing operations through a discussion of the growth in significance of BPC as a military mission; an examination of the operational experiences of the U.S. Army in this area during the current, ongoing conflicts; a description of how Army policy is now institutionalizing BPC capability within the force; and a review, through informed speculation, regarding if and how GF roles could be expanded to provide more or better support to operations in this area.

b. What is building partner capacity? At this time, BPC is not an official joint military term; that is, it is not defined in the most recent version of Joint Publication 1-02. In addition, neither FM 1-02 nor FM 3-07 defines the term. However, definitions from other sources do exist and are presented below.

(1) Building partnership capacity, as defined by the Quadrennial Defense Review BPC Execution Roadmap, is, "... targeted efforts to improve the collective capabilities and performance of the DOD and its partners."<sup>51</sup>

(2) A new proposed definition originating from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) is, "... the ability to assist domestic and foreign partners and institutions with the development of their capabilities and capacities – for mutual benefit – to address U.S. national or shared global security interests."<sup>52</sup>

(3) An Army policy paper on stability operations, approved by the HQDA Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, defined capacity building as, "... the process of creating an environment, supported by appropriate policy and legal frameworks, which fosters institutional development,

community participation, human resources development and enterprise creation, and the strengthening of managerial systems."<sup>53</sup>

c. Over the past 6 years, DOD and Army emphasis on BPC has grown significantly as a result of the demands of OEF and OIF, and is marked by the approval of numerous policy and doctrinal documents that raise BPC activities to a level of central importance.

(1) DOD Directive 3000.05 states that, "... stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the DOD shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DOD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning." It further states that the DOD "... shall develop greater means to help build other countries' security capacity quickly to ensure security in their own lands or to contribute forces to stability operations elsewhere."

(2) National Security Presidential Directive 44 established guidance and a framework for a whole-of-government approach for BPC under the overall direction of the Department of State (DOS).<sup>54</sup>

(3) The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review articulated the concepts of stability operations and BPC as important elements for future national security and directs that joint ground forces "... possess the ability to train, mentor, and advise foreign security forces and conduct counterinsurgency campaigns".<sup>55</sup>

(4) The 2008 National Defense Strategy notes that the essential ingredients of future success in conflict will often depend on U.S. activities that support partner nations in the areas of economic development, institution building, establishing the rule of law, promoting internal reconciliation and good governance, providing basic services to the people, and training and equipping indigenous military and police forces. The June 2008 Army policy paper, *Stability Operations in an Era of Persistent Conflict*, asserts several times that the absence of sufficient interagency participation in BPC compels the U.S. military, and especially the Army, to fill critical gaps in executing or coordinating many of these nonmilitary tasks. This can be expected to continue until other USG agencies develop more effective and robust capabilities in these areas.

(5) *DOD Guidance for Development of the Force, FY2010-2015*, 12 May 2008, specifically calls for action to reduce capability gaps in the following areas:<sup>56</sup>

(a) Increase capabilities to build partner capacity by training, advising, and assisting foreign security forces . . . in performing large-scale civil-military operations needed for stability operations and enabling transition to civil authorities.

(b) Reduce gaps in GPF capability to deploy, plan, and execute missions with indigenous forces and the capability to synchronize and support stability operations.

(c) Increase DOD capability and capacity to train and equip foreign forces at operational and tactical levels and to advise foreign defense ministries and military institutions at the strategic level. Efforts should focus on closing gaps in the capability and capacity to train, advise, and assist foreign forces for the purposes of foreign internal defense, stability operations, and counterinsurgency.

(6) DOD Directive 3000.07 further reinforces the significance of and provides direction for DOD activities to create safe, secure environments in fragile states through activities that fall under the rubric of building partner capacity.

d. The Army's response to these policy directives includes a variety of initiatives, one of which is the establishment over the past 4 years of a solid doctrinal base to guide Army forces. That base includes FM 3-0, FM 3-07, FM 3-24, FM 3-07.1, and FM 7.0. Collectively, these doctrinal manuals comprise an integrated, internally consistent foundation for current and future activities in support of BPC, with primary emphasis on security force assistance.

e. It is clear from this discussion of definitions and policy directives that BPC encompasses an enormous breadth of tasks that require a whole-of-government approach from the U.S. From the military perspective, BPC will normally involve activities that are defined elsewhere as security assistance, security cooperation, security sector reform, peacetime engagement, humanitarian assistance, security force assistance, and others. The Army maintains on a routine basis a broad set of organizational capabilities that address many of the functions listed above; however, at the Department of the Army level the responsibility for these various Title 10 and 22 authorities, to include oversight, management, and policy, reside across the Secretariat staff and Army staff. These include:<sup>57</sup>

(1) Within TRADOC, the Security Assistance Training Directorate, G-3/5/7, manages TRADOC's assigned Title 22 Security Assistance responsibilities (per Army Regulation (AR) 12-1) within the Army's FMS enterprise construct through established USG security assistance channels and process, and by means of two internal organizations:

(a) The Army Security Assistance Training Field Activity has the mission to manage U.S. Army-sponsored security assistance training programs (Title 22) and selected DOD programs (Title 10) that bring approved international military students and civilians to U.S. Army-managed training in CONUS in accordance with AR 12-15. In FY2008, the activity oversaw the Army's efforts to train and educate over 8,000 students from 161 countries at 86 CONUS locations. This included FMS, international military education and training, DOD counternarcotics program, and DOD counterterrorism fellowship funded programs supporting all six geographic COCOMs.

(b) The Army Security Assistance Training Management Organization (SATMO) has the mission to plan, form, prepare, deploy, sustain, and redeploy CONUS-based security assistance teams, primarily in support of FMS equipment or system sales; about 400 personnel deploy annually. These teams execute OCONUS security assistance missions in accordance with AR 12-7 by providing technical assistance, extended training services, mobile training teams, and predeployment site surveys. In FY2008, SATMO deployed or sustained 47 security assistance

teams in 31 countries to support security assistance efforts. These teams logged more than 80,000 workdays overseas.

(2) USASAC, under AMC, is the Army's executive agent for security assistance materiel and services programs. It coordinated over \$5 billion in FMS in 168 countries in FY2007. As of 2008, the total program value across all geographic COCOMS amounted to over \$62 billion.

(3) ASCCs are also the primary Army agents in the planning and execution of the joint worldwide training and exercise program managed by U.S. Joint Forces Command, which constitutes a fundamental element of peacetime engagement. In addition, Army military groups, country attaché teams, and elements within offices of defense cooperation have long been established in individual countries in support of BPC objectives.

(4) Because these GF organizations carry out these missions as their primary tasks, they fall outside the scope of this study, which is centered on GF support to operations. Within the study's scope, since military participation in BPC in theaters of conflict is often associated with stability operations, it is possible to narrow the focus of BPC to the five main task areas that characterize stability operations: civil security, civil control, restore essential services, governance, and economic and infrastructure development.<sup>58</sup> The goal is to strengthen partner capacity in each of these areas as a means of reducing instability and enabling the partner nation to eventually accomplish these tasks with minimal or no assistance from the U.S. This chapter focuses its discussion on how the Army has conducted BPC during the course of OEF and OIF in reconstruction and infrastructure development and in security force assistance, which align with two of the five tasks above – respectively, economic and infrastructure development, and civil security. Taking this approach in the study is desirable in that it limits the discussion to the two areas in which military contributions to BPC have the greatest effect on current operations, while also identifying the corollary benefits that ensue to areas such as governance and civil control.

### **4-3. Reconstruction and infrastructure development**

a. Under U.S. policy, "The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is the lead U.S. government agency for U.S. foreign assistance planning and programming. It works in fragile states and post-conflict environments which often require program adjustments without compromise of its overarching mission to improve the capacity of local institutions, improve the host country's ability to assure stability, and achieve sustainable development."<sup>59</sup> The policy directs all of USAID's operating units to cooperate with DOD in joint planning, assessment and evaluation, training, implementation, and communication in all aspects of foreign assistance activities where both organizations are operating. However, it also cautions that cooperation with DOD will not divert USAID resources from their primary development mission or the principles of development assistance.<sup>60</sup>

b. Army units and organizations have developed fruitful cooperative approaches with USAID in pacified areas. However, Army activities fill an important gap to support reconstruction in areas which still remain unsafe. In addition, the reconstruction activities carried out by Army forces in Iraq and Afghanistan tend to focus on smaller-scale projects that have an immediate pay-off with regard to improving local stability. A third distinction is the use of the

commander's emergency response program (CERP), a funding stream established by Congress for the express purpose of producing rapid funding efforts to meet immediate local needs for reconstruction and infrastructure development, as identified by U.S. military operating force commanders. In almost all cases, projects funded by CERP can be initiated far more rapidly and sometimes even completed before USAID can obtain the approval necessary through its quick impact project funding program.<sup>61</sup>

c. The Army has devoted significant, nontraditional efforts in this area in both Iraq and Afghanistan by three primary means: activities by Army operating forces; work performed by the USACE districts in Iraq and Afghanistan; and Army support to provincial reconstruction teams.

d. Operating forces. Since the initiation of stability operations in both OEF and OIF, many operating force units have been involved in reconstruction. In some cases, units have employed their own resources for small projects, such as construction of schools or clinics. However, the largest volume of such projects originated through CERP-funded projects initiated by unit commanders, in conjunction with local authorities, leaders, NGOs, and USAID, with the advice and assistance of USACE forward elements, using either U.S. contractors or indigenous companies to perform the work.<sup>62</sup>

e. Theater-level initiatives have also made important impacts on economic and infrastructure development. In Iraq, for example, MNF-I enabled Iraqi businesses to support forward operating bases with a wide variety of services. The command also introduced a "buy Iraqi first" program and created opportunities to develop the Iraqi scrap and bottling industries, truck stops, gas stations, and other endeavors to expand economic opportunities.<sup>63</sup>

f. Although these activities have been extremely helpful to strengthening local infrastructure and economies, this chapter will not discuss them further, since they involve activities by operating forces rather than elements of the GF. For the same reason, this chapter omits discussion of the routine activities conducted by Army special operations forces worldwide.

g. USACE engineer districts.<sup>64</sup>

(1) USACE districts are the execution agents for major construction activities and have a specified geographic area of responsibility. This greatly constrained USACE in establishing organizations necessary to effectively manage and execute the level of construction effort required in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Initially, USACE gained HQDA approval to establish a forward division and three subordinate districts in Iraq and one independent district in Afghanistan in order to support reconstruction operations. But the time required to gain approval of the required organizational structure to execute large-scale reconstruction operations restricted the ability to rapidly deploy these capabilities into a theater of operations. To mitigate this constraint, USACE developed and gained approval of a concept plan that enabled USACE to retain the district organizational structure developed for Iraq in a requirements-only status which could be rapidly activated when required.

(2) The concept plan also approved the permanent formation of a deployable contingency division HQ that will provide command and control of these deployable districts as required. Only on 29 September 2009 was the CETAD activated and aligned with the CENTCOM AOR, replacing three USACE organizations in place for several years to meet the immediate needs of OEF and OIF. TAD is organized into five districts, four of which are forward deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan, along with a forward-deployed HQ element. The TAD HQ and the fifth district are stationed at Winchester, Virginia. The future of the TAD organization will depend on the workload demanded to support OEF and OIF.

h. Provincial reconstruction teams (PRT).

(1) PRTs are viewed as being the primary means in Afghanistan of using relatively large-scale construction projects to improve security and stability. Virtually all sources attest to their effectiveness, although their employment has not been devoid of challenges and problems. However, "PRTs have been an effective tool for stabilization in Afghanistan. They have strengthened provincial and district level institutions and empowered local leaders who support the central government. In many locations, PRTs have helped to set the conditions where increased political, social, and economic development is possible. . . . PRTs also delivered reconstruction and humanitarian assistance in remote, violent areas where no other developmental actors have been willing or able to operate. They also made significant contributions to security through their presence, and through support to the Afghan National Police and Army, the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program, and the disarmament of illegal armed groups program."<sup>65</sup>


(2) Initiated in late 2002, the PRT program operates under the auspices of the DOS, but is implemented by DOD. The program began as an interagency initiative in response to the need to develop governance and economic infrastructure in Afghanistan. The PRTs operate in cooperation with USAID, coalition forces, and the Afghan National Solidarity Program under the national-level guidance of the PRT executive steering committee.<sup>66</sup> Although reconstruction is the focus, PRTs also contribute to stability through direct effects on security, governance, and community political participation. In addition to their primary function of initiating and executing reconstruction projects, PRTs meet with village, district, and provincial leaders in the interests of improving understanding, forestalling disputes, and engaging leaders in the decisionmaking process. The first PRT arrived in January 2003 in the city of Gardez and was quickly followed by six more stationed in other parts of the country that same year. As of early 2009, there were 26 PRTs operating in Afghanistan, 12 under U.S. commanders.<sup>67</sup>

(3) PRTs are designed to operate in semipermissive environments and have access to CERP funds. They fill a gap in the achievement of BPC goals in Afghanistan (as like organizations do in Iraq for similar reasons) because they operate where USAID and the Afghan National Solidarity Program do not, and because they are able to initiate and complete projects more quickly.<sup>68</sup>

(4) Although PRTs are often described as a mix of military and civilian personnel, in practice the teams in Afghanistan only include a small number of civilians. Teams consist of between 50 and 100 personnel, commanded by a serving field-grade officer. In the beginning,

the Army and USMC provided all the PRT commanders; today, commanders are sourced from all services. The DOS, Department of Agriculture, and USAID each are supposed to provide a senior member co-equal with the military commander, but not all teams have been fully staffed in this fashion.<sup>69</sup> In addition, the Afghan Ministry of Interior provides a team member for coordination with local police authorities.

(5) The PRT's military component includes an administration and operations element, a combat service support team, a full platoon for force protection, an engineer advisor and/or project manager, a military police team, and up to eight or nine civil affairs officers.<sup>70</sup> Tour lengths are one year. The size and nature of the teams depend on the unique conditions within the provinces in which they operate, including level of security, status of infrastructure, effectiveness of governance organs, and the presence of other private, intergovernmental, or nongovernmental organizations performing similar functions.<sup>71</sup> Figure 4-1 shows a core task organization.



**Figure 4-1. Core task organization for U.S. PRT in Afghanistan<sup>72</sup>**

(6) Despite their effectiveness, PRTs in Afghanistan have not lived up to their full potential because of a number of endemic problems, some of which continue to be present. Some of the more significant obstacles and shortfalls include:

(a) PRT effectiveness suffered from a lack of common vision and strategy at theater level.

(b) Relationships with civilian development agencies, such as USAID and NGOs, were not always as cooperative as is desirable due to institutional resistance within the civilian agencies to

work with military forces, which they felt tended to compromise their standing with the population.<sup>73</sup>

(c) In the past, the lack of explicit guidance led to confusion about civilian and military roles in the U.S. PRTs.

(d) Support for the civilian members of the team was not always sufficient.

(7) For years, teams lacked adequate training and fully qualified staff members, and tour lengths were not standardized or synchronized.<sup>74</sup> Initially, teams were formed in theater with all the attendant challenges in that approach in terms of readiness, effective teamwork, internal coherence and confidence, and sufficiency of training. A new approach began in 2006, described below, that addresses most of these shortfalls. The publication of a PRT Handbook in 2006 further enhances effectiveness and unity of effort internal to and between PRTs.<sup>75</sup> Today, most of the U.S. teams are attached to a U.S. brigade commander in the U.S.-led Regional Command-East, but two U.S. teams fall under International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Regional Commands-West and -South, which are commanded by other coalition partners.

(8) PRTs in Iraq. The PRT program expanded to Iraq in 2005, with some notable differences in implementation. To begin with, a senior foreign officer rather than a military officer most often commands these teams. Size varies from 50 to 85 personnel, with the military component comprising less than half the total. Most of the PRTs operate independently, while others are embedded with BCTs. The embedded PRTs work directly with the brigade commander and receive support from the BCT. Iraqi PRTs also do fewer reconstruction projects than those in Afghanistan. Instead, they concentrate on coaching, mentoring, and training local government officials. PRTs operate under the overall supervision of an executive steering committee composed of senior representatives from MNF-I, the U.S. Embassy, and the government of Iraq. As of November 2007, 25 PRTs were active in Iraq.<sup>76</sup>

(9) Military members of PRTs in Afghanistan are sourced within the joint global force management process as individual augmentees and then form up and train as a team during a 90-day training program for both Soldiers and civilian members at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Although the training program clearly could be viewed as a pure GF activity, it has been conducted under the auspices of the 189<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade since 2006.<sup>77</sup> In contrast, Soldiers for Iraq PRTs receive no formal training, with the exception of some undergoing civil affairs orientation training at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Predeployment activities for these personnel also include visits to the Foreign Service Institute in Washington, DC and 5 days at the Foreign Affairs Counter-Threat Course at Dunn Loring, Virginia, the latter consisting of counterterrorist driving, explosives training, and weapons familiarization.

i. SFA. FM 3-07 defines SFA as, "the unified action to generate, employ, and sustain local, host nation, or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority." These activities are often informally referred to as "train-advise-assist." FM 3-07.1 states that SFA is normally part of a larger security sector reform effort, while in other instances SFA is not tied to reform but to building partner capacity. FM 3-07.1 is based on two primary foundations: the Army policy on SFA that has evolved to its current state over several years, and the operational experiences of

HQs and operating forces during the course of OEF and OIF. These two foundations will be discussed below, beginning with a brief operational history of SFA in OEF and OIF.

j. Operational experience in SFA for OEF and OIF.

(1) Following the defeat of the Iraqi regular army and the transition to long-term stabilization of the country, commanders and planners realized early on that a significant effort would be required by U.S. forces to rebuild what became known collectively as Iraqi security Forces (ISF). These forces were a critical component of the overall stabilization and democratization of the country and the establishment of the rule of law. From the beginning, commanders and planners relied almost exclusively on the use of operating forces committed in theater to carry this out.

(2) Under the short-lived coalition provisional authority, two initial organizations were created to train Iraqi army and police forces: the coalition military assistance training team and the civilian police assistance team. In addition, the joint HQ advisory support team stood up to develop a command and control system and assist in operational and strategic planning. All three of these missions were consolidated in 2004 into the Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I).

(3) MNSTC-I served as the theater-level organization under MNF-I charged with the development, organization, training, equipping, and sustaining of the military and police forces of the ISF. MNSTC-I's subordinate organizations included separate theater advisory and planning teams for the Iraqi Army; Air Force; Navy, Marines, and Coast Guard; Joint HQ; Ministry of Defense; Ministry of Interior; national police; and intelligence organizations. It also assisted Iraqi special operations forces through the Iraqi National Counterterrorism Task Force, and included a security assistance office to help in the purchase of equipment and U.S. training.<sup>78</sup> In execution of this mission, MNSTC-I employed a combination of two tailored approaches, the first using general-purpose operating forces to partner with ISF to build capacity and capability, and the second using transition teams in concert with GPF.

(4) On 1 January 2010, as part of the drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq, U.S. Forces-Iraq (USF-I) was activated as a consolidated command, subsuming a number of HQs that had been operating in theater. These included MNF-I, Multinational Corps-Iraq (MNC-I), MNSTC-I, and Task Force (TF) 134 (which oversaw theater detainee operations). MNSTC-I's missions transitioned to USF-I Advise and Training, a subordinate element of USF-I.

k. Transition teams.

(1) The U.S. Army began using transition teams in early 2004 as the operational focus shifted to developing self-reliant security forces in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Essentially, in Iraq transition teams became the primary instrument to execute the MNSTC-I mission, alongside BCTs that were partnered with Iraqi units. Initially, forces in theater staffed the teams, but were given minimal focused training and few resources. In response to the training gap, in 2005 the Army established training activities at Fort Carson, Colorado, Fort Hood, Texas, and Camp Shelby, Mississippi. In March 2006, FORSCOM consolidated transition team training at Fort

Riley, Kansas with the 24<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division in charge of the training. Five months later, responsibility transferred to the 1<sup>st</sup> Infantry Division at Fort Riley, Kansas.<sup>79</sup> In 2009, the transition team training mission was institutionalized at the Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, Louisiana, under the 162<sup>d</sup> Infantry Brigade.<sup>80</sup>

(2) MNSTC-I established the Iraq Assistance Group (IAG) in 2005 as the primary administrative and support organization for the growing volume of transition teams required to deal with the enormity of the task of rebuilding the ISF. Transition teams are assigned to the IAG, but then attached to the BCTs in whose area they operate, under the direction of the BCT commander.<sup>81</sup> The IAG also runs Camp Buehring in Kuwait, where deploying transition teams are acclimatized and equipped for their tour. Transition teams then go to the Phoenix Academy in Baghdad, which is their final training venue before their attachment to a BCT. The IAG synchronizes transition team rotation, closely monitors activities, maintains a country-wide assessment, and ensures transition team support requirements are met.<sup>82</sup>

(3) Transition teams are embedded within the ISF elements they support. Teams rely on the BCT for command and control and for logistical support. Transition teams can request close air support, indirect fire, and medical evacuation in concert with their partner unit. The teams are task organized depending on which echelon they are assigned, and thus will vary in design, size, and composition. In Iraq, there are five primary applications of transition teams:

(a) The majority of transition teams are military transition teams charged with training and advising the Iraqi army.<sup>83</sup> The standard approach is to assign a division-level military transition team matched with an Iraqi division, with multiple brigade- and battalion-level military transition teams covering subordinate elements within the division, all under the command and control of the U.S. BCT that is partnered with that Iraqi division.<sup>84</sup>

(b) National police transition teams embed within the paramilitary Iraqi national police and the Iraqi police service. National police transition teams normally include a contracted U.S. civilian police officer to provide expertise in law enforcement.

(c) Police transition teams train and advise local police forces, so their size and composition vary in accordance with local conditions.<sup>85</sup>

(d) Border transition teams are embedded within elements of the Ministry of Interior's Department of Border Enforcement at the regimental and battalion levels. Border transition teams assist the Iraqi border forces in the areas of patrolling, border control, and prevention of infiltration of insurgent, terrorist, and criminal elements.

(e) The fifth primary transition team is the port of entry transition team, which is embedded with Department of Border Enforcement units at Iraq's major ports of entry. In addition to the border control functions described for the border transition teams, these teams also focus on illegal shipments and smuggling. Both the border and port of entry transition teams normally include maintenance and communications personnel not found in other transition teams because of the remoteness of their locations and/or their nonattachment to a U.S. BCT.

(f) Other specialized transition teams found in Iraq and Afghanistan train, advise, and assist in the areas of administration, logistics, base security, corrections, and transportation.

(g) The typical military transition team numbers between 10 and 16 personnel, depending on the specific requirement.<sup>86</sup> Field-grade officers lead the teams, which are staffed with subject matter experts in specific warfighting functions, but organized much like a traditional staff. A brigade-level military transition team cited in a U.S. military journal in 2006 included the following personnel elements: Field artillery lieutenant colonel, serving as the team chief; field artillery major, executive officer; engineer captain, S-1; military intelligence major, S-2; military intelligence captain, assistant S-2; infantry major, S-3; field artillery captain, assistant S-3; quartermaster captain, S-4; signal corps sergeant, S-6; and, field artillery staff sergeant, NCO in charge.

(h) Transition teams are sourced Armywide from both operating forces and GF organizations, based in part on demands for specific skills, through the joint global force management process. Teams are comprised of individual augmentees who converge on the designated CONUS training center, where they participate in a 60-day training program.<sup>87</sup> Subsequently, the teams deploying to Iraq receive theater orientation training as well as personal and team equipment and familiarization at Camp Buehring. The teams then move to the Phoenix Academy at Camp Taji in Iraq for training focused on counterinsurgency, advisory skills, and language training, as well as hands-on training on communications and mobility equipment. Transition teams headed for Afghanistan deploy directly to Afghanistan and receive final training at Task Force Phoenix in Kabul, which combines the preparation efforts described for Iraq transition teams.

(i) Like any rapidly instituted, ad hoc approach to a new operational mission, the employment of transition teams in concert with GPF suffered growing pains. Some of the shortfalls cited in defense news articles and post-operation interviews include the following.

- Predeployment training: lack of meaningful detail on how transition teams actually operate in practice and the challenges facing them.
- Predeployment team formation: late arrivals within the team, uneven quality of personnel.
- Lack of unity of effort between the three core elements involved in SFA – the U.S. BCT, transition teams, and the Iraqi partner units.
- Maintaining effective relationships and equal situational understanding between the core elements of SFA.
- Loss of progress as a result of transition team rotation.
- Reliance on ad hoc practices to address systematic deficiencies.
- Failure to use contractors to address some of the recurring, predictable requirements, which could have reduced the burden on transition teams and BCTs.
- Failure to preidentify civilian skill sets in reservists assigned to transition teams that could be applied to SFA or support requirements.

(j) However, the most significant challenge may involve logistics support to the ISF and transition teams. This problem area is rooted in two main areas. First, in the course of

organizing and training ISF units, the Army issued rolling stock, arms, and other equipment to the ISF without thorough fielding, training, and sustainment plans. As vehicles broke down and other equipment failed, sometimes from misuse, Iraqi units suffered clear loss of combat power. To avoid this problem, complex efforts were required to arrange services, obtain repair parts, and provide maintenance for the equipment. The second root is the routine absence of sufficient capacity within many BCTs to meet their own needs and respond to ISF logistics requirements as they occurred.<sup>88</sup> Finally, support for the transition teams often had to be obtained through multiple sources (the IAG, the BCT, and others) rather than from a single, responsive source.<sup>89</sup>

(k) By December 2006, the number of transition team personnel in Iraq exceeded 5,000. Since that time, the numbers have increased further as U.S. emphasis continued to shift toward the accelerated development of the ISF to assume greater responsibility within Iraq as a necessary condition for the withdrawal of U.S. general-purpose forces in accordance with timelines agreed upon with the government of Iraq.<sup>90</sup> In the 15-month period between April 2008 and June 2009, transition teams and U.S. general-purpose forces assisted in forming more than 115 army and police combat battalions. As a result of the surge effort, there are now more than 600,000 trained and equipped members of the ISF.<sup>91</sup> Overall, HQDA G-3/5/7 reported 254 transition teams in action in OEF and OIF as of 11 December 2008.<sup>92</sup>

(4) Afghanistan training teams.

(a) In Afghanistan, the organization comparable to MNSTC-I is the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A).<sup>93</sup> In partnership with the host nation and ISAF, CSTC-A plans, programs, and implements the generation and development of the Afghan national security forces in order to enable the state to achieve security and stability.

(b) Five Army regional security integration commands (ARSIC) accomplish the CSTC-A mission, matching up with the five Afghan national army corps: the 201<sup>st</sup> Corps based in Kabul; 203<sup>d</sup> Corps in Gardez; 205<sup>th</sup> Corps in Kandahar; 207<sup>th</sup> Corps in Herat, and the 209<sup>th</sup> Corps in Mazar-e-Sharif. Each ARSIC is comprised of a regional police advisory command and a regional corps advisory command. The police advisory command is responsible for training, coaching, and mentoring all organizations of the Afghan national police. The corps advisory command has the same mission, but for the Afghan national army corps and lower echelon units. Instead of transition teams, each organization possesses a number of police mentoring teams that work closely with the Afghan national police, and embedded training teams that perform a similar function with the Afghan national army. U.S. Army BCTs may also be assigned to ARSICs to perform combat operations and accomplish other civil security tasks.

(c) The jointly staffed police mentoring teams (PMT) and embedded training teams (ETT) are the backbone of the ARSICs. These U.S. Soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines train, coach, and mentor the Afghan national army soldiers and police forces in functions that range from daily mission planning and preparation to safety, unit training, and moral and ethical training.

(d) In addition to the PMT and ETTs, police operational mentoring liaison teams (OMLT) and OMLTs perform similar functions and work directly in support of the ISAF.<sup>94</sup> There were 52 U.S. military embedded training teams in Afghanistan in 2009, as well as 59 NATO OMLTs

on the ground as of October 2009. OMLTs are located in all five regions of Afghanistan and support the appropriate ARSIC.<sup>95</sup> U.S. Army members of PMTs, ETTs, and OMLTs are sourced Armywide and participate in the training regimen described earlier.

(5) Army policy on institutionalization of SFA and PRT training.

(a) In July 2007, recognizing a long-term requirement for U.S. forces to participate more comprehensively in SFA, HQDA G-3/5/7 issued a memorandum directing TRADOC to initiate the development of an enduring transition team and PRT mission training capability. Pursuant to TRADOC's analysis, Decision Point 110 of the Army Campaign Plan was presented on 17 January 2008 to the VCSA, who made several decisions:<sup>96</sup>

- The Army will institutionalize transition team and PRT training structure.
- The Army will combine transition team and PRT training to the extent that there are common tasks and efficiencies to be achieved.
- FORSCOM and TRADOC will share command and control responsibilities for the training.
- Training will be relocated from Fort Riley, Kansas to Fort Polk, Louisiana, but remain independent from the colocated combat training center program.

(b) Simultaneously, TRADOC developed a concept for fulfilling SFA requirements through the establishment of theater military advisory and assistance groups (TMAAG). The concept proposed the assignment of TMAAGs to the theater ASCC to execute theater security cooperation tasks and activities in support of geographic combatant commanders. In practice, TMAAGs would provide ASCCs with dedicated GPF to support security assistance and SFA programs, support small-unit military exercise programs, and carry out other military-to-military engagements with partner nation military forces. Designed as a permanent (vice rotating) structure, a TMAAG was envisioned to include a 39-personnel HQ for planning and administrative control of and support to three security cooperation detachments. The 22-person security cooperation detachments contained personnel trained in languages and culture pertinent to the geographic command. The concept called for security cooperation detachments to focus at brigade level and below and to accept augmentation across specific functions particularly pertinent to stability operations. Note that the security cooperation detachments were not intended to address all the tasks that characterize SFA activities in OEF and OIF, such as combat advisory roles or training to host nation special operations.<sup>97</sup>

(c) Ultimately, departmental considerations moved away from the TMAAG concept in early 2008, and in April 2008 the CSA disapproved the implementation of the concept. Instead, HQDA issued updated guidance that backed away from the creation of specialized units for the SFA mission.<sup>98</sup> This established a different approach which has since solidified into Army policy centered on the development of the "advise and assist brigade" (AAB)<sup>99</sup> and the institutionalization of transition team and PRT training at Fort Polk, Louisiana. The memorandum stated the following.<sup>100</sup>

- The Army will utilize, to the greatest extent possible, full-spectrum modular forces. The ARFORGEN model will provide elements of BCTs, functional units, and

multifunctional units to execute capacity building missions. Teams generated by SATMO should receive appropriate advisor training prior to deployment.

- The enduring training requirement is to train units, teams, and individuals to perform capacity building missions on a worldwide basis.
- At initial operational capability, the training mission must be capable of meeting forecasted OEF and OIF demand in FY2009.
- Advisory training will be performed by a standardized TDA that allows for scalability as training throughput requirements shift over time.
- The primary focus of the advisor training center is advisor skills. The advisor training center will also be capable of training required force protection, survivability, and theater-directed predeployment requirements.

(d) The Army Strategy issued on 22 August 2008 confirmed the 4 April 2008 memorandum as Army policy, reinforcing the following ideas:<sup>101</sup>

- The Army will extend the SFA mission to GPF.
- The Army will develop an enduring capability to train individuals, teams, and units for SFA.
- The ASCCs must have the capability to plan for and coordinate SFA.
- The Army will examine regional focus for BCTs in ARFORGEN as a means of reinforcing enduring capability.

(e) After breaking from the TMAAG concept and committing to an approach to SFA centered on GPF, the Army began work in earnest in the spring of 2008 on a concept for a BCT-based capability for SFA. Initially described as the "security cooperation BCT," the organizational approach evolved through several iterations before being labeled the "AAB," with yet another evolution now being termed the "BCT augmented for security force assistance." During the course of this developmental process, CAC and JCISFA also collaborated on and produced a draft of FM 3-07.1, which was approved in April 2009. In releasing the FM, the TRADOC CG, stated, "It's important to note that SFA occurs under a variety of conditions, and it is the conditions that will determine how and what organizations we use to accomplish the mission."<sup>102</sup>

(f) The TRADOC commanding general further stated that, "Under conditions of active conflict where we have direct responsibility for security – as in Iraq and Afghanistan – tactical commanders will have a security force assistance mission to train, advise, and assist tactical host nation forces. This mission is accomplished using the resources of the modular brigade augmented as necessary based, again, on conditions."<sup>103</sup> The AAB is one of the Army's primary organizational solutions to the SFA requirements described in the statement. The first AAB (the 4<sup>th</sup> Heavy BCT/1<sup>st</sup> Armored Division) deployed to Iraq as the pioneering "proof of concept." Prior to its deployment, the brigade went through a 10-month reset and training period, in conjunction with ARFORGEN, receiving over \$60 million in new equipment. Some civilians from the PRTs that the 4<sup>th</sup> BCT now supports in-theater participated in the brigade's mission readiness exercise at the end of its ARFORGEN cycle.

(g) The Army's advisory and assistance training was moved to Fort Polk, Louisiana in 2009, and encompasses training of transition teams, PRTs, and the augmented BCTs assigned advisory missions. The training program for the 4<sup>th</sup> BCT/1<sup>st</sup> Armored Division as an augmented BCT included 2 weeks of civil affairs training at Fort Bragg, North Carolina; a city manager's course in Austin, TX; on-site work with city planners and managers in El Paso, TX; a 5-day course with the U.S. Border Patrol; and a rotation at the National Training Center.<sup>104</sup> A stability and support transition team, the core of which is a group of field-grade officer advisors specially trained for SFA, augments the BCT.

(h) The 4<sup>th</sup> BCT is assigned to Multinational Division-South (34<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division) and operates within the three southern Iraqi provinces of Dhi Qar, Mayson, and Al-Muthanna. The BCT exercises command and control over the 21 transition teams already present within the region and supports the four PRTs working there.<sup>105</sup> As the Army continues its developmental program of up to eight AABs,<sup>106</sup> transition teams rotating to Iraq are envisioned as being formed within the brigades during their ARFORGEN ready cycle, then deployed and redeployed with them to ensure fully integrated operations during their year of employment.<sup>107</sup> This approach is intended, in part, to reduce or eliminate the need for externally sourced individual augmentees or transition teams. As AABs become trained and available, the intent is to allocate them regionally, but not to align them permanently as is currently done with such organizations as the MIBs and AFSBs. It is also envisioned that AAB elements may train and deploy below brigade level for specific missions that do not require the entire BCT.<sup>108</sup>

(i) Coincident with the development of the first AAB, the Army reactivated the 162<sup>d</sup> Infantry Brigade (foreign security forces–training teams) on 1 May 2009 at Fort Polk, Louisiana becoming a new element in the GF training base as the advisor academy anticipated in the policy decisions cited above. Taking over the mission previously performed by the 24<sup>th</sup> and 1<sup>st</sup> Infantry Divisions, the 162<sup>d</sup> Infantry Brigade consists of approximately 825 Soldiers augmented significantly by contractor staff. It is tasked to prepare about 5,000 individuals from all services each year for SFA activities in Afghanistan and Iraq. Future student volume will go up or down depending on operational requirements.<sup>109</sup>

(6) Other Army initiatives to build capability to conduct BPC.

(a) The discussion above covers major initiatives undertaken by the Army to improve its capabilities within operating and generating forces for BPC, but this chapter would be incomplete without listing other actions that also support improved capability. Important examples include the following.

- The authorization of 1,300 new civil affairs positions distributed within the active Army and RCs.
- The setting of "Grow the Army" goals ranging from 16 to 53 percent growth for civil affairs, engineers, military police, and special forces, plus 129 percent growth for psychological operations. The functions associated with these forces are relevant to BPC activities.
- The establishment of the TRADOC Cultural Center at Fort Huachuca, Arizona.
- The establishment of the UFMCS at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

- The establishment of HTTs, described in [chapter 2](#).
- The establishment of ARNG ADTs for deployment to Afghanistan to assist farmers in that country.
- The assignment of proponency for stability operations and security force assistance to CAC and designation of commander, CAC as the director for the JCISFA.<sup>110</sup>
- The agreement with SOCOM to cosponsor and staff the JCISFA, established at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
- Action by USAFMSA to develop systems, organizational designs, and force management designs to help Afghan and Iraqi police and defense officials to manage their forces, as well as training provided by USAFMSA to those officials.

(b) Two observations gleaned from this list are particularly noteworthy. First, many of the initiatives require institutional change within the GF. Second, with the exception of HTTs, the changes within the GF fundamentally represent reachback capability to support the action of operating forces in theater that are conducting BPC, rather than deploying GF capability to provide direct support. (GF reachback support in the area of BPC is described in [chapter 3](#).)

(c) A challenge in identifying personnel who could support BPC efforts is ensuring visibility of people with critical skills. One initiative being explored at this time is the documentation of civilian acquired skills for RC personnel. An application of this program would be the assignment of the best people with the skills required to fill augmentation positions which support BPC. Just one example would be identifying individuals with necessary skills supporting civil affairs tasks and assigning them to mobilization TDA positions that augment civil affairs units and BCTs, expanding unit capabilities by utilizing civilian-acquired skills and education, but without the need to take Soldiers out of standing MTOE assets and reducing their readiness.

#### **4-4. Observations, conclusions, and recommendations**

a. The generating and operating forces provide complementary capabilities for stability operations. Army modular formations are, by design, currently capable of conducting many stability operations missions across the spectrum of conflict. Similarly, the institutional Army has resident within it many technical and specialized capabilities that can support stability operations. However, many areas still lack sufficient competence, capability, or capacity to accomplish nontraditional missions.<sup>111</sup> The following observations highlight the realities and challenges to the Army's approach to BPC.

b. Limited GF direct support to operating forces in BPC. As noted above, the GF plays a significant role in the accomplishment of the Army's many responsibilities connected to meeting current and future requirements in the area of BPC, in accordance with national, DOD, and Army mandates. It is also clear that the institutional Army has adapted and is continuing to adapt in order to satisfy those requirements. However, most of the activities performed by GF organizations with respect to BPC are performed in the course of the conduct of their primary missions. In contrast, GF direct support to operating forces with regard to BPC is a relatively small contribution, the most significant element of which appears to be the sourcing of GF

personnel as individual augmentees, rather than providing organizationally- or capability-based direct support. To the degree that the Army continues to rely on GPF as the primary agent for BPC activities and particularly for SFA, these conditions can be expected to remain in place.

c. Strategy to resources. It is fair to question whether or not the current Army Strategy, which projects a reduction in the size of the GF as part of the "Grow the Army" campaign, will resource the GF sufficiently to meet all of its institutional and operational requirements for BPC. The Army is pursuing this approach in the face of its previous identification of 10 significant capability or capacity gaps that exist within the Army for stability operations, most of which are directly connected to the Army's ability to support BPC.<sup>112</sup> While many of these shortfalls are being addressed, it is reasonable to conclude that reducing the size of the GF will perpetuate many of them.

d. Incomplete strategic framework for SFA. The Army's current focus on the conduct of SFA within the context of ongoing counterinsurgency and stability operations deliberately relies on operating forces, notably the emergence of AABs as the primary agent to conduct SFA in the future. This approach is incomplete in that it does not account for other factors, such as the following.

(1) How does the Army incorporate some minimal level of resident SFA capability within the entire operational Army that would be trained and ready for the next contingency operation?

(2) How does the Army fully address the wide variety of SFA requirements that do not require the commitment of an AAB or even part of an AAB, assuming that special operations forces will not have the capacity to accomplish them all?

(3) Consideration of the idea that other brigade and battalion formations (such as maneuver enhancement, engineer, or other functional modular units) will likely be better suited than a BCT for certain kinds of BPC tasks, such as reconstruction.

e. Sourcing outside of modular BCTs. Moreover, given the wide variety of SFA requirements, the Army should expect a continuing need to source outside AABs to fill some SFA requirements on an ad hoc basis. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that the Army framework for SFA deserves further development in order to address requirements on a global, full-spectrum basis.

f. Operating forces performing GF functions. It is noteworthy that most of the activities inherent within BPC constitute core GF functions. For example, the main tasks associated with SFA at the tactical level consist of organize, train, enable, rebuild, and advise, all of which are GF functions. The Army does acknowledge that at the strategic or ministerial level, the organize, train, enable, rebuild, and advise functions will have to be handled by GF experts and organizations, such as USAFMSA, rather than by operating forces.

g. At the same time, both in theater and in the institutional base, operating forces have been committed to augment the GF to perform what are clearly GF tasks. Some examples of this anomaly include the use first of the 1<sup>st</sup> Infantry Division and now the 162<sup>d</sup> Infantry Brigade to

train transition teams. The employment of the 189<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade to conduct PRT training at Fort Bragg, North Carolina; the Phoenix Academy in Iraq; and the commitment of a BCT as the core element of Task Force Phoenix in Afghanistan.

h. Supplemental funding. Supplemental funds appropriated by the Congress to support OEF and OIF are the primary funding source that has enabled the GF to expand its capabilities during the current conflicts to support BPC. However, the use of supplemental funding as an approach to support major ongoing operations experiencing significant expansion and contraction in requirements, rather than relying upon the less flexible standard budgeting process, has become an issue. The expectation now is to end supplemental funding. As these funds disappear, it would likely impair, and in some cases seriously disrupt, the capability of GF organizations to build upon the successes that have been achieved to this point in BPC.

i. Proponency. The Army's policy paper on stability operations, published in June 2008, acknowledged that the Army "...lacks a unifying intellectual institution that can bring together the variety of related, but disparate, efforts that are necessary to fully realize stability operations as a dimension of full-spectrum operations. Many of the most highly demanded stability operations capabilities have partial solutions that have enabled their execution in support of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, they have not been fully institutionalized across DOTMLPF." Since that time, CAC has been designated as the Army proponent for both stability operations and SFA, but it is too early to judge if this measure will prove sufficient to integrate, synchronize, and rationalize the myriad of Army organizations involved in BPC. At this time there are several agencies – joint, Army, and multiservice, – established at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas and linked with CAC, to include JCISFA, the Army/USMC COIN Center, the U.S. Army Stability Operations Proponency Office, and the U.S. Army SFA Proponency Office. But it is not clear yet whether these various organizations will help to enable a unified effort. In this regard, the wide array of challenges to rapidly foster effective stability operations and SFA by the U.S. military has led to a diverse set of organizations addressing these challenges, much as has been seen with efforts to counter IEDs.

j. Further institutionalization of BPC capability within the GF. It remains to be seen to what degree the Army will take action to make permanent many of the ad hoc organizations that have been formed to improve its capabilities for stability operations and BPC. As a prime example, consider the employment of PRTs, which have proven their value in both Iraq and Afghanistan as a critical capability for creating and advancing stability and partner capacity during the hold phase of a clear-build-hold framework. Although the PRTs technically are a DOS program, the U.S. has relied upon military assets to field them, highlighting the fact that conditions in-theater may often demand that DOD have such a capability ready for employment. The challenge of transitioning from military-led PRTs (DOD) in unsecure areas to civilian-led PRTs (DOS) once relative security has been established must be factored into fielding and training plans. The projected effectiveness of AABs is based in part on the presence of a PRT-like capability. Given this mutually beneficial relationship, what action should the Army take to institutionalize PRT-like capability? Similar questions can be raised regarding the future disposition of organizations such as HTS, the TRADOC Cultural Center, and others.

---

## **Chapter 5**

### **GF Support to Improvement in Strategic Responsiveness of the Operational Army**

#### **5-1. Synopsis**

Because of the dependence of the Army on joint enablers – notably joint lift, joint information operations planning systems, and joint deployment and distribution processes – the Army GF alone lacks the capability to substantively improve the strategic responsiveness of the Army.

#### **5-2. Introduction**

a. This chapter addresses the ways and means by which the Army can employ GF capabilities to improve the strategic responsiveness of the operational Army. It considers lessons learned during the course of recent operations, recognizes the shortfalls and gaps that currently exist which hinder strategic responsiveness, takes note of initiatives that GF organizations have already undertaken to improve strategic responsiveness, and identifies additional improvements that appear to be feasible and desirable.

b. One of the three fundamental categories of GF support to operations as presented in FM 1-01 is enabling strategic reach. The FM defines strategic reach as the "... distance and duration across which the nation can project military power." Thus, the overall idea of strategic reach centers on force projection, which is further separated into projection of forces, force packages, capabilities, and the stocks and supplies required to sustain those forces and capabilities. The converse of force projection is redeployment and retrograde operations as the means of returning forces and capabilities to start points where they are reset, re-equipped, retrained, and made ready and available for future operational requirements.

c. In the U.S. Army, the concept of force projection has matured over time beyond simply the idea of moving forces and stocks to distant locations, to the realization that it is best viewed as a complex operation, focused rigorously on meeting joint force requirements, in which operators, transporters, and logisticians play critical, integrated roles. The complexity of force projection can be simplified by thinking within the framework of strategic and operational lift, infrastructure, processes, and the organizations required to execute force projection.

(1) Lift encompasses the materiel assets required to move physically forces from points of origin to the JOA. The critical elements for strategic force projection are strategic airlift and sealift capabilities, complemented by intratheater lift assets that can be used to complete strategic force projection from intermediate staging bases, when used, or for forces located in regions adjacent to the joint operational area. Lift also includes Army watercraft and over-the-shore capabilities, as well as APS and equipment afloat.

(2) Infrastructure encompasses the nodes from point of origin through air and sea ports of debarkation through intermediate staging bases or forward operating bases to air and sea ports of debarkation. For the purposes of this study, it does not include the surface transportation networks used to move from installations to the ports of embarkation or from ports of debarkation to operational areas.

(3) Processes cover the joint planning process, the joint deployment process, and the joint distribution process, along with the materiel and information enablers required for them and for supporting functions, such as in-transit visibility, data management, automated decision aids, and others.

(4) The Army is the only service that, with the exception of certain aviation assets, depends entirely on joint capabilities to project its forces, stocks, and supplies. The Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps all possess organic capabilities to deploy all or most of their capabilities required to support joint force commanders. For this reason, most of the significant initiatives to improve the strategic responsiveness of the Army depend on action taken by the other services to provide improved capabilities.

### 5-3. Study constraints

a. Lift capacity, as well as the development of advanced lift capabilities, fall outside the scope of this chapter for two reasons. First, ARCIC and HQDA have already completed work analyzing and justifying the need for advanced air and sea platforms. If developed, the consequences of this work would create a leap forward in the strategic responsiveness of the Army and its ability to meet the deployment goals established for it in future concepts and the Army's Power Projection Program Management Plan.<sup>113</sup>

b. Second, decisions regarding air and sea lift, as well as the composition and positioning of APS-afloat, are OSD-level policy decisions that often take years to implement, particularly with respect to new capabilities. This chapter also does not include the reception, staging, onward movement, and integration process in-theater, since those processes largely fall under the purview of the joint force commander. Consequently, this chapter constrains its discussions to infrastructure, processes, and organizations relevant to force deployment and redeployment.

c. Known shortfalls in the joint deployment and redeployment process. The experience of recent conflicts richly informs a multitude of areas in which improvement is desirable and achievable with respect to deployment infrastructure, processes, and organizations. Additional demands to enable no-notice or short-notice crisis response must also be considered.

#### (1) Infrastructure.

(a) Army installations vary significantly with respect to standardized processes, owing in part to variations in the surface means that they use to move forces to PODs, as well as in capacity with respect to force flow.

(b) Installation infrastructure optimized in the past for deployment of active Army forces needs improvement to accommodate the increased force flow of USAR and ARNG forces.

(c) Joint and Army port opening and port clearing capabilities do not have the capacity needed for major force deployments.

(d) DOD has not invested fully in the sea port of debarkation and intermediate staging base infrastructure that the joint force will likely be using in future contingency operations.

(2) Processes.

(a) Despite years of effort, both the joint deployment and joint distribution processes have not been integrated fully into a joint deployment and distribution enterprise (JDDE).

(b) The automated knowledge and management systems required for greater integration are not fully interoperable.

(c) In-transit visibility of both forces and stocks continues to fall short of the level of quality desired.

(d) Data standards to support interoperability across planning, deployment, distribution, and redeployment information systems have not been fully established or implemented. Noncommon data standards create a wide variety of hindrances that normally require deliberate and time-consuming efforts to deconflict.

(e) Overall, deployment and distribution software, automated systems, and architectures lag behind those developed to meet operational needs.

(f) Redeployment and retrograde operations have not adequately supported the ARFORGEN reset process. Despite recent improvements and initiatives, the timelines remain challenging. For example, deployment planning data used for redeployment operations have often been in error, because data had not been properly scrubbed to reflect an accurate accounting for equipment actually on the ground.

d. Joint and Army initiatives to improve strategic responsiveness of operating forces. The initiatives described below originate primarily from joint organizations, for the reasons stated earlier. The ones selected for discussion here are those for which the Army is involved through SDDC (the Army service component command within TRANSCOM) and through Army collaboration with Joint Forces Command (JFCOM).

(1) Infrastructure improvement and support.

(a) The Deployment Process Modernization Office, established under TRADOC's CASCOM, is currently developing a set of standardized templates for installation support functions, exploiting a "best practices process and expressed in terms of resources, training, and procedures. Intended benefits include the establishment of a clear set of responsibilities for installation deployment support, empirical data to clarify work load, matched against required resources, and a higher level of standardization on a worldwide basis."<sup>114</sup>

(b) In an action to improve joint and Army port opening capabilities, SDDC led the development of a transportation theater port opening element (TTOE) to fill a gap in that area. HQDA resourcing decisions project the creation of one active, five USAR, and one ARNG

TTOE unit(s). The active Army unit is the 382<sup>d</sup> TTOE, assigned to the 7<sup>th</sup> Sustainment Brigade. The mission of the TTOE is to facilitate rapid theater opening and to sustain expeditionary force flow.

(c) TRANSCOM–JTF-PO. The JTF-PO, described in [chapter 2](#), is another initiative to address the gap in port opening and clearance operations. This organization enhances the capability of joint and Army forces to maintain better visibility of initial force and distribution flows into theater and to ensure the proper synchronization of logistics capabilities in order to optimize force flows through ports of debarkation. SDDC is directly involved in any follow-on staffing of the JTF-PO construct.

(2) Improving processes. The two joint organizations charged with executive agent and proponent responsibilities for joint deployment and distribution processes are JFCOM and TRANSCOM. The Secretary of Defense designated JFCOM as the joint deployment process owner (JDPO) on 12 November 2001, to improve "... effectiveness and efficiency of the joint deployment and redeployment processes." Two years later, on 16 September 2003, he designated the commander of TRANSCOM as the distribution process owner and charged the commander with responsibility to "... direct and supervise strategic distribution and synchronize all participants in the end-to-end supply, transportation, and distribution pipeline." JFCOM and TRANSCOM have developed a shared vision of the JDDE to synchronize and rationalize their respective responsibilities.

(a) JFCOM JDPO initiatives.<sup>115</sup>

- Deployment information integration. Deployment information integration supports deployment data quality and integration initiatives, including single load planning capability and a data quality strategy for DOD automatic identification technology.
- Single load planning capability. This initiative is a comprehensive, JDDE-integrated load planning capability for air, sea, rail, and road movement. It provides an enterprise-wide capability that uses an integrated data source for load plan development, execution, and sharing of data.
- Automatic identification technology. This initiative is designed to help create clearly defined data standards that give joint forces reliable and authoritative deployment information. It includes visualization and decision support tools to maintain visibility of shipment status and provide combat closure information.
- Coalition deployment planning tool. This tool provides visibility of coalition deployment information in U.S. command and control systems.
- Joint capabilities requirements manager (JCRM). See [chapter 7](#) for an in-depth discussion of this initiative and its beneficial effects on improved aggregation of force sourcing requirements, integrating planning data with the deployment process.
- Unified view experimentation. The JFCOM JDPO conducts a continuous experimentation process intended to identify joint deployment process challenges and recommend solutions through an aggressive application of the JCIDS process.
- OIF deployment planning and execution lessons learned. This initiative represents JDPO's deliberate action to collect lessons learned from operational experience and to identify required deployment and redeployment improvements for long-term action.

(b) TRANSCOM initiatives.<sup>116</sup>

- Transportation tracking numbers. In collaboration with JFCOM JDPO, TRANSCOM is working with the services and defense agencies to resolve differences that exist within the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES) and the Defense Transportation System regarding planning, movement data, carrier data, and shipment data through the use of transportation tracking numbers. TTNs are intended to provide accurate reporting on shipment closure, aid synchronization of movements from strategic to theater points, compare what was actually moved against what was planned, and provide multi-modal visibility on force movements on commercial assets.
- Transportation priority 4. This is an initiative that increases the use of unused airlift capacity for retrograde of materiel. It is proving to be a low-cost approach that creates additional capacity for retrograde requirements.
- Node management enhancements. As a result of the node management and deployable depot advanced concept technology demonstration, TRANSCOM incorporated the use of commercial, off-the-shelf applications to provide the warfighter with improved node management visibility data and support tools. This capability can complement JTF-PO operations, service-specific expeditionary theater opening forces, and the enduring presence of Army sustainment commands (expeditionary) mission in-theater, as directed by the joint force commander (JFC).

(c) AMC Initiatives – responsible reset TF. AMC executes on behalf of the Army a responsible reset using the full power of the Materiel Enterprise. This program ensures rapid return, repair, redistribution, and combat power regeneration for the Army in coordination with CENTCOM, ARCENT, and USF-I in-theater, HQDA, and the core enterprises in CONUS. The TF is an organization that was designed to synchronize theater and Materiel Enterprise processes in order to efficiently and effectively reset the Army as combat forces draw down from the theater. It is manned by resources from the materiel enterprise, giving it the capability to right-size based on requirements. It is a split-based operation (CONUS, OCONUS) designed to bridge the gap between theater operations geared toward combat and materiel enterprise processes geared toward Army reset. The TF ensures property accountability, total asset visibility, equipment triage forward, and timely disposition for equipment and materiel. It is constructed to leverage the full spectrum capability and capacity of the materiel enterprise to enable the rapid rebuild of Army combat power.

(3) Organizations

(a) TRANSCOM. TRANSCOM helped to create the CENTCOM Distribution and Deployment Operations Center. This center links strategic deployment and distribution processes to operational and tactical functions in support of the warfighter, with the ultimate goal of improving logistics from the point of origin to the point of consumption. In order to do this, the center is staffed with members from TRANSCOM, JFCOM JDPO, DLA, AMC, Joint Munitions Command, ASC, and the other services.

(b) SDDC. SDDC dispatches deployment support teams from its deployment support brigades (sourced from the RC) into theater to augment theater capabilities. Similarly, it sends unit movement teams to support redeployment operations. The unit movement teams verify

dimensional data on cargo that is heading to port before it is received to ensure accurate loading manifests. SDDC has also established Transportation Coordinators' Automated Information for Movement System processing stations throughout the Iraq theater to help meet the decreased redeployment timelines that have been established to speed up the return movement of equipment needed in ARFORGEN reset cycles.

(c) DLA. DLA created the Deployable Distribution Center as a rapidly deployable capability to provide near real-time decision support in the early days of a contingency. This center is an option to the JFC to establish an in-theater supply depot capability. More study is necessary to determine how the deployable distribution center is planned for, deploys with, and integrates into the theater logistics footprint. This should include command and control deployment, movement and inventory planning, parts inventory, movement of inventory, and how the center is synchronized with other sources of supply to meet the materiel requirements of the JFC.

(d) AMC and ACC. AMC developed a concept plan consolidating the Army Contracting Agency with AMC assets in order to create the ACC as a separate command able to serve as the Army's single contracting command. It developed and staffed an FDU adding 256 Soldiers to the Total Army MTOE contracting force structure. AMC developed and staffed a concept plan to add 594 TDA civilian contract administration and support civilian authorizations to the ACC to expand reachback contracting support to deployed operating forces, and established the Expeditionary Contracting Command under the ACC to provide adaptable, deployable operating force capabilities to conduct contracting support to forces in-theater.

#### **5-4. Conclusion**

a. Because of the dependence of the Army on joint enablers, the Army GF alone lacks the capability to substantively improve the strategic responsiveness of the Army. Army force projection is subject to the continued maturation, refinement, and, where appropriate, expansion of the JDDE. The Army is awaiting significant joint improvements in the areas of lift, infrastructure support, and JDDE processes capable of supporting the full range of Army assets, to include heavy, medium, and light forces deploying to multiple entry points in a wide variety of environments and limited-access situations.

b. Within the theater of operations, particularly in cases where greater distances between forces and/or complex terrain stress limited ground distribution capabilities, intratheater movement and maneuver will rely more on force projection capabilities traditionally applied to intertheater movement. The Army's greatest direct influence is in improving the infrastructure of strategic deployment platforms at home station to enable force responsiveness, especially for no-notice or short-notice crisis response. Such infrastructure improvements are expensive to implement and typically lag behind other higher priority requirements.

## **Chapter 6**

### **Accelerating Materiel Development and Equipping**

#### **6-1. Synopsis**

Due to a variety of challenges and obstacles, especially early on, the Army GF reacted slowly, but eventually quite effectively, to warfighter demands that emerged during the course of OEF and OIF for rapid equipping of materiel solutions to satisfy significant capability gaps in-theater. The lessons learned in the past years should be institutionalized fully through the establishment of a permanent rapid equipping framework during times of peace and war. This chapter surveys the record of GF support in this area during the course of recent operations, and proposes a comprehensive set of principles and guidelines to institutionalize and improve the Army's capability.

#### **6-2. Introduction**

a. One of the most consistently demanding challenges in the conduct of OEF and OIF has been the need for accelerated materiel equipping and fielding to meet urgent operational requirements. As each year passed, new capability gaps emerged in connection with the unique and changing conditions of the conflict, notably the adversaries' innovative employment of lethal means to threaten U.S. forces (and civilians) and perpetuate conditions of instability. The Army and DOD were often surprised by both the means and techniques used by adversaries. However, the efforts undertaken by the DOD represent a significant success story responding and adapting to new operational requirements, and in which the GF played a central role. This chapter examines the role of the GF in this area, asserts the need for the institutionalization of an inherent capability within the Army for rapid equipping and fielding, and proposes a set of principles and guidelines that should lead to an improvement in the capability of the GF to meet such requirements more rapidly and effectively in the future.<sup>117</sup>

b. Before doing so, however, the chapter provides a brief history of previous organizational approaches to accelerated materiel development, describes how the Army adapted to current operational needs in this area, and describes the specific challenges that need to be addressed effectively in any institutionalized organizational solution to future requirements. With respect to the core issue of institutionalizing a capability for accelerated materiel development and equipping, the creation and maturation of the Army's REF and the JIEDDO constitute particularly useful case studies.

#### **6-3. Definitions**

a. Materiel development. The conception, development, and execution of solutions to materiel requirements identified and initiated through the combat developments process, translating equipment requirements into executable programs within acceptable performance, schedule, and cost parameters.<sup>118</sup>

b. Fielding. A complete and detailed DOTMLPF approach focused on a general solution for the entire Army. Fielding is the standard process, governed by Army regulations, Chairman of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instructions (CJCSI), and DOD Instructions (DODI), for identifying, validating, developing, and providing new materiel capabilities.

c. **Equipping.** A timely and evolvable rapid solution meeting or exceeding minimum DOTMLPF issues focused on the needs of a specific unit or theater. As such, equipping is an adjunct to the standard fielding process.

#### **6-4. Historical perspective**

a. Every conflict is accompanied by the emergence of capability gaps and introduces operationally-based requirements for rapidly delivered materiel solutions, with the urgency of those requirements most often depending on the scale, duration, and lethality of the conflict.<sup>119</sup>

b. **World War II and the Korean War.** Early in 1942, the War Department established the War Production Board, which then developed and used the controlled materials plan to emphasize the need to convert civilian industry to military production and to drive rapid growth of production capabilities. The overall approach included dedicated efforts to maintain visibility of dynamically changing operational conditions and requirements;<sup>120</sup> rapidly build capabilities needed to execute new operational concepts; respond to operational assessments of fielded equipment; introduce significant upgrades and model improvements during the course of the war; and, in general, get new technology and equipment into the force as rapidly as possible. In the history of U.S. involvement in World War II, few success stories rise higher than that of the ability of the country to mobilize its industrial capacity to become the arsenal of democracy,<sup>121</sup> not just for the U.S., but for its allied partners, as well. Initially lagging behind Nazi Germany and Japan in many military technologies, the U.S. quickly caught up and surpassed its adversaries in most areas, particularly in the air. However, not all rapidly fielded materiel solutions were successful, the tank destroyer being a notable example.<sup>122</sup> The urgency and flexibility of the World War II system remained in place through the Korean War, but disappeared in the 1950s as the development and acquisition system became more politicized and regulated.

c. **Vietnam war and cold war.**

(1) During the Vietnam war, the deliberate, peacetime materiel development and procurement system largely ruled the day, with a few well-known exceptions. For example, the Army accelerated the fielding of the claymore mine, the M79 grenade launcher, and unattended ground sensors because of their high utility in that operating environment; however, all three items had already been developed prior to the war, so the developmental function was small compared to the need simply to upgrade and procure sufficient numbers. One developmental item fielded quite rapidly was the YO-3A "quiet aircraft," the requirement for which emerged in April 1967. Industry satisfied this need 5 months later with the delivery of two experimental (wooden) aircraft and eventually fielded a mature version in 1970, with a more powerful engine and improved sensor capabilities.<sup>123</sup>

(2) In the post-Vietnam and cold war years, several factors prevented the success of efforts to accelerate the acquisition process. Complications with the commitment and flexible use of

funds constrained effectiveness, including the hand-off of projects from initial, rapid development to the normal long-term procurement and sustainment process. The decline of global threats and reduced commitment of forces in conflicts simultaneously reduced the perceived need for an accelerated development capability. Under such conditions, decision-makers were unwilling to maintain a program approach that inherently included substantial risk when compared to the normal, deliberately low-risk, peacetime acquisition process. The incentive to build and maintain a capability for accelerated materiel development and fielding to be better postured to respond to future conflicts simply did not exist.

d. Post-cold war.

(1) In the 1990s, the Army's Force XXI program to create a digitized force and its recognition of the future need of a more adaptive and responsive acquisition system led to the most notable effort of that time period to create a rapid materiel development program. This was driven in part by the innovative investigations of the Army After Next program to explore the requirements of future war. The initiative was the Warfighter Rapid Acquisition Program (WRAP). The intent in establishing WRAP in 1996 was to rapidly field emerging technological concepts and prototype equipment by bridging the POM process and streamlining program execution.

(2) The first WRAP program, the Bradley-Linebacker mobile air defense system, was an unqualified success that demonstrated the potential value of WRAP. In contrast to three previous efforts that consumed \$8 billion and failed miserably in the preceding 25 years to achieve approval, the Bradley-Linebacker combined two proven systems (the Bradley infantry fighting vehicle and the Stinger surface-to-air missile system) to produce a line-of-sight, forward-area, heavy air defense system, going from concept to full production in only 34 months. The keys to this success included the Secretary of the Army's personal endorsement of the WRAP approach; a clear statement and broad concurrence on the requirement; use of existing, government off-the-shelf (GOTS) components; very low developmental costs; and use of an abbreviated operational requirements document. Collectively, these advantages enabled the system to bypass normal, time-consuming steps for acquisition, as envisioned by the WRAP process.<sup>124</sup>

(3) Although the Bradley-Linebacker broke new ground in rapid acquisition, WRAP was not as effective in other areas. Congressional examination into the program discovered cost growth and schedule delays on some initiatives and criticized the failure to use all the funding allocated to the program. In just a few years, WRAP fell victim to shrinking defense budgets and was disestablished as a funded program by 2003. Had it remained in existence with a continuing funding line, it could have served as the foundation for the rapid equipping and fielding organizations that were subsequently created under crisis conditions, beginning in late 2002, and perhaps helped avoid some of the difficulty and delay that the Army experienced. Instead, going into OEF in 2002 and OIF a year later, neither the Army nor DOD had an effective system in place to respond rapidly to the growing volume of urgent requests that would soon begin to emerge from Army and joint commanders.

## 6-5. GF adaptation from 2002 to 2008

### a. REF.

(1) In many respects, the REF was the flagship of Army organizational innovation to create a capability for rapid response to urgent and immediate warfighter needs for new materiel capabilities in-theater. The history of the organization dates from discussions between the-then-VCSA and the Acquisition Deputy in the Objective Force Task Force at HQDA. The specific issue at the time was the problem of locating and clearing caves in Afghanistan of booby traps and explosive devices. When the Deputy stated he thought he could quickly find a man-portable, remotely operated vehicle to do the job, the VCSA provided initial funding and directed the Army staff to support the effort.

(2) Acting on the authority of the VCSA, the Deputy quickly found some workspace at Fort Belvoir, borrowed some manpower, and pieced together an initial organization. Within 30 days, he succeeded in locating two candidate robotic systems, arranged for an operator controller unit to be customized, and used his staff of volunteers to take what eventually came to be known as "Packbot" and "Marcbot" into theater. While waiting in-country to employ the system, the forward team of volunteers and support contractors trained on the operation of the system, assessed its performance, and made adjustments. Once taken to field locations, the team worked directly with small units at tactical sites and continued the process of feedback, modification, and training of users in these units. Within a short period of time, the units were ready to take control of the gear and execute tasks without the team's assistance. The team handed off the system to CJTF-180 (the U.S. command in Afghanistan at the time) and returned to the U.S. with a list of other needed items not available through the supply system.

(3) Based on this initial success, the REF was officially formed by VCSA directive in November 2002 and placed under the HQDA G-3/5/7, but reporting directly to the VCSA, with a one-year mandate to prove its worth. However, significant obstacles remained with respect to manning, obtaining a reliable funding stream, satisfying acquisition regulations and legislative requirements, stabilizing the organization, and determining the source of its organization and direction.

(4) Two of the initial foundations established by the REF were the selection criteria used to respond to an urgent need, and adoption of a narrow focus with respect to the duration and scope of REF involvement in new materiel development. The critical criterion was time as the fundamental driver – that is, could the organization reliably meet the warfighter request for a materiel solution in a reasonably short time? Neither HQDA nor REF ever established a formal standard for what constituted an acceptable timely response, although the phrase "hours and days rather than weeks and months" framed the general response.<sup>125</sup> Other criteria included validation of the urgency of the need, reasonable cost, and an assessment of feasible maturity of the potential materiel solution.

(5) The second foundation was focus and scope, underscored by the title of the organization itself, which made it clear that the REF would restrict its activities to "equipping" an initial force with the proposed solution. Equipping throughout the theater and fielding the

capability more broadly across the Army, if necessary, would require migration of responsibility to the institutional acquisition community. Equipping was further understood to encompass only an initial sustainment package consisting of contractor support, spare parts, minimal training materials, and support for rapid fabrication, repair, and adaptation.

(6) In addition, based on guidance received from the CENTCOM commander, REF adopted a standard of "acceptable" (defined as a 51 percent solution)<sup>126</sup> as the performance criterion for materiel solutions, which is in stark contrast to the much higher standards that characterize the overall acquisition process. REF further undertook to establish a permanent presence in-theater with forward support element(s) charged to coordinate directly with units; help describe immediate urgent requirements; provide the minimal sustainment as described above; ensure delivery of materiel; collect feedback on system performance; and transmit recommendations to the parent organization regarding the need for improvement, modification, or termination.

(7) During the course of 2003, the REF struggled as a temporary organization to execute its mission to meet urgent operational requirements through rapid equipping of new capabilities, which expanded quickly to cover a broad gamut of needs, including communications, clothing, sensing devices, jamming devices, and even construction and infrastructure items. Initially, the Army provided funding through the Army Strategic Planning Board, a three-star panel chaired by the HQDA Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, applied to individually approved projects, primarily using supplemental funds. An effort to establish a funding line failed due to constraints on how current-year and POM dollars could be used. Simultaneously, an extended, running debate emerged with respect to the long-term disposition of the REF, comprising several competing viewpoints.

(8) In August 2003, the new CSA, directed that the REF continue to report directly to the VCSEA, while operating under the direction of the HQDA G-3/5/7 and under the oversight of the Army Acquisition Executive, specifically the Military Deputy (MILDEP) to the ASA(ALT). He also assigned two new tasks: first, to conduct operational assessments to support decisions on development and fielding of new capabilities beyond the immediate needs met in-theater; and, second, to review requirements for the future force and help identify technologies suitable for incorporation. Nevertheless, as the one-year anniversary of the REF and its November 2003 formal review approached, the organization still had no reliable, sufficient funding source; no authorized source of work force; no approved TDA, MTOE, or organizational hierarchy; and only borrowed workspace in the Night Vision Laboratory at Fort Belvoir, Virginia.

(9) The lack of a staffing document meant that the REF had no authority to requisition personnel, and the Army's Human Resources Command had no authority to assign personnel to them. As a result, the organization continued to rely on volunteers and borrowed work force to obtain the experienced operators, logisticians, and acquisition experts that it needed to succeed. In 2004, HQDA G-3/5/7 also issued formal personnel taskings for the REF, within the constraints of the 179-day assignment limit permissible under that process. While this approach helped to staff the REF, it also generated a recurring need for personnel training and assimilation and created high personnel turnover.

(10) Another continuing issue concerned the REF's oversight. Despite clear guidance articulated in August 2003, the debate continued over the question of the parent organization for the REF. Both the Army Acquisition Executive and AMC objected to the placement of the REF under the HQDA G-3/5/7 on the grounds that, as an acquisition entity, the REF should operate under the direction and oversight of the acquisition community. Considering the research and development character of the REF approach, one AMC course of action proposed making the REF subordinate to RDECOM. An assessment by the Army Office of the General Counsel in early 2004 reinforced these concerns by emphasizing the perceived lack of positive control over the acquisition activities of the REF by the milestone decision authority. Legislative constraints on adding organizational structure to HQDA in the National Capital Region further complicated the question.<sup>127</sup>

(11) In March 2004, the VCSA and ASA(ALT) MILDEP jointly approved a draft REF charter and proposed organization and mission. Its mission was to "provide operational commanders with rapidly employable solutions to enhance lethality, survivability, and force protection through the insertion of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) ('insert'), GOTS ('equip') and future force technologies while informing the Army stakeholders ('assess') to remain ahead of an adaptive enemy." This mission statement with its three primary functions of insert, equip, and assess was briefed to Congress by the ASA(ALT).<sup>128</sup> Nevertheless, full implementation stalled. Thus, during the course of 2004, three main questions continued to remain unresolved: How is the REF to be manned? How can a reliable funding line be established? How can the REF be aligned organizationally to accommodate both the need for operational direction to optimally represent warfighter requirements and the simultaneous need to ensure appropriate acquisition oversight to remain in compliance with the manifold requirements within that process?

(12) The decisive point in this debate occurred in October 2004 in conjunction with an in-progress review for the VCSA. At the review, the VCSA directed the preparation of a TDA for the REF and charged the acquisition community to ensure that the REF remained in compliance with Title 10 constraints and acquisition regulations and to accept early hand-off of responsibility for sustainment and fielding. The VCSA instructed TRADOC to deal with the issue of documentation of requirements and determination of the long-term disposition of new capabilities; and directed the HQDA G-8 to get the REF formally funded in the POM. At a subsequent meeting, the VCSA confirmed the overarching relationships previously defined by the CSA a year earlier – that the REF would fall under HQDA G-3/5/7 direction and continue to report to the VCSA. The TDA for the REF was submitted in January 2005 and approved in March, with an effective date of October 2005, roughly 3 years after the REF's stand-up. Figures 6-1 and 6-2 depict the final functional and organizational relationships that define the REF.

(13) Despite the long delays in stabilizing the REF structure, its command relationships, and a funding stream, the REF's performance in support of deployed forces has been remarkably successful. By the end of 2007, the organization had delivered over 550 types of equipment and more than 75,000 individual items, achieving an average of 111 days across all projects for their fielding. The REF did not operate in isolation. As the requirements for its support expanded, so did other requirements that generated parallel demands for rapid response to operational needs beyond the scope or time horizon of the REF. Over time, an integrated network of such

organizations arose, all of which connected in significant fashion to the activities of the REF and vice versa. Some of these are summarized below.




Figure 6-1. The REF model (2004)




Figure 6-2. REF organizational chart with command relations (2004)

b. The Army IED TF and JIEDDO.

(1) By October 2003, the IED threat in Iraq had grown to a scale that demanded an institutional response, leading to a decision to establish the Army IED TF. The VCSA deliberately linked the activities of the REF to the new IED TF, which quickly adopted many practices originated by the REF. Essentially, the IED TF and REF formed a partnership, with the

REF providing technical assessment and contracting support in the effort to mitigate the IED threat. IED TF teams in-theater, colocated with REF forward elements. The REF acted as the rapid acquisition agent for the IED TF.<sup>129</sup>

(2) From its inception, the IED TF worked closely with the other services, and its projects often served multiple services. Given the common nature of the IED threat and the logic of fully integrating efforts across the joint force, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, in July 2004, acted to "reflag" the Army IED TF as the joint IED TF (JIEDTF) and formally assign it joint responsibilities under Army executive agency. The ongoing relationship with the REF remained in effect, but expanded to include direct personnel support to JIEDTF in the areas of acquisition, training, scientists, intelligence analysis, and program analysis. The pre-existence of both the REF and Army IED TF substantively enabled the new joint organization to execute its mission without interruption. However, after DOD converted JIEDTF to the JIEDDO in February 2006 and the Army relinquished executive agency, direct interaction between REF and JIEDDO declined (although REF support to JIEDDO remains a priority).<sup>130</sup> In addition, the much larger size of JIEDDO and differences in mission and functions serve to increase the separation.<sup>131</sup>

(3) The JIEDDO mission is notably different from REF in that it focuses more or less exclusively on actions to counter IED threats, and it also carries out a comprehensive training mission. The JIEDDO mission is to lead, advocate, and coordinate all DOD actions in support of the combatant commanders and their respective JTFs' efforts to defeat IEDs as weapons of strategic influence. JIEDDO supports the warfighter through three lines of operations: attack the network, defeat the device, and train the force. Like the REF, JIEDDO employs field teams that are permanently deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan to support its equipping and fielding activities, performing functions similar to those of REF field teams. In the training arena, the JIEDDO Joint Expeditionary Team advises units from platoon to division level prior to deployment on how to attack IED networks, and provides counter-IED battle staff training.<sup>132</sup> It may also temporarily deploy elements to perform the same functions in theater. See figure 6-3.




Figure 6-3. JIEDDO organization (2008)<sup>133</sup>

(4) The rapid acquisition process employed by JIEDDO is the Joint IED Capability Approval and Acquisition Management Process (JCAAMP), published in 2007. JCAAMP leverages an extensive network of interested parties and organizations in industry, academia, service and DOD laboratories, and other government agencies to develop potential counter-IED solutions to urgent operational needs. In 2007, that network included relationships with nearly 300 corporations, 24 universities and research centers, and 37 government labs.

(5) JCAAMP is described as operating like an investment bank to accelerate the development of off-the-shelf technologies and products with high potential for application in-theater. In addition, JIEDDO takes some risk with technologies that still require additional maturation and iterative testing. Candidate solutions are developed and validated for funding within the JCAAMP, then tested, refined, deployed, and assessed under operational conditions. After a sustainment period of 1 to 2 years under JIEDDO control, initiatives are migrated to the services as a program of record or are terminated. JIEDDO calculates that JCAAMP significantly shortens the time between recognition of an urgent capability gap and the delivery of a feasible solution. Its organizational goals are to find and develop an initiative within 4 to 12 months and to deploy and assess that initiative within 12 to 24 months. (As noted earlier, JIEDDO target goals for putting a feasible solution in the hands of Soldiers extend well beyond those of the REF.)<sup>134</sup>

(6) The Joint Center of Excellence established at Fort Irwin, California, in 2006 is the primary executor of the JIEDDO training function, ensuring that units "have the opportunity to train with the counter-IED tactics and equipment currently found in-theater and in conditions that mirror those in Iraq and Afghanistan."<sup>135</sup> The Joint Center of Excellence is augmented by service-specific centers of excellence at Twenty-Nine Palms, California (USMC), Lackland AFB, Texas (U.S. Air Force), and Indian Head, Maryland (U.S. Navy).

(7) In 2007, JIEDDO stood up its COIC to support efforts in-theater to attack enemy networks employing IEDs, fusing multiple source intelligence to support tactical targeting.<sup>136</sup> It also enables strategic reachback to exploit information and serves as a source for new technologies in the intelligence community.

(8) Army integration with JIEDDO operates through multiple avenues under oversight of the Army Asymmetric Warfare Office at HQDA. The most directly connected is the Army's JTCOIC, established in 2007 based on a memorandum of agreement with JIEDDO. The JTCOIC is responsible for coordinating the training of deploying units on joint, national, and interagency intelligence and on counter-IED and emerging asymmetric capabilities; integrating processes, practices, concepts, and materiel capabilities into Army DOTMLPF solutions; and coordinating with training centers to provide realistic enemy and environmental signatures into models and simulations in support of realistic intelligence collection and analysis. The JTCOIC models counter-IED solution sets necessary to develop and implement internal unit training provided to deploying brigade and division battle staffs in order to enable effective employment of counter-IED solutions, assist deployed forces in analysis of counter-IED operations, and proactively assist in identifying and addressing counter-IED capability gaps. It maintains high situational understanding of changing IED conditions in-theater through direct linkages to

deployed JIEDDO elements and in-theater intelligence sources, and acts quickly to apply those changes into the Army's counter-IED training programs.<sup>137</sup>

(9) Since its inception, JIEDDO has been resourced through a three-year supplemental fund specifically allocated to their mission. As noted in its FY2007 Annual Report, JIEDDO's rapidly changing requirements often require reprogramming between JIEDDO's three lines of operations. (An example of flexible funding was the Army loan to JIEDDO of \$80 million in operations and maintenance funds to ensure coverage of JIEDDO operating costs in the first quarter of FY2007.) As of Fall 2008, OSD Program Analysis and Evaluation was seeking to stabilize JIEDDO funding, which has been at a level of about \$4 billion annually, relying heavily on supplemental funds. The funding line in the base budget (\$500 million in 2008 and 2009, slated to increase to \$1 billion by FY2013) will cover approximately one-third of JIEDDO's overall funding requirement. Looking to the supplemental process to supply the other two-thirds is viewed as encouraging more rapid hand-off of capability solutions to the services for program sustainment and providing flexibility to respond to the ebb and flow of requirements, and to address the delay that often accompanies supplemental legislation. This overall approach presupposes parallel commitment and action by DOD to institutionalize the organization.<sup>138</sup>

(10) In terms of performance, the JIEDDO Web site notes that the organization "fielded more than 32,000 jammers that prevent remote-control triggered IEDs. It has helped field additional armoring on thousands of vehicles to mitigate IED effects; provided HTTs that helped commanders better understand social networks in their areas of operations; fielded intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities; and provided law enforcement professionals who help commanders better understand the enemy's decentralized, criminal-like networks. Also, JIEDDO provided significant training support for deploying troops by fielding surrogate training systems and enhancing the operational environments in the training centers to reflect conditions in-theater. Training enhancements, troop proficiency, and the employment of protective capabilities have caused the enemy to work harder to achieve desired results."<sup>139</sup>

(11) Despite an array of capability initiatives delivered to theater forces over the past several years by JIEDDO, a recent subcommittee report by the House Armed Services Committee criticized the absence of meaningful metrics that clearly demonstrate the value of JIEDDO activities and permit a reliable assessment of the organization's effectiveness. The report also complained that JIEDDO's reliance on supplemental funding hampered Congress's visibility of JIEDDO's expenditures and hindered the transition of JIEDDO initiatives to service programs of record.<sup>140</sup>

c. Asymmetric warfare group (AWG) and the AAWO.

(1) The DOD decision to annex the Army IED TF as the base for the JIEDTF left the Army without its own organizational proponent in this area. In response, the Army established the AWG in January 2005 as a FOA under HQDA G-3/5/7.<sup>141</sup> The AWG absorbed the tasks performed previously by the IED TF and assumed others, including the following:

(a) Serving as the global conventional U.S. Army expert on asymmetric warfare.

- (b) Deploying, integrating, coordinating, and commanding AWG trained and ready forces.
- (c) Assisting in the identification, development, and integration of countermeasure technologies.
- (d) Establishing linkages with all internal, COCOM, and national intelligence agencies.
- (e) Disseminating validated tactics, techniques, and procedures in the area of asymmetric warfare.
- (f) Analyzing asymmetric threats and supporting JTF commanders and units in countering asymmetric warfare threats.

(2) As is evident, the AWG's purview extended well beyond that of the REF to areas such as threat assessment, training, and a much broader set of asymmetric warfare concerns. The AWG and REF worked very closely together, with the REF reporting to the AWG and the AWG acting as the conduit for operational direction and prioritization from HQDA G-3/5/7. Subsequently, the G-3/5/7 recognized that it needed its own dedicated staff element to more fully integrate and direct the activities of the AWG, REF, and other organizations, thus establishing the AAWO to assume direction of both the AWG and the REF.

d. TRADOC Asymmetric Warfare Division (AWD) and Accelerated Capabilities Division (ACD)

(1) TRADOC's AWD traced its origins to the establishment of several CSA task forces in late 2003 and early 2004, one of which was charged with examining and providing solutions regarding how TRADOC could respond more rapidly to capabilities urgently needed to support operating forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. This effort was merged with an existing organization at TRADOC, known then as the Spiraling Division, which was engaged in accelerating capabilities emerging from the Future Combat Systems program (an effort otherwise focused on a component of the future force) to be fielded to the current force. Staffed initially with experienced contractors, the new organization successfully supported several major new initiatives, including TF Odin, the counter-rockets, artillery, and mortars program, and counter-IED development.

(2) In 2005, an approved TDA was established and the Spiraling Division transitioned to the AWD, with a portfolio that expanded in the next several years beyond immediate materiel needs to include a broader range of responsibilities and activities related to asymmetric warfare. Over time, the AWD became deeply involved in the development, demonstration, and deployment of many other significant capabilities, including: Convoy protect demonstration, sniper defeat, full spectrum effects platform–Stryker, enhanced logistics support off-road vehicle, base expeditionary targeting and surveillance system, and land warrior–next generation.

(3) With an expansion of its mission to serve as the TRADOC lead for accelerated capabilities development to support the current force across all DOTMLPF domains, the AWD transitioned to become the ACD, while retaining subelements that are still deeply engaged in its

former areas of interest. The ACD is also the central coordinating organization for HQDA G-3/5/7 and AAWO support requirements, and is the integrator for asymmetric warfare activities across TRADOC, the Army, and DOD. Periodically, the ACD deploys teams into theater to clarify requirements and obtain firsthand observations and reports on the performance of capabilities which it has sponsored or assisted in development. It is also the action agency for the capabilities development for rapid transition process, described below.

e. RFI.

(1) The RFI is briefly described here as a contrast to the REF, which constitutes the core of the discussion in this chapter. Like the REF, the RFI was created as a result of a VCSA decision in Fall 2002, based on reports of unmet requirements in OEF. In the case of the RFI, the compelling issue was evidence that Soldiers in Afghanistan were purchasing personal items needed for their protection or well-being that were commercially available, but had not been issued to them prior to or after deployment. In response, the VCSA directed Program Executive Officer (PEO) Soldier to take immediate action to equip all deploying Soldiers with enhanced capabilities driven by the demands of operations in-theater, and which supplemented the pre-existing baseline of unit and Soldier equipment. Initial successful efforts quickly led to the institutionalization of the RFI as a centralized, rapid fielding arm of PEO Soldier, with a goal of furnishing a set of new gear to every single deploying or already-deployed Soldier.

(2) Drawing from current programs and operational lessons learned in OEF and OIF, and relying heavily on COTS technology and products, RFI seeks to improve the survivability, lethality, and mobility of Soldiers and units. The list of equipment falling under RFI, which is periodically updated by TRADOC, has grown over 6 years from 15 to over 80 items, based on Soldier feedback and changing requirements. Two categories of equipment are provided, the first focused on Soldier needs and the second on unit requirements.<sup>142</sup> Today, the organization has successfully synchronized its fielding program to issue equipment prior to unit deployments, but in its initial period of activity it employed teams to meet units in-theater to size Soldiers for equipment and arrange for immediate delivery from rapidly established fielding sites. As items within RFI kits are incorporated into the Army supply system, they are removed from the RFI list.

(3) By the end of 2007, PEO Soldier had fielded RFI kits to 100 percent of the active Army and 60 percent of the RC, essentially accomplishing the mission set for it in late 2002. However, it continues to innovate and improve its processes to meet Soldier needs in-theater, while also reducing costs. Over the past year and more, PEO Soldier has modified its fielding process to reduce redundant fielding of RFI items, taken action to improve the sustaining base for new gear, trained units to conduct their own sizing activities, and implemented measures to improve supply discipline. In addition, the organization is now implementing and evaluating a HQDA-directed pilot program to conduct RFI fielding in the premobilization phase for RC units identified for deployment.<sup>143</sup>

(4) As of September 2008, over 1,180,000 Soldiers worldwide had received RFI kits. In addition to the hard work and innovation at PEO Soldier, the immediate and continuing success

of RFI can be attributed to the following factors, which are notable as a contrast to the history and evolution of the REF:

(a) RFI was established within an existing organization with an existing POM funding line and manning document.

(b) It is functionally contained within the acquisition community for direction and execution, and well-postured for transition of procurements into programs of record and the sustaining base.

(c) The mainstream function of fielding Soldier and unit equipment was already being performed by PEO Soldier.

(d) It developed and employs streamlined processes for distribution and accountability.

(e) It handles a relatively narrow scope of required equipment, which in most cases was resolved fairly easily through GOTS and COTS procurements.

f. Joint rapid acquisition cell (JRAC).

(1) Other than JIEDDO, the most significant initiative undertaken at the joint and OSD level to address the need for meeting urgent operational requirements was the establishment of the JRAC in September 2004. The JRAC was formed "...to assist in resolving issues impeding the urgent materiel and logistics requirements that the combatant commanders certify as operationally critical,"<sup>144</sup> specifically targeting the "institutional barriers that prevent timely and effective joint warfighter support."<sup>145</sup> Organized as an element within the Rapid Reaction Technology Office under the director of Defense Research and Engineering, JRAC functions as the single point of contact in OSD for addressing urgent joint force needs, as opposed to service-specific rapid acquisition requirements. The USD(AT&L) and the USD comptroller collectively provide oversight, with the requirement for periodic direct reports on JRAC activities to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense. JRAC's small permanent cell is augmented by a larger core group and an advisory group of flag officers and senior executive service representatives from the services, COCOMs, and other defense activities.

(2) Unlike the Army's and other services' rapid equipping organizations, JRAC is focused exclusively on accelerating the acquisition process, primarily through the rapid validation of joint urgent operational needs statements (JUONS).<sup>146</sup> Per directive, JUONS may be submitted by a COCOM (or COCOM delegated authority), the CJCS, a military department, a DOD agency, or a senior defense official through the USD(AT&L). In practice, the majority of JUONS originate from COCOMs. The Vice Director, Joint Staff J-8 serves as the gatekeeper for receipt of JUONS, which are then reviewed by the Joint Capabilities Board or one of the Functional Capabilities Boards, as appropriate, to develop a recommendation for disposition, validation by the CJCS, and transmission to the JRAC. The goal for action by the Joint Staff is 48 hours, but no later than 14 days. If the Joint Staff recommends a materiel solution to the JUONS, the core group will normally convene to determine if the JUONS will be designated as

an immediate warfighter need.<sup>147</sup> Target execution time to provide a solution to the immediate need is 120 days.

(3) At this point, the JRAC designates a military department, a defense agency, or SOCOM as executive agent to implement the project, and then monitors execution. The JRAC provides no funding, but it assists the designated executive agent to obtain funding through Congressional supplementals, such as the Iraqi Freedom Fund, or through reprogramming.

(4) The enactment of the Rapid Acquisition Authority legislation in 2003, amended in 2005, expanded the authority of the Secretary of Defense to acquire rapidly equipment urgently needed on the battlefield. Although it provided no funding source, it allows the DOD to reallocate current-year funding and waive laws and regulations governing equipment testing and procurement. JRAC, as the action agent, serves as the administrator of the Rapid Acquisition Authority.<sup>148</sup>

(5) The JRAC views its activities as a successful adjunct to the normal acquisition process and cites a number of important equipping efforts. These include the rapid development and deployment of counter-rocket, artillery, and mortar capability; funding support for a suite of non-lethal capabilities applicable to urban environments; purchase of commercial radios to facilitate communications between coalition forces in rugged terrain; and the surge in interest in and emphasis on biometric capabilities to support the war on terror. Work continues within the JRAC to help resolve two common challenges: expansion and simplification of the ways in which current-year funding can be used to support rapid acquisition initiatives, and improvement in the transition of rapid acquisitions into service programs of record to support full fielding and long-term sustainment.<sup>149</sup>

g. Challenges and obstacles.

(1) Peacetime materiel development and acquisition. The fundamental challenge to rapid equipping and fielding is the fact that the existing materiel development and acquisition system is firmly based on a deliberate, time-intensive, closely regulated, peacetime framework.<sup>150</sup> The system depends on rigorous analysis to validate the operational requirement through capabilities-based assessments, which may often take a year or more simply to complete and move through the initial approval process. Once approved for further development, a funding line must be established within the POM (and recertified every 2 years), and a schedule is established to synchronize the effort to acquire the new materiel capability through subsequent milestone reviews and decisions. The process is intended to ensure that new capabilities can be employed in a wide variety of operational conditions and can be fielded across the force. Optimal solutions are sought, adding time, additional requirements, and complexity to the governing requirements documents. Prototypes for major systems are normally required. As products are completed, they are further exposed to exhaustive tests, formal evaluations, and operational assessments. Within the acquisition community, a 5- to 10-year developmental process is viewed as normal; considerably more time is often required for major new air, land, or sea platforms.

(2) Authorities and legal constraints, and acquisition oversight. Overall, the peacetime system is inflexible, difficult to compress in time or to simplify, constrained significantly by

policy and law, and designed to avoid risk, misuse of funds, or failure. The pressure of Congressional oversight and the possibility of Government Accounting Office reports or other investigations generate additional caution and deliberateness. The consequences of failure to meet all regulatory requirements, act on the proper authorities, or comply with all approval processes and technical steps can be organizationally and individually dire. As a result, the culture of the community rests on the idea that "slow and sure" is preferable to "fast with risk." This bureaucratic mentality often stands astride even the most well-intentioned and desirable efforts to accelerate specific programs or capabilities.

(3) Methodology for requirements determination. Although the peacetime acquisition system includes the use of operational needs statements (ONS) as a forcing mechanism for priority requirements, the system typically has not linked ONS with an accelerated development and fielding process. During the course of OEF and OIF, both the Army and OSD were compelled to create tailored methodologies for urgent requirements determination to qualify those needs for rapid acquisition. Although the actual formats differed significantly, both provided the information required to support an initial decision. The REF used a modified ONS "ten liner" and assisted users in-theater in completing requirements documentation. That collaboration accelerated the process of validation and also established some fundamental parameters (such as numbers of items needed, enumeration of support requirements, and identification of possible sources) that jump-started project planning.

(4) Organizational stand-up: manning and funding. The historical narrative in paragraph 4 provides a reasonably detailed picture of the many obstacles that must be overcome, first to establish and sustain temporary, ad hoc organizations, and then to institutionalize those organizations as permanent structures. In the first case, ad hoc organizations that exist for more than a few months spend an enormous amount of energy simply sustaining their own existence through the pursuit of personnel, funding, sponsorship, and influence. Absent an official institutional foundation, a temporary organization may be ignored by other organizations whose support may be helpful. Having no requisition or tasking authority, temporary organizations have to rely on the cooperation and largesse of willing partners; they have no guarantees of being able to tap into higher-quality or even well-qualified sources of personnel or obtaining access to other resources. Similarly, initial funding will often be slow in materializing and seldom will have utility or sufficiency through multiple fiscal years. Management and accounting for such funding sources can introduce its own complexity for a fledgling organization.

(5) Subsequently, the implementing actions required to make a temporary organization permanent are also time-consuming and highly complex with respect to manning documents and approvals. They are often constrained by workforce ceilings or other limitations and subject to bureaucratic resistance, particularly when there is another bill payer involved.

## **6-6. Institutionalizing rapid equipping functions within the GF**

a. Since 2006, the Army has engaged in meaningful deliberations regarding the long-term disposition of the organizational capabilities that it has built through the AWG, REF, JTCOIC, and others, and the forms and functions that should be institutionalized to maintain an accelerated materiel development capability for the future. The following discussion is not

intended to prescribe a solution or set of solutions to these ongoing discussions. Instead, this section proposes a set of principles and guidelines that should be accounted for within any future organizational solution set. The learning experiences over the past 7-plus years by the DOD and Army organizations previously summarized substantively inform the elucidation of these principles, which are grouped into three main categories, as described below. For the ease of discussion in this study, the strawman organization envisioned for establishment will be referred to as the accelerated materiel development and equipping organization (AMDEO).

b. Organizational principles.

(1) Topping the list of organizational principles is the idea of extreme flexibility that also combines operational direction of the organization's activities with effective oversight by the acquisition community. Extreme flexibility must be maintained in order to permit the AMDEO to adapt its own staff organization, practices, processes, and purview to the dynamically changing character of conflict and associated operational needs. Perhaps the one certain characteristic of a GF capability for accelerated materiel development and equipping is the fact that warfighter requirements will change rapidly as existing conflicts evolve and new conflicts or operational requirements emerge. The discussion below includes additional examples of the need for extreme flexibility in the areas of project approval, commitment of funds, and staff functions.

(2) Operational direction simply means that the organization is guided first by priorities established by HQDA G-3/5/7 rather than by the acquisition community. This principle was widely debated during the evolution of the REF and decided rightly. The HQDA G-3/5/7 is best positioned to fully understand the capability gaps surfaced during ongoing operations and to prioritize them in terms of significance, urgency, and resources. At the same time, however, the organization must deliberately link at multiple levels to the acquisition community, involving the Army Acquisition Executive, a designated milestone decision authority, and specific program managers and program executive officers, to ensure that acquisition law, regulations, and rules are strictly observed and that the close coordination required to deliver materiel to users without delay is carried out.

(3) These two factors – operational direction and effective acquisition oversight – further underpin one of the critical factors for the success of the REF and RFI: four-star sponsorship of both the organization and its authorities and purview. In the case of the REF, the VCSA performed that role by virtue of inherent authority over both the operational and acquisition elements of the HQDA staff. Given that successful experience, it is possible to make strong arguments to establish the AMDEO as a DRU or FOA under HQDA, subject to the overarching oversight of the VCSA. This approach helps ensure priority access to bodies with project approval authority, such as the Army Requirements Oversight Council.<sup>151</sup>

(4) The experiences of rapid equipping during OEF and OIF further support the principle that the future AMDEO should retain a narrow focus, characterized by an emphasis on materiel requirements that are critical to force protection, survivability, and other capabilities deemed essential to overall mission success. Similarly, the focus should remain on equipping rather than fielding (although a parallel study on the ways and means of achieving accelerated fielding

would be a worthy endeavor). At the same time, the AMDEO must be multifunctional in order to adapt rapidly to changing requirements and priorities across doctrinal warfighting functions.<sup>152</sup>

c. **Autonomy.** Both the AMDEO director and selected deputies or representatives (such as chiefs of forward support teams) must retain significant authority and autonomy to initiate projects and adapt plans in progress, based on assessments made during the execution process, without preapproval from higher authorities.

d. **Operational linkages.** The AMDEO should deliberately incorporate a staffing and organizational scheme that aligns its activities with active operations under the direction of COCOM, JTF, and Army commanders. Following the example of the REF and JIEDDO, the AMDEO organization should include forward support teams located within JOAs. Forward support teams require secure communications, mobility, and a support structure (either organic or provided by other theater assets) to enable effective direction of in-theater equipping operations and close coordination with the units being served by their activities. Typically, forward support teams will require a combination of operators, technicians, and administrative or support personnel in order to function effectively and to avoid over-reliance on in-theater organizations for support.

e. **External networking and joint integration.** Standard practices in DOD materiel development include rigorous emphasis on joint integration with respect to the development and fielding of new materiel capabilities. Although some redundancy is desirable across services because of unique requirements or applications, excessive duplication must be avoided. In support of this goal and to exploit the work of other organizations involved in related or supporting activities, the AMDEO must maintain a robust capability for networking with a broad variety of organizations external to itself. Within the Army, those organizations include the combat development community (such as TRADOC), the intelligence community, RDECOM, and its subordinate elements, ATEC for support and adherence to assessment requirements, and various other acquisition elements on which it will depend for support, and eventually, hand-off of sustainment responsibilities. Networking outside the Army will involve close ties to DOD acquisition and rapid technology and rapid fielding activities, DOD and service labs, advanced technology development proponents, joint commands, and joint organizations such as JIEDDO. In addition, AMDEO must maintain linkages to national labs, industry, academia, and non-DOD scientific and technology centers.

f. **Staff expertise.** The experiences of REF and JIEDDO both point persuasively toward the need for staff personnel within an AMDEO-like organization to include operators, logisticians, and technical and scientific expertise, acquisition and contracting experts, and agile, innovative support personnel. Personnel must be deployable, with previous in-theater experience highly desirable. It is not unusual to find that the capability to acquire contractor staff provides a higher degree of experience, flexibility, and responsiveness than relying solely on the military and government civilian personnel systems. Contracted personnel also provide a means to adapt to an ebb and flow in tempo.

g. **Spin-off organizations.** By virtue of the change that it introduces within the force, an AMDEO-like organization can be expected to generate simultaneous requirements for spin-off

organizations that are required to support, complete, or expand projects and programs initiated by the AMDEO. These spin-offs may be needed for functions such as manning, funding, training, sustainment, and program management, and may appear in the form of tiger teams, task forces, or other temporary organizations, or permanent structures.

## **6-7. Principles and guidelines for execution**

a. Speed and simultaneity. Because rapid materiel development and equipping is intended to meet operational needs, the time in which a solution to those needs is developed and delivered is a critical hallmark of successful organizational execution. Establishing a time standard for project completion in terms of initial delivery of a new capability appears to be an effective metric that serves multiple purposes. It creates a shared expectation with the operational customer; sets a predictable framework for completing all the steps in project execution; helps to size the organization itself and determine the number of projects that can be handled simultaneously; synchronizes action plans across multiple projects; and creates an overall organizational operational tempo for efficient management.

b. Risk balanced against urgency. The imperative of speed and the difficulty of meeting some operational needs introduce risk of failure into the process. Simultaneously, the urgency of requirements creates a higher tolerance for prudent risk. Although a comprehensive analysis of risk will rarely be possible, the AMDEO process should document a risk assessment for each project of sufficient rigor to justify moving forward. Exceptions to this practice should be permissible with respect to observably low-risk projects that may be initiated in-theater. In addition, senior leaders must be prepared to accept and defend a reasonable level of failed projects.

c. Acceptable vice optimal solutions. The urgency of immediate operational needs constrains the ability of a rapid equipping organization to identify, develop, and deliver optimal materiel solutions which would be suitable for the wider variety of conditions and environmental factors normally associated with a traditional procurement. As a result, the AMDEO should establish metrics for what constitutes an acceptable materiel solution. If and when a rapid acquisition is approved for fielding, the Army acquisition system will have the opportunity to upgrade the capability to meet higher performance standards.

d. GOTS and COTS. AMDEO must rely heavily on procuring and adapting technologies and products that are already available commercially or through other government programs. This approach, in turn, demands the organizational capability to quickly contract for the purchase of the materiel, as well as the industry and contractor support that will often be required to adapt the materiel to the specific functions required on the battlefield.

e. Perpetual research. The AMDEO must pursue continuous research activities in order to maintain high visibility of GOTS and COTS technologies, prototypes, industry capabilities, maturing technologies within the government and private science and technology communities, and other potential sources and suppliers. In addition to supporting the rapid identification of possible materiel solutions, this research activity will also serve to avoid redundant efforts,

generate multiple solution options for performance and cost comparison, maintain some level of competitive procurement, and provide alerts to potential providers of key defense interest areas.

f. Operations inside the acquisition system. The AMDEO will only be successful if it is able to streamline (that is, abbreviate) and accelerate the standard acquisition process to enable it to rapidly validate requirements, obtain appropriate approvals, commit funding, arrange support contracts, meet test and evaluation requirements, and deliver capability within its established time metric. However, as the previous historical narratives and discussions have indicated, even as it operates under streamlined processes, the AMDEO must also ensure that each project is executed in compliance with fundamental acquisition guidelines, laws, and regulations, which in turn demands close harmony with the acquisition community. It is also imperative to establish a dedicated direct-support relationship with a contracting office and/or contracting team to ensure rapid acquisition support; warranted contracting officer(s) assigned to the AMDEO could also ensure staff expertise.

g. Priority of efforts. If not otherwise directed due to unique circumstances, the logical priority of effort by the AMDEO would be first, to deployed joint and Army forces; second, to deploying Army forces; third, to coalition partners; and fourth, to all others (such as other service-specific needs).

h. Staff functions and planning. AMDEO staff functions extend from basic, continuous research to validation of urgent requirements, thence to project initiation, execution, and delivery, culminating ultimately in a disposition decision that transfers responsibility for sustained support of materiel or else results in redirection or termination of projects. The following are suggested to illustrate their nature and scope.

(1) Maintenance of direct links to theater operators and support organizations, including forward support teams.

(2) Identification, evaluation, selection, and purchase of GOTS and COTS materiel or other-sourced nongovernmental items.

(3) Contracting for support services; contract close-outs.

(4) Collaboration with industry vendors and coordination with other services, joint entities, and coalition partners.

(5) Documentation and certifications in compliance with acquisition statutes and regulations.

(6) Preparation of project supporting plans, including the following:

(a) Acquisition strategy – schedule, performance, and cost.

(b) Materiel development and production plan.

- (c) Theater distribution plan.
  - (d) Employment concept.
  - (e) Training plan and materials.
  - (f) Predelivery testing and safety validation.
  - (g) Operational assessment in conjunction with capability employment.
  - (h) Sustainment plan, including shipping, delivery to unit, accountability, and initial maintenance.
  - (i) Transition plan.
- (7) Delivery capability in-theater, in-theater training, adaptation, and feedback; and in-theater hand-off.
- (8) Post-project evaluation of operational significance.
- (9) Conduct and response to predictive analysis.

i. Transition. After a rapid acquisition capability is delivered, validated as meeting the operational need, and distributed to users, AMDEO will need to accomplish an effective, timely hand-off of responsibility to an appropriate component of the Army acquisition and sustaining base for completion of the fielding process in-theater and the establishment of the capability to sustain the materiel solution (maintenance, repair, parts supply, and others). Rapid transition enables AMDEO to apply resources to additional projects and also reduces the burden on the rapid equipping budget.

j. An additional requirement exists to determine the final disposition of rapidly acquired capabilities. That is, will they become permanent items (programs of record) within the Army inventory and supply system, disposed in some other fashion, or terminated? Beginning in 2004, the Army has used the capabilities development for rapid transition process, under TRADOC purview, to determine final disposition of candidate programs of record originating through rapid acquisition. This process considers both materiel and nonmateriel capabilities and introduces those capabilities determined to be suitable as Army programs of record into the JCIDS process for full development. TRADOC carries out an assessment based on feedback from theater users, ATEC, and other objective evaluations, including collection teams. TRADOC's recommendations go to the VCSA for approval, and then to the Army Requirements Oversight Council and Joint Requirements Oversight Council to complete the process.<sup>153</sup>

k. Anticipation vice reaction. Because of the dynamic character of conflict, a rapid equipping organization will normally find itself reacting to emerging requirements rather than anticipating them and having solutions in hand or underway when needed. However, the capability for

AMDEO to anticipate urgent operational requirements can be developed by a variety of means.<sup>154</sup>

(1) First, the importance of maintaining linkages to intelligence organizations is essential. AMDEO operators must understand how an adversary is operating, how an external supporter might assist that adversary, how similar groups have operated in the past, and exploit sources which can make reliable projections regarding how the enemy may be going to adapt. Along this line, AMDEO's activities can also be expected to generate enemy adaptation. For example, if jamming devices are deployed by AMDEO to prevent terrorists from setting off IEDs by remote signals, they will find another way to detonate the devices. AMDEO should have a process in place, perhaps something like an internal Red Team, to deliberately analyze how the enemy is going to react to the capabilities that it pushes forward. That analysis should be accompanied by a plan to identify follow-on counters to the enemy counters before rather than after the enemy changes his tactics. In short, AMDEO should plan for, not wait for, enemy adaptations, where feasible.

(2) Other means of anticipation deliberately employed by AMDEO to improve anticipation could include use of commissioned studies, access to operational lessons learned (including those emerging from other non-U.S. conflicts), information obtained from captured combatants, and trends analyses.

l. Metrics. The discussion above has cited several instances of the importance in the use of metrics (such speed in acquisition, time to field, risk taken, and viability of materiel), both to guide the work of the AMDEO and to measure the value of its output. Because of the nature of its mission, as the need for rapid equipping inevitably declines when conflicts are stabilized or resolved, demands will rise for AMDEO to justify its past and continuing existence. It will have to prove its effectiveness and continuing utility. Metrics must extend beyond merely documenting what has been done; they should be developed to show effectiveness and operational benefits with respect to issues such as lives saved; decline in injuries and property loss; increase in enemy losses and ineffectiveness; improvement in task or mission accomplishment; satisfaction of clearly defined capability gaps; applicability across the joint force; cost avoidance; competitive procurement; and cost savings through innovation.

m. Information sharing. Many organizations across DOD will be involved in rapid materiel development and equipping. The Army should encourage, support, and participate in DOD-wide information-sharing venues and protocols both to share its experience and capabilities and to benefit from the activities of others.

## **6-8. Budgeting and programming principles**

a. Funding flexibility. Experience unequivocally demonstrates that the dynamic nature of rapid materiel development and equipping requires both a reliable, predictable funding line and a flexible means of using that funding line, with access to additional funding in the budget year, if needed. That suggests that the approach currently pursued by both JIEDDO and REF – establishment of a base budget in the POM, with access to existing supplemental funding (or support through new supplemental legislation) – is an appropriate funding strategy for a future

AMDEO. In addition, designation of base budget dollars as multiyear funding would further enhance flexibility.

b. Authority to commit funding and rapid access to contractors. Selected persons in the AMDEO and its forward support teams must have the authority to commit funding quickly to meet project deadlines. That authority could include direct purchases under a specified ceiling without use of a contract vehicle, as well as the capability to execute contracts very rapidly via warranted contracting officers on staff or a dedicated, priority support relationship from an existing government contracting office.

### **6-9. Concluding caveat**

As described in paragraph 3, the historical record exists of previous attempts to institutionalize a capability for accelerated materiel development and equipping. However, circumstances always arose in the past that resulted in decisions to disestablish that capability. Generally, those circumstances included reduced demand for rapid development and equipping, coupled with budget pressure. The Army will likely face those circumstances again in the near-term. Should they lead to decisions in the future not to retain a standing organizational capability in this area, the least that the Army should do to remain somewhat prepared for the re-emergence of such requirements is to retain the TDAs and supporting documentation that could be used to quickly reinstate the capability.<sup>155</sup>

### **6-10. Related future studies**

This chapter focuses heavily on rapid materiel development and equipping as a GF function that should be institutionalized and improved in order to enhance GF support to operating forces in active theaters. Related studies that could be considered for future work include the development of an accelerated fielding process that operates in parallel with the existing deliberate process, and the deliberate identification of key technology vectors and their applications that will likely be needed in the future joint operating environment.

## **Chapter 7**

### **Integrating GF Capabilities within the Joint Global Force Management Process**

#### **7-1. Synopsis**

During the course of OEF and OIF, Army GF organizations have frequently committed a significant measure of their capabilities in support of ongoing operations in theater. Although the employment of GF capabilities has contributed favorably to operational success, the response to theater demands has often been slow, ad hoc, and reactive in nature. To better support joint and Army commanders in planning, exercises, and operations, they require improved visibility of and access to the operationally useful capabilities resident with Army (as well as joint) generating force assets. To more fully optimize this visibility and access, GF capabilities should be incorporated within the joint global force management (GFM) process and reflected in the JCRM.

## 7-2. Introduction

a. One of the unexpected and distinctive characteristics of OEF and OIF is the comprehensive employment of Army GF capabilities in support of operating forces. The long-term commitment of the Army to these COIN and stability operations placed demands for capabilities (and sometimes capacities) within operating forces that necessitated expanded reliance on GF organizations outside of their traditional missions. This blurred the lines that had previously existed between operating forces and the Army GF, as it was realized that successful execution of the extraordinarily wide range of functions and activities inherent within irregular warfare required capabilities that only existed within the GF or could be more readily created within the GF. Encompassing both direct and reachback support, GF support to operations has manifested itself in a variety of forms from individual augmentation, to small capabilities-based functional packages, to the creation of completely new capabilities. The cumulative effect of these efforts has been judged as having high operational significance, particularly after the conclusion of major combat operations in those campaigns.

b. Despite the fact that the employment of the GF in this fashion constitutes a notable success story, more often than not the response to the need for GF support to operations has been ad hoc and reactive in nature, rather than anticipatory and planned. Since no redundancy exists within the Army GF to perform these functions, the commitment of GF capabilities also produced significant stress and strain on the ability of some GF organizations to accomplish their primary Title 10 missions. In addition, much, if not most, of the employment of GF capabilities in reachback support has occurred outside the scope of the force management process and so lacked visibility. The unpredictable and ad hoc nature of the vast majority of demands for reachback support has introduced longstanding management challenges. The lack of adequate visibility of all requirements being placed on the GF also makes it difficult to accurately quantify costs and risks. In short, the Army cannot quantify the demand signal that the GF is meeting, nor the costs and risks associated with those requirements.

c. Simultaneously, efforts to measure the readiness or effectiveness of GF organizations are hindered by the absence of meaningful metrics. However, given the diversity of GF organizations and the functions that they perform, devising a means of measuring readiness and the impact of task loads on these organizations will likely need to be adapted to each organization. Past studies to examine this issue have not produced actionable, effective solutions because the nature of Title 10 functions resists quantification and effectiveness metrics.<sup>156</sup> Growing the Army over the next several years will unquestionably require simultaneous evolution and adaptation of the GF even while support to ongoing operations will still be expected. The challenge is in assessing the balance of missions and the resources required for GF organizations under this changing set of conditions. All of the factors described here introduce complexity and uncertainty with respect to decisions regarding GF structure, management, and resourcing.

d. It could be argued that the conditions described above are a temporary anomaly that will decline significantly when U.S. forces are drawn down from Iraq and Afghanistan. On the other hand, one of the fundamental assumptions in the current administration and DOD is the expectation that the demands of an era of persistent conflict will drive the continuing long-term

commitment of U.S. forces abroad. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that the future will require expansion of, and improvement in, the manner in which GF capabilities are employed to support full-spectrum joint operations. The challenge is made more difficult by the indispensable need for the GF to maintain its ability to perform its primary, routine missions within the level of its current capacities, which are projected to decrease, not increase, in the future. Although some operational demands for GF capabilities have been met by other services, the record shows that the Army has borne most of that burden. It is appropriate to assess where other services could increase their role in meeting future requirements, and where the Army must retain or expand capabilities, based on inherent Army expertise or assigned executive agent responsibilities. In addition, certain joint GF assets (though often still sourced directly by the services) could also expand support to operations.

e. All of these factors support the supposition that joint Army force overall will be well served by deliberate action to incorporate Army, other service, and joint GF capabilities into the GFM, with their inclusion into JCRM.

### **7-3. Projected benefits**

a. Given the complexity and diversity of service and joint GF capabilities, incorporating them into the JCRM will be an arduous task.<sup>157</sup> However, if successful, the effort can be expected to produce the following organizational and operational benefits:

(1) The primary benefit is expanding capability options for employment by joint and service commanders.

(2) Providing greater visibility of GF capabilities to support planning.

(3) Establishing a basis for comparative analysis of GF capabilities and improvement in burden sharing of the demand for them across the joint force.

(4) Quantifying the volume and scope of operational demands.

(5) Establishing a baseline, based on historical demand, to help determine the need for permanent measures that would improve the readiness and availability of GF capabilities to support operations.

b. Improvements in managing GF capabilities available for support to operations through the GFM process and in JCRM should include:

(1) Identifying recurring requirements and reusability of GF functional capability packages.

(2) Evaluating if GF capability providers might be better organized to meet operational demands.

(3) Providing quantifiable evidence for judgments regarding force structure or the need for changes in capacity.

(4) Illuminating ways and means of mitigating the cost incurred with respect to GF primary mission performance.

(5) Improving the predictability of employment, with timely scheduling and completion of predeployment training and preparation.

(6) Potentially reducing the pressure on low-density, high-demand capabilities through greater burden-sharing across services.

#### **7-4. The JCRM<sup>158</sup>**

a. The JCRM is a global prototype that merges the requirements generation capability of the joint force requirements manager with the capabilities library of the joint capabilities requirements tool. As such, JCRM is intended to become the global repository for capabilities libraries and force requirements that are presented to the joint planning and executive community for time-phasing into JOPEs. Fundamental capabilities include:

(1) A global force requirements database empowered by a collaborative staffing tool with workflow functionality.

(2) A standardized and automated process for requests for forces or capabilities and universal capabilities definitions.

(3) The means for designing and documenting capabilities-based force packages and the ability to generate force tracking numbers for requirements.

(4) Function as a joint conduit for global force sourcing and utility to do all the above in support of emergent, rotational, exercise, planning, and individual augmentee requirements.

b. The JCRM traces its origins to July 2007, when the force management executive committee<sup>159</sup> established the force management integration project team and directed it to deliver: a global force requirements management capability, a collaborative staffing capability for common sourcing and analyses, and enhanced visibility of force data. In pursuit of these goals, in February 2008, the project team directed actions to be taken to integrate both the joint force requirements manager and the joint capabilities requirements tool. The JCRM has been tested in multiple joint exercises, providing full utility of its projected capabilities, and is available for use at its beta-site for prototype, experimental, and training activities at the supported command and JTF levels.

c. Specific JCRM features include the following.

(1) DOD-wide standardized force capability definitions and descriptions of force characteristics.

(2) Rapid identification and selection of force requirements and capabilities validated by authoritative service data sources, which an operational planner can request for employment.

(3) Transparency of both planning and deployment data for those involved in the deployment planning and execution process.

(4) Ability to export requirements and capability packages into multiple data formats. Ability to bridge service units or service capabilities to joint capability areas through service tasks and the universal joint task list (UJTL).

(5) Ability to operate in a services-oriented architecture and interface with critical force projection systems for authoritative data.

d. At full operational capability, JCRM should function as a user-friendly, advanced data and capabilities library and requirements generator, operating like a search engine with the intuitive responsiveness expected of a web-based tool to have maximum utility for planners who may not be experts in the JOPES and TPFDD domains. It will provide operational capability packages in both plain-text descriptions of the requirement for the user and the detailed data-centric information required for JOPES. JCRM will also enable automated generation of force tracking numbers and mitigate the incidences of request for forces that are delayed or rejected due to ambiguous, incomplete, or unexplained requests.

## **7-5. Challenges to implementation**

a. Numerous challenges exist with respect to the incorporation of GF capabilities into the GFM process and the JCRM. Perhaps the most significant is the complexity and diversity of the myriad tasks performed by GF organizations as part of their routine activities. The need to identify specifically the capabilities associated with those tasks in terms applicable to JCRM and its authoritative data sources, as well as the mutability of the organizations themselves, adds further complexity. Although the current version of the joint capability area framework appears to account for many GF capabilities, it would likely need some level of revision and expansion to accommodate all that could be classified as globally available to support warfighters. Similarly, the UJTL and service task lists would likely have to be augmented significantly. Comparative analysis of service capabilities is an ongoing problem within JCRM that will also apply to GF capabilities, as long as services use different means of identifying capabilities. The latter is one of four major challenges identified by the JRCM project office that hinder the full operationalization of JCRM and that will equally affect the incorporation of GF capabilities. These operationalizing requirements include development of compatible extensible markup language data schemas across all services; conduct of a data pilot to test schemas and web services; web service capability for service-owned authoritative data sources to have web service capability; and the determination of the data messaging service to be employed.

b. Defining appropriate metrics and readiness for GF capabilities presents yet another daunting challenge, since readiness to perform primary missions at home station does not equate to readiness to support operations in theater. In addition, it appears that GF organizations may

need to establish internal JOPES and JCRM-trained operations cells where they currently do not exist in order to maintain current data entries and link into the GFM process.

c. Finally, another critical issue is the degree to which JCRM can account for the non-validated demands for reachback support to GF organizations that are not explicitly identified in the demand stream. This issue was discussed during three events of the UQ 09 campaign of learning, with the goal of developing answers to the following questions:<sup>160</sup>

(1) Are the potential benefits produced by the incorporation of GF capabilities into JCRM and the GFM process significant enough to warrant the effort? If yes, how should the Army and/or JFCOM move forward?

(2) Is it feasible to expect support from other services, the Joint Staff, and other joint agencies to participate in implementation?

(3) How does the joint capability area framework need to be expanded to incorporate joint GF capabilities in some fashion?

(4) Is the volume of service and joint GF tasks too large to accommodate within the JCRM database?

(5) How do the UJTL and service task lists need to be updated to reflect GF tasks in order to incorporate GF capabilities into JCRM?

(6) What joint organizations and capabilities need to be incorporated into JCRM to make them available to operating forces?

(7) How can service GF capabilities be effectively compared in order to expand options for operating forces and to improve burden sharing?

(8) Can existing readiness metrics and support requirements be applied in some fashion to GF capabilities?

(9) What issues exist, if any, with respect to oversight and approval of commitment of GF capabilities in response to requests for comments?

(10) How can reachback demands on GF capabilities be incorporated into the JCRM?

(11) Does incorporation of GF capabilities into JCRM address any existing warfighting challenges submitted by services or COCOMs?

d. The UQ seminar process served well to educate participants on this issue of accessing GF capabilities through the GFM process, but despite the best intentions and sponsorship of the issue by HQDA G-3/5/7, the specific expertise of the participants did not enable a discussion to a level of detail sufficient to answer the above questions. When briefed to the global security panel at the capstone wargame, panel members recognized the projected benefits of pursuing this

potential initiative. However, the panel elected not to develop the issue in detail, viewing it as a technical matter, and declined to endorse a recommendation for HQDA to take the matter for action. As a result, the issue was not raised to the senior leader seminar.

## **7-6. Conclusion**

The merits of incorporating GF capabilities into the GFM process have not been seriously challenged and have been informally endorsed at the action officer and staff director level at JFCOM.<sup>161</sup> The difficulty in adding GF capabilities to the JCRM has also been recognized as requiring a major effort. Moving forward on this initiative as a joint policy issue would require formal endorsement and sponsorship at HQDA, in concert with a joint partner such as JFCOM, supported by parallel efforts to obtain the cooperation or non-opposition of the other services.

---

## **Chapter 8 Mitigating Strategies**

### **8-1. Synopsis**

The GF has adopted a variety of mitigating strategies to help ameliorate the negative impact to performing primary missions due to capacity shortfalls caused by the increasing demand on capabilities used to support operations. These approaches have had a favorable impact on reducing risk to primary missions, but have not fully eliminated the negative effects of diverted capabilities. Contractor support will likely remain the most pervasive and responsive means of addressing capacity shortfalls and rapidly responding to new tasks, but its utility will be highly sensitive to declining budgets, as well as future policy guidance.<sup>162</sup>

### **8-2. Introduction**

This study has periodically reinforced the significance of frequently voiced concerns that the GF is not structured or resourced to support operations. Thus, one of the major consequences of the increase in GF support to operations is the risk created to the performance of primary GF missions. Whether tasked to provide individual personnel to fill positions in validated joint manning documents or serve as advisors, to deploy teams with unique capabilities, to execute new tasks associated with supporting ARFORGEN, or to divert capabilities for other validated requirements, GF organizations must somehow compensate for the loss of capacity or capability previously dedicated to primary mission performance. This chapter describes some of the mitigating strategies that GF organizations have employed or that may be available in the future.

### **8-3. Strategies**

a. Capacity. The simplest strategy to mitigate the negative effects described above is to increase the capacity of those elements of the GF that are being tasked to commit capabilities to support operations. As this study demonstrates, the Army has already increased capacity by creating a variety of new organizations to perform critical support functions, such as the REF, contracting support brigades, JTCOIC, and the 162<sup>d</sup> Infantry Brigade (foreign security force-training team) at Fort Polk, Louisiana. The drawbacks to this approach are time, funding, legislative or policy constraints, and the process of institutionalizing new organizations when

needed. The same drawbacks exist in establishing new military and civilian personnel authorizations within existing structures.

b. Contractors.

(1) The most pervasive and effective means of compensating for GF capabilities diverted to operational requirements is the use of contractors. In theater, huge numbers of contractors hired through supplemental funding bills perform critical GF-like functions in support of operations, encompassing functions which military assets simply cannot carry out due to internal resource constraints or shortfalls in expertise, such as life support, base construction, base operations, infrastructure improvement, transportation, maintenance, sustainment, security for other U.S. government agencies, restoration of essential services, and so on.<sup>163</sup> The volume of the requirements for this support even exceeded the capability of LOGCAP and drove the expansion of Army contracting capability as described in [chapter 2](#). At times, the size of the contractor establishment in Iraq nearly equaled that of the U.S. joint force. In making its case for the expansion of Army contracting capability in 2007, the commission report noted that there were 160,000 contractors on the battlefield in Iraq in November 2007.

(2) GF organizations in CONUS have also relied in many instances on contract support as a backfill strategy for diverted capacity, and as augmentation to support new requirements that have emerged as a result of ongoing operations.<sup>164</sup> Contractors man almost all of the new Army organizations mentioned in this study; in many cases, contractors comprise the largest component of their personnel. Provided funding is available, contractors have significant advantages over other approaches. Normally, they can be emplaced rapidly, they provide a more flexible workforce than DA civilians, they can be reduced in number or terminated easily when requirements are reduced or eliminated, and they often present a level of expertise and experience that exceeds that of the government personnel in the offices that they support. On the other hand, the replacement of uniformed personnel by contractors in certain areas, such as the training and education arena, is an undesirable necessity. In some areas, contracted staff and services will be less expensive than what the Army can replicate with government personnel; in other areas, they will be more expensive.

(3) Although this study does not include a detailed examination of contractor support, the use of contractors appears to be indispensable in peacetime and conflict. DOD policy confirms the reliance on contractors in official documentation, including DODI 3020.37. The DODI states that components will "rely on the most effective mix of the total force, cost, and other factors considered, including active, reserve, civilian, host nation, and contractor resources necessary to fulfill assigned peacetime and wartime missions."<sup>165</sup> The instruction directs contractors to use all means at their disposal to continue to provide their services during periods of crisis, and instructs components to develop and implement plans and procedures to assure noninterruption of essential services, as well as contingency plans to replace incumbent contractors if their continuing support is in doubt.

(4) Presidential administrations have also resisted legislative constraints on how contractors can be employed, a recent example of which is a Statement of Administration Policy, published in September 2008, which objected to legislation that would have denied the use of

contracted services to perform private security functions or detainee interrogations in Iraq and Afghanistan.<sup>166</sup> An interesting aspect of applying contract support has been the policy issue of military strength caps in-theater. In some cases, such strength caps have not had to include the deployed contractor population, leading to a further reliance on contractor support to maintain capabilities and capacities.

(5) A major challenge to relying on contractors to help provide surges in capacities or adding new capabilities in support of operations in the next few years is the current Administration's policy to reduce overall Federal Government use of contracts and contractors. The official goals for this effort have been published by the Office of Management and Budget, focusing on saving money and improving in-house government capabilities. A clear desire is "ending the overreliance on contractors." Near-term goals in savings in Federal contracts are 3.5 percent for FY2010 and percent by the end of FY2011 (out of about \$500 billion in contract spending). Part of this will be accomplished in converting contractor support positions to full-time Federal Government employee positions. All Federal departments and agencies are expected to contribute to meeting such goals, to include DOD.<sup>167</sup>

(6) Currently the DOD workforce is 39 percent support service contractors. DOD's expectation is to reduce this to the pre-2001 level of 26 percent over the next 5 years, applying an in-sourcing initiative introduced in the FY2010 budget. Note that other Federal agencies that might support their in-theater missions through contracted support are facing expectations to reduce their overall contracted workforce. The Army's concern is to ensure a balanced total workforce of military, government civilians, and contractor personnel that appropriately aligns functions to the public and private sector. While this administration initiative is focused on the steady-state workforce and reliance on contracts, this basic policy has repercussions to any initiative to establish contracted means to surge capabilities in-theater or backfill DOD deploying personnel. Taken along with the reduction in supplemental funding that has been a prime mechanism to surge contract support for ongoing operations, the Army will face major issues in its ability to apply contracted support for operations in the future, beyond such in-place means as LOGCAP, despite clear evidence that such support is an effective, sometimes critical, requirement.

c. Internal organizational adjustments.

(1) GF organizations have employed a variety of internal adjustments to compensate for loss of personnel to temporary deployments of individuals and teams. Some of these adjustments include maintaining battle rosters for personnel, cross-training personnel across related functions, shifting workload internally, and maintaining off-the-shelf TDAs and MTOEs for subelements that might be needed to support requirements on short notice. They also include taking action to increase official personnel authorizations, seeking individual augmentees from the RC (normally through approved augmentation TDAs), and prioritizing primary mission tasks to determine which tasks may have to be postponed, fulfilled partially, or dropped as a result of diverted capabilities. Statutory guidance must also be accounted for when dealing with Total Army assets, such as the ARNG reserve program.

(2) IMCOM is applying an assessment and management process to help balance primary mission support and support to operations. With regard to prioritizing primary mission tasks to determine which tasks may have to be postponed, fulfilled partially, or dropped as a result of diverted capabilities, IMCOM has developed a decision tool that matches more than 500 core installation management tasks to the resources required for their execution. The tool further prioritizes those tasks according to significance and defines cut lines based on the availability of resources. The decision tool enables IMCOM senior leaders to quantify the effects of variations in annual resource plans in terms of mission tasks and to make decisions regarding the optimized use of available resources.

(3) A few GF organizations are also using the DOD personnel force innovation (PFI) program as a backfill option. The program allows Guard and Reserve personnel to apply for active duty tours, working for various DOD agencies and using either their reservist or civilian skill sets to qualify, where regular active duty personnel are not available and PFI reservists are more cost effective than civilian employees or contractors. Those selected for PFI duty are placed on fulltime active status and receive active duty pay, allowances, and benefits. DOD agencies fund the active duty costs of tours by reimbursing the ARNG or USAR member's service. Agencies also fund all temporary duty costs and moving expenses. Tours can be stateside or overseas, for a period of a few weeks or as long as 3 years. Applicable career fields depend on vacancies, as advertised on the DOD PFI Web site, which can range from food service to medical specialties to information technologies.<sup>168</sup>

d. DOD civilian expeditionary workforce (CEW).

(1) The relative paucity of deployed DOD civilians in support of OEF and OIF is another distinctive feature of those conflicts. "Since 2001, more than 16,000 civilians have served in direct support in combat zones. Approximately 1,600 DOD civilian employees have deployed to Afghanistan and 6,500 civilian employees to Iraq."<sup>169</sup> This scale of civilian involvement pales when compared to the contractor workforce in theater, the number of uniformed individual augmentees deployed annually, or the relative size of the DOD civilian workforce against the number of uniformed personnel. This huge reserve of human capacity has not been tapped effectively as a source of capability for operations.

(2) In January 2009, OSD reissued DOD Directive (DODD) 1404.10 to establish a new policy to expand the use of civilians to support operations. The policy directs the establishment of an "appropriately sized" subset of the DOD civilian workforce to be pre-identified, organized, trained, and equipped in a manner that facilitates the use of their capabilities for operational requirements. It identifies expeditionary requirements in terms of combat operations, contingencies, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, emergency operations, drug interdiction, restoration of order, and stability operations. A central goal of the program is to reduce the burden currently borne by the uniformed military to fill approved joint manning documents and other personnel requirements by distributing that burden to civilians.<sup>170</sup>

(3) The program applies to OSD, the military departments, the Office of the CJCS, the Joint Staff, COCOMs, defense agencies, and DOD field activities. The CCS is specifically enjoined to ensure the maximized utilization of DOD civilians as a sourcing solution. The

directive requires COCOMs to include support by DOD civilians in future plans and joint manning documents, and directs components to determine and maintain a CEW subset. The directive defines four CEW categories.

(a) Emergency-essential. Position-based designation to support the success of combat operations or the availability of combat essential systems.

(b) Non-combat essential. Position-based designation to support expeditionary requirements in other than combat or combat support situations.

(c) Capability-based volunteer. An employee who may be asked to volunteer, to remain behind after other civilians have evacuated, or to backfill other DOD civilians who have deployed to meet expeditionary requirements.

(d) Capability-based former employee volunteer corps. A collective group of former DOD civilian employees (including retirees) who have agreed to be listed in a database as individuals who may be interested in returning to Federal service as a time-limited employee to meet expeditionary requirements, or who can backfill deployed emergency-essential or capabilities-based volunteer civilians.

(4) Personnel in the first two categories are designated as key employees in accordance with DODD 1200.7. Accordingly, they are required to sign a workforce agreement regarding eligibility for deployment as a condition of employment. Personnel rotate in and out of an available pool based on a 6-month window. Deployment may not exceed 2 years, but personnel may volunteer and be approved for consecutive tours if desired. The CEW directive also establishes broad readiness metrics with respect to employee capabilities, training requirements, medical and psychological fitness, and administrative preparedness. It requires components to refine and implement the metrics to ensure readiness.

(5) As of May 2009, HQDA G-1 had initiated the first phase of action (essentially analysis of the requirement) to comply with the directive.<sup>171</sup> Next steps were to include:

(a) The issuance of a draft Army instruction on CEW by the end of FY2009.

(b) Expansion of recruiting efforts to nongovernment applicants.

(c) Piloting a deployment and readiness index to four functional communities of civilian employees (financial management, information technology, logistics, and medical).

(d) Developing CEW orientation and training curricula for civilian personnel offices.

(6) Currently, it is unclear to what extent GF organizations may have to respond to the CEW directive or the degree of utility that it will present. However, it is reasonable to expect that if the program is implemented effectively, it will undoubtedly expand the pool of civilians available to meet expeditionary requirements. (This should not be confused with other options currently being used, such as the recall-to-active-duty program, which could be another way to

provide augmentees with military or civilian acquired skills; CEW is meant to leverage the skills of the DOD civilian workforce, and most notably allow GF assets to deploy capabilities without the need for augmentation.)

e. Force designs.

(1) Some GF organizations have created assets to both reduce the impact on primary mission accomplishment when demand to support operations increases, and to provide more effective and focused support. Two examples provide possible templates for future designs, where applicable. The ACC's expeditionary contracting command is designed to deploy assets that provide required contracting support in-theater. These assets are standing organizations that are meant to be deployed. When not operating in-theater, they carry out tasks in CONUS which support ACC missions, ensure readiness, and provide training. But such work is not their primary mission.

(2) The ARSC is an integrated set of augmenting teams designated to support a wide variety of logistics and acquisition organizations when these organization must surge capacity, both in CONUS and deployed. With standing manning in each of these teams, both supporting and supported elements can establish long-term relationships and regularly train and operate together. In most cases, the ARNG and USAR augmenting teams are colocated with their supported entities. Because the ARSC is organized around a set of common occupational specialties, better personnel management, and cross-leveling is allowed.

#### **8-4. Conclusion**

a. The GF has adapted to increasing demands on its capabilities for support to operations through the adoption of a variety of mitigating strategies. Those approaches have had a favorable impact on risk to primary missions, but have not fully eliminated the negative effects of diverted capabilities. The 2008 Army Strategy and Grow the Army campaign plan may exacerbate the situation further if the stated intent to reduce the size of the GF is implemented. In addition, there is no empirical evidence at this point that the implementation of the Army enterprise initiative will free up GF resources or create conditions for more efficient use of existing GF resources.

b. Contractor support will likely remain the most pervasive and responsive means of increasing GF capacity to support operations and respond to new tasks, but its utility will be highly sensitive to declining budgets and policy decisions. Intuitively, if supplemental funding declines at a more rapid rate than the reduction in demand for GF capabilities, it may create additional risk to primary mission performance as contract support is terminated. The CEW program has the potential to provide additional flexibility in how demands are met, but it does not represent additional capacity. Another option not explored in this study, is the potential expansion of the role of the USAR in a more comprehensive way as an "organizational reserve" for the GF – that is, not just as a source of individual augmentees, but of assets designed specifically to backfill, add capacity, or add new capabilities to GF organizations.

## **Chapter 9**

### **Observations, Conclusions, and Recommendations**

#### **9-1. Overview**

a. The scope and volume of the demand for the commitment of GF capabilities in support of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan represent one of the distinguishing features of those conflicts. In many respects, it also represents a unique episode in the history of the U.S. Army. In fact, although much attention has been given over time to the change in the role of the RC from serving as the strategic reserve to becoming an operational reserve, the same can be said, on a smaller scale, with respect to the GF. Certainly the duration and changing nature of these conflicts must be viewed as major contributing elements to the comprehensive demand for support from GF organizations to Army and joint operating forces. Given the view of the current Army leadership and DOD that the nation is facing an era of persistent conflict, it is reasonable to expect that extended operations may become commonplace in the future. For that reason, this study constitutes a useful reference for anticipating and assisting preparedness for similar future requirements that may be placed on GF resources.

b. It is fair to describe the response of GF organizations to operational requirements as a qualified success. This observation is particularly true with respect to reachback support, which was achieved more easily than other forms of support because of the network capability that enabled easy access by operating forces to the knowledge and analytical base that exists across GF organizations. This study demonstrates that GF organizations proved to be highly sensitive to the needs of operating forces, innovative, and adaptive, including the creation of new, expeditionary capabilities that did not previously exist within the GF. However, because of the diversity of the GF, the approaches taken by individual GF organizations to support operational requirements do not necessarily translate as models for similar action by other GF organizations. In addition, many significant challenges that adversely affected the timeliness or scope of GF responses had to be overcome. The remainder of this chapter revisits and summarizes key observations and conclusions regarding those challenges and offers some suggestions as to how the GF may adapt further in the future to reduce or ameliorate them.

#### **9-2. Observations and conclusions**

a. The study confirms an introductory assumption that capacity shortfalls within GF organizations to both accomplish their mandated primary missions and to support operating forces represent the main challenge to expanding and improving GF support to operations. In addition, operational experience confirms a fundamental doctrinal principle stated in FM 1-01, that the GF capabilities emplaced and resourced to perform primary Title 10 missions are also those that are most often needed to support operating forces in theaters of conflict, inherent in their expertise, processes, and functional focus. It is also noteworthy that the non-negotiable commitment of successive administrations to an all-volunteer force operates as a significant constraint regarding the options available to the Army, in a long-duration conflict, in expanding capacity, both in operating forces and in the GF.<sup>172</sup> To a certain degree, supplemental funding mitigated the capacity shortfalls and enabled the GF to adapt more quickly to operational requirements through organizational innovation and the expanded use of contractors. By these

means and others, GF organizations proved able to create a surge in expansion of capacity, including deployable capabilities, that otherwise would not have been possible.

b. Capacity shortfalls within the GF will likely be exacerbated in the future by the diminishing volume of supplemental funding as deployed forces are drawn down, as well as by the current Grow the Army strategy, which projects reductions in the size of the GF. Collectively, these factors and those mentioned earlier comprise a complex problem set that deserves further study to answer a fundamental question: How does the GF retain capability to surge rapidly to meet operational requirements in future conflicts and avoid having to face the same challenges that impeded the scope and timeliness of responsiveness during the current conflicts?

c. Because of the absence of a surge capacity for most GF organizations, ad hoc measures based largely on redirecting resources from primary missions characterized the great majority of GF initiatives to adapt to requirements to support operations. While admittedly unavoidable in many circumstances, the management challenges associated with ad hoc approaches and the diversion of capabilities, even temporarily, can often be detrimental to primary missions. A negative driver of ad hoc solutions is the lack of anticipation that exists within the Army overall regarding requirements for GF support. In some cases examined within this study, action could have started sooner to apply GF capabilities in support of operations if the Army had a more effective means of early identification or prediction of requirements. The development and promulgation of FM 1-01 may have a favorable impact on this issue in that it provides a reliable framework and guide for the kinds of support that GF organizations should expect to have available to commit in the future.

d. Decisions and effective action to institutionalize changes to GF organizations – that is, to place them on a firm, sustainable foundation to better support operations – as a result of recurring requirements for support to operations, almost always require an inordinate period of time, owing to the requirement to establish FDUs, manpower authorizations, and funding lines. Notable examples surfaced in the study include the REF, FEST, engineer districts, and Army contracting organizations. Until those steps are taken, GF organizations have no recourse other than to rely on supplemental funding and to divert resources and borrow personnel in some fashion to maintain the capability needed to support operating forces. A partial solution to this challenge is for GF organizations to maintain on-the-shelf TDAs or MTOEs that have been reviewed previously and can be approved and implemented more quickly when the need arises. Ultimately, however, HQDA needs to examine its existing processes for standing up new force structure so as to develop a means to accelerate the institutionalization of GF capabilities to meet urgent needs that can be expected in operations of extended duration. Simultaneously, additional fundamental policy questions arise that are connected to end-strength and budget constraints.

(1) How many of the current innovations and new capabilities created within the GF should be institutionalized in order to ensure and improve responsiveness to operational needs for GF capabilities in the future?

(2) Of those capabilities that have been institutionalized, how long can the Army afford to maintain them in the structure in the absence of a pressing, enduring need?

(3) As a subset of these, which of these institutionalized capabilities are particularly critical not just for long-duration campaigns, but in support of crisis response operations, which will also demand short-notice support?

e. Historical experience suggests strongly that organizations are not long kept in place in the absence of pressing need or with sponsorship by senior leadership. For this reason, the long-term existence of expeditionary capability created to meet operational requirements remains in question. Thus, these considerations point toward the need for an approach that is scalable; that permits the maintenance of at least skeletal organizations that can be quickly expanded as need increases.

f. Because GF capabilities generally are not fully incorporated into the GFM process, the commitment of GF capabilities to support operating forces suffers from a lack of visibility, with concomitant negative impacts on resourcing and management of the driving requirements. To add to this challenge, neither the Army nor even many GF organizations themselves can accurately quantify either the demand signal for GF capabilities to support operating forces, or the full scope and volume of the response. Deliberately incorporating GF capabilities from all services and from joint organizations would ameliorate this shortfall to a significant degree and provide other benefits with respect to operational planning and burden-sharing across the joint force. It would also provide a more empirical basis for right-sizing the GF. Clearly, the Army can only implement this kind of initiative through a joint approach.

g. The commitment of operating forces to the execution of GF tasks, particularly with respect to training functions, is one of the means that the Army has used to expand GF capacity quickly. It is not an optimal approach, but it may be unavoidable, given GF capacity constraints, particularly for activities that the Army considers not to be enduring or for tasks requiring rapid attention.

h. The Army's ability to employ contractors, often through supplemental funding, in support of the GF and to accomplish in-theater GF activities associated with construction, maintenance, system support, basing, reconstruction, infrastructure development, life support, and sustainment has been and continues to be an indispensable component of operational success. It is the most flexible means to support rapid response and adaptation and to maintain the viability of GF organizations to perform primary missions, plus it can be terminated when the need abates.

i. The Army has not been able to exploit its large contingent of general service civilians effectively in expeditionary operations, from either an organizational perspective to meet specific GF requirements, or as a means of reducing the burden on uniformed Soldiers to fill validated individual augmentation requirements. Current initiatives to establish a CEW are moving slowly. In addition, questions exist with respect to how the Army will manage a CEW contingent over an extended period of time, particularly during future periods when force deployments have diminished.

j. Interoperability challenges often arise when GF elements are deployed in support of operating forces. Although life support and security can be obtained from supported operating

forces without imposing a significant burden, the requirement for supported organizations to provide mobility and communications gear is significant. Communications interoperability is an imperative. As such, it will often create a requirement for GF government agency elements to have training on systems that they routinely do not operate. Thus, deployable GF capabilities will most often benefit from having organic mobility and communications equipment, pointing toward the development or modification of MTOE organizations as the most effective organizational solution, as well as augmentation TDAs with appropriate equipment for those TDA assets that might be deployed.

k. The RSG structure described in [chapter 2](#) to accommodate the IMCOM base operations concept may prove to be a feasible candidate as a means to provide similar support and services to assets from other GF organizations that are deployed to support operations on an intermittent or temporary basis.

l. The Army's current approach to BPC and SFA is incomplete and does not account for all the variations of support that will be required in these areas in the future.<sup>173</sup> It is noteworthy that most SFA tasks from tactical to ministerial level are GF functions. The deliberate reliance on GPF to perform SFA activities within a BCT construct does not yet include a thorough examination of the future conditions under which GF force organizations may have to play a wider role than currently envisioned, nor how those GF capabilities will be sourced. Moreover, as noted in [chapter 4](#), the Army lacks an intellectual institution at this time that can fully integrate all the disparate efforts required within a global approach to SFA requirements. CAC is the nexus for joint and Army assets focused on SFA, most colocated at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, but a true integrating body does not yet exist.

m. With respect to the ability of the GF to meet urgent materiel requirements, the Army needs to continue ongoing efforts to investigate and institutionalize accelerated processes in a number of areas, including test and evaluation, equipping, fielding, training and sustainment packages, and establishing funding lines for acquisition. Similarly, a broader effort already initiated within TRADOC to create an institutional capability for accelerated capability development across all DOTMLPF domains should be continued and accompanied by metrics based on operational significance.

n. A GF concept. This study was also charged to assess the need for a separate GF concept, focused on support to operations. Under the emerging Army Concept Framework and the fact that Army warfighting challenges are based upon the warfighting functions, it is assessed that developing a GF concept for support to operations is not appropriate at this time. The challenge, however, is to incorporate critical aspects of GF support capability requirements into TRADOC's process to generate required capabilities. The reality is that, given the inextricable relationship between GF primary Title 10 missions (outside the purview of the TRADOC requirements process) and support to operations, this task must reside at HQDA, which remains the echelon charged with overseeing GF organizations. Thus a more appropriate approach might be HQDA developing a strategy for GF support to operations. The AETF could be the executive agent for this. A significant component would be the GF's role in enabling Army executive agent responsibilities and support to other services. With GF support to operations crossing all

warfighting functions, ranging across all DOTMLPF domains, and affecting all budget management areas, an overarching strategy will be a challenge.

o. Updating doctrine on GF support to operations. CAC is the proponent for FM 1-01 and should determine if there is a need to update the FM based on the results of TRADOC Pam 525-8-1 and other inputs. Note that the current version of FM 1-01 was designed to present a snapshot of GF support to operations to ongoing operations at the time of publication, with the intent to inform the field on capabilities and opportunities presented by GF organizations. The FM will become outdated over time, especially given the rapid changes taking place in GF organizations, in part driven by the desire to improve the effectiveness of support to operations. However, it is not recommended by this study to update the FM at this time. It is recommended that the proponent consider establishing an online forum to post documentation from all stakeholders on GF support to operations, allowing for more current information to supplement FM 1-01. This can be done in concert with HQDA. CAC could also encourage case studies and other independent reviews by students and faculty of the Command and General Staff College, to include the School of Advanced Military Studies, as well as encouraging similar efforts at the U.S. Army War College, to include the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, at USMA, and at ASCC HQs.

p. Additional applications of GF study results include those below:

(1) Provide to the HQDA enterprise TF a detailed and integrated perspective on this aspect of GF organizations, as this may influence the processes being applied to the four Army core enterprises.

(2) Support the TRADOC leads for the warfighting functions in the conduct of their CBA. As discussed, GF support to operations impacts all warfighting functions from the national strategic to the tactical levels, and should not be treated in isolation from operating forces. One challenge is in deconflicting these demands on GF organizations that are also performing primary Title 10 missions and are overseen in the conduct of these missions by HQDA.

(3) Inform TRADOC during the CNA process for FY2014-19 (and beyond) in determining required capabilities provided by GF organizations outside of those required to perform their primary missions.

### **9-3. Recommendations**

a. Because GF organizations differ significantly from each other in mission, design, and oversight, single solutions cannot be applied to them in a wholesale fashion. Initiatives must be deliberate and measured, focused on specific components of the GF, and balance risk to GF primary missions and resource demands against operational utility. With these caveats in mind, the following baseline recommendations are presented, in no priority order.

b. The Army and DOD should evolve the integrating authority and processes to improve visibility, oversight, management, and tasking of GF capabilities, including incorporation of GF capabilities in the global force management process.

- c. Assess a tiered approach to generating responsive capabilities, with a balance between standing assets institutionalized by approved TDA and by ad hoc measures.
- d. Improve the expeditionary quality of GF assets, including a surge capacity for support to no-notice and short-notice contingency operations, development of a CEW, and the ability to provide tailored exportable assets.
- e. Better enable the capacity to provide reachback support to operations, including resourced operations centers fully enabled by the global network.
- f. Better leverage GF capabilities for support to building capability and capacity in partner nations, with a focus on reconstruction and SFA.
- g. Institutionalize the capability for accelerated materiel development and equipping in response to urgent operational needs.
- h. Identify options to mitigate the negative effects of diverting capabilities normally committed to GF primary mission performance, as well as developing metrics to determine readiness of GF organizations.
- i. In addition, possible means to enhance the ability of GF organizations to support operations are presented in more detail in appendix D, organized under the seven themes used in this study.

#### **9-4. Suggestions for further study**

- a. During the course of researching TRADOC Pam 525-8-1, the following topics emerged as fruitful targets for additional investigation.
- b. Exploration of possibly expanding GF capabilities within the RC based on the concept of the RC functioning as an operational reserve.<sup>174</sup> One such approach would be a comprehensive strategy in the USAR providing an organizational reserve for the GF – that is, not just serving as a source of individual augmentees, but also of a greater range of assets designed specifically to backfill, add capacity, or even add new capabilities to GF organizations. Another approach to consider would be deliberately building more GF capability within the RC to respond directly to requests for GF capability to support operating forces. A prime example of an integrated augmentation organization designed to expand other GF capabilities to perform both Title 10 missions and support to operations is the ARSC. The overarching goal in this investigation is to achieve the optimum balance between the active Army and RC with respect to meeting demands for GF capabilities in support of operations more effectively and responsively.<sup>175</sup>
- c. Examination of the command, control, and support challenges that occasionally complicate the effectiveness of the employment of GF elements deployed in support of operating forces, with a view toward discovering potential solutions.

d. Consideration of the need and desirability of incorporating a regional orientation within GF organizations that extends beyond what already exists with respect to theater committed forces under GF parent commands.

e. Analysis of the long-term effect on GF organizations in meeting the surge of requirements for support to ongoing operations. In order to rapidly satisfy the needs of operating forces by realigning priorities, personnel, organizations, and funding, the issue is whether damage has been done to these organizations in meeting future requirements to carry out primary missions, retain manpower, and ability to reprioritize tasks.

f. It was noted earlier in this chapter that capacity shortfalls which exist within the GF may be exacerbated by the current Grow the Army strategy, which projects that the overall size of the GF may be reduced, while the size of operating forces will increase to meet the Army's new end-strength ceiling. The information in this study suggests that it would be prudent to revisit this aspect of the Army strategy for the following reasons.

(1) The Army already recognizes in its 2008 Stability Operations White Paper that the Army "lacks competence, capability, and capacity" in both the GF and operating forces "to accomplish nontraditional missions" connected to stability operations.

(2) Simultaneously, the Army's commitment to the idea that the Nation has entered an era of persistent conflict includes an inherent expectation that Army involvement in stability operations will be a frequent, perhaps even a constant, feature of the future OE, perpetuating demands for GF support to operations.

(3) In addition, the growth of the operational Army will increase requirements within the GF to man, equip, train, and sustain those new forces as they are established.

(4) It is reasonable to expect that contractor support enabled through supplemental funding on which many GF organizations currently rely will also suffer cutbacks.

(5) Under these conditions, the intent to implement reductions in the size and capacity of the military and civilian structure within the GF would seem to raise additional, serious doubts about the ability of the GF to meet continuing requirements to support operating forces and simultaneously satisfy an expansion of requirements regarding its primary GF missions.

g. Assess in greater detail how GF organizations in all components of the Army support homeland defense and defense support to civil authorities, and identify future opportunities and challenges. There are unique GF capabilities in the active Army, USAR, and ARNG that can support any Federal response, and some remain untapped.<sup>176</sup> As an example, the concept of reachback for local, state, and Federal non-DOD entities represents a particular subset of the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational philosophy, but which raise unique policy and access issues.

h. Explore how the Army can better leverage joint GF capabilities that reside outside of the service.

i. Determination of specific GF capabilities that may be required for future operational requirements with the potential to emerge in the more distant future (2016 and beyond), in concert with the development of updated Army concepts under the emerging Army Concepts Framework.

---

## **Appendix A References**

### **Section I**

#### **Required Publications**

Army regulations, field manuals, and other Army publications are available at the Army Publishing Directorate homepage, <http://www.usapa.army.mil>. TRADOC publications are available at the TRADOC publications Web site, <http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/index.htm>.

FM 1-01

Generating Force Support to Operations

### **Section II**

#### **Related Publications**

Anderson, Steve, Brigadier General, Director HQDA G-43. Top Ten Strategic Lessons Learned of the War in Iraq. PowerPoint presentation, with the assistance of the Reverse Collection and Analysis Team Program, Fort Lee, Virginia, 3 March 2008.

Army Logistician. Army Establishes New Contracting Units, November-December 2006.

AR 5-22

The Army Force Modernization Proponent System

AR 12-7

Security Assistance Teams

AR 12-15

Joint Security Assistance Training

AR 71-9

Materiel Requirements

AR 700-137

Logistics Civil Augmentation Program

Army Materiel Command Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5. The Generating Force Forward. Briefing, March 2009.

Army Public Affairs Office. U.S. Army News Release, 22 September 2006.

Brannen, K. Army Eyes Slate of Promising Efforts for 'Program of Record' Status. Inside the Army, 6 October 2008.

Buhrkuhl, R. J. Buhrkuhl. When the Warfighter Needs It Now. Defense AT&L, November-December 2006.

Caldwell, W. Lieutenant General, Commander, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center. Comments reported by Kate Brannen, Inside the Army, 28 March 2009.

Censer, M. DOD says JIEDDO Has 'Enduring Value,' Should Be Institutionalized. Inside the Army, 22 September 2008.

CJCS 3470.01

Rapid Validation and Resourcing of Joint Operational Needs Statements in the Year of Execution

CJCSI 3170.01E

Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS)

----- House Investigators: Measuring JIEDDO's Performance 'Impossible.' Inside the Army, 24 November 2008.

Commanding General, TRADOC. CG TRADOC Directive, TRADOC GF Study, 3 November 2008.

Collective Training Directorate. Transition Teams and Provincial Reconstruction Teams Enduring Training Capabilities. U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 27 May 2008.

CSTC-A Web site. <http://www.cstc-a.com/mission/ARSIC.html>

Demspey, M. E. General, Commander, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. Comments on release of FM 3-07.1, Security Force Assistance, 5 May 2009. Retrieved from <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/05/security-force-assistance/>

Deployment Process Modernization Office. Standardizing Installation Deployment Support Functions. Briefing, 2009.

DODD 1404.10

DOD Civilian Expeditionary Workforce

DODD 3000.05

Military Support to Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR)

DODD 5158.5

Joint Deployment Process Owner

DODI 3020.37, with Change 1

Continuation of Essential Contractor Services during Crises

FM 1  
The Army

FM 1-02  
Operational Terms and Graphics

FM 3-0  
Operations

FM 3-07  
Stability Operations

FM 3-07.1  
Security Force Assistance

FM 3-24  
Counterinsurgency

FM 63-11  
Logistics Support Element

FM 7-0  
Training the Force

FM 100-10-2  
Contracting Support on the Battlefield

FM 100-11  
Force Integration

Fix, R., Colonel, Director, Army Transformation Office, HQDA G-3/5/7. U.S. Army Transformation in Operational Context. PowerPoint presentation, 17 December 2008.

Fort Belvoir Research and Development Center After Action Report on Operation Restore Hope, 1994. Quoted in D. Bennett Dickson, U.S. Army Rapid Equipping Force, 2002-2007.

Gabel, C. R. Seek, Strike, and Destroy: U.S. Army Tank Destroyer Doctrine in World War II. Leavenworth Paper No 12, September 1985.

Gates, R. Secretary of Defense. Speech to the Association of the United States Army, in Washington, D.C, 10 October 2007. Retrieved from <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1181>

Gilmore, G. J. Iraqi Police Learn Rule of Law, Concept of Tolerance. Armed Forces Press service, 26 January 2007.

Hotaling, A. Major, & McGuire, J. Major. Sustaining the Military Training Teams. Unpublished manuscript, JCISFA, June 2008.

HQDA, G-3. Stability Operations in an Era of Persistent Conflict. Army Policy Paper, 12 June 2008.

HQDA, G-3 (DAMO-SS). Army Position on SFA. Presentation, undated but released after August 2008.

HQDA, G-3/5/7. Army Force Modernization Proponency for Stability Operations and Security Force Assistance. Memorandum, 22 January 2009.

HQDA, G-3/5/7 and G-4. Army Power Projection Management Plan. 20 May 2009.

HQDA, G-37/FMP. Briefing, "Army Global Force Pool – Army Campaign Plan Decision Point #99," 16 September 2008.

"History of MNSTC-I." Retrieved from MNSTC-I Web site, [http://www.mnstci.iraq.centcom.mil/history\\_of\\_mnstci.aspx](http://www.mnstci.iraq.centcom.mil/history_of_mnstci.aspx), on 2 July 2009.

JACD, ARCIC. "Quick-Turn Doctrinal Assessment of GF Doctrine – Literary Search Report." Mini-CBA Deliverable #1, 13 March 2009.

JACD, ARCIC. "Quick-Turn Doctrinal Assessment of GF Doctrine – Assessment Report." Mini-CBA Deliverable #2, 25 June 2009.

JACD, ARCIC. "Quick-Turn Doctrinal Assessment of GF Doctrine Solutions and Recommendations." Mini-CBA Deliverable #3, 15 July 2009.

JCRM Program Office, JFCOM J-3/4. Briefing materials and updates available online at [https://JCRM\\_240.je.jfcom.smil.mil/JCRM](https://JCRM_240.je.jfcom.smil.mil/JCRM)

JDPO, U.S. JFCOM. JDPO Information Briefing. Briefing, February 2008.

Joint IED Defeat Organization. JIEDDO Annual Report, Fiscal Year 2007, undated.

Joint IED Defeat Organization. JIEDDO Fact Sheet, "About JIEDDO." Retrieved from JIEDDO Web site, <https://www.jieddo.dod.mil/AboutJIEDDO/ajfaq.aspx>, on 13 January 2009.

Joint Publication 1-02  
DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms

Joint Warfighting Center, U.S. Forces Command. Pre-Doctrinal Research White Paper No. 07-01, Provincial Reconstruction Teams. 21 November 2007.

Jordan, T. A., Brigadier General (Ret). Comment posted to article, Theater Military Advisory and Assistance Groups, on Small Wars Journal Web site, 20 March 2008.

LOGCAP Executive Summary Briefing, 25 April 2008.

Malkasian, C. and Meyerle, G. Provincial Reconstruction Teams: How Do We Know They Work? LeTort Paper, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, March 2009.

Miles, D. "Army Reserve Prepares for Post-Conflict Requirements," American Forces Press service, 12 January 2010. Retrieved from <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=57471>

MNSTC-I Web site. <http://www.mnstci.iraq.centcom.mil/>

Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy. Building Partnerships Framework and Lexicon presentation. 17 April 2009.

Office of the Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction/Department of State; Joint Center for Operational Analysis/U.S. Forces Command; & Bureau of Policy and Program Coordination/U.S. Agency for International Development. Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan – An Interagency Assessment. 5 April 2006.

Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Meeting Immediate Warfighter Needs. Memorandum, 15 November 2004.

Office of Management and Budget, Executive Office of the President. Acquisition and Contracting Improvement Plans and Policies: Saving Money and Improving Government, December 2009.

Office of Management and Budget, Executive Office of the President. Statement of Administration Policy re s.3001 (National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009). 9 September 2008.

Parson, J. P., Director of Contracting, Army Sustainment Command. Contingency Contracting Structure and Growth. Briefing, 21 September 2007 with updates.

PFI, Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) Web site. [http://pfi.dod.mil/PFI\\_Online.html](http://pfi.dod.mil/PFI_Online.html)

Program Executive Officer (PEO) Soldier, RFI Pre-Mobilization Equipping for Reserve Components. Information Paper. Retrieved from the PEO Soldier Web site, <https://peosoldier.army.mil/RFI/index.asp>

Quadrennial Defense Review Building Partnership Capacity (BPC) Execution Roadmap, 2006.

Report of the Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations, 31 October 2007.

TRADOC Pam 525-8-1

Schultz, J. USARC G-3/5/7 IT Division. United States Army Reserve Generating Force Information Briefing, 29 February 2009.

Sheftick, G. Army News service, 1 May 2009.

Schwind, J. Sergeant First Class. Iraq Assistance Group Supports the Feature Performance. U.S. Central Command Public Affairs Office, 17 May 2007.

Steele, D. Advisor Training Shifts to Fort Polk: Army Establishes Enduring Mission. Army, September 2009.

Thornton, R., Major. Mosul Security Force Assistance Case Study. Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, Fort Leavenworth, KS, April 2008.

TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-6

The United States Army Functional Concept for Move, 2015-2024

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers News Release, 29 September 2009,  
<http://www.tam.usace.army.mil/MED09-11-30-03.asp>

USAID Civilian-Military Cooperation Policy Statement, July 2008.

U.S. Transportation Command. U.S. Transportation Command Initiatives. Briefing, 28 April 2008.

Whitehouse, T., Deputy Assistant G1 for Civilian Personnel, HQDA G-1. CEW. PowerPoint presentation, 5 May 2009.

Wuestner, S. G. BPC/SFA. LeTort Paper, U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, February 2009.

## **Appendix B**

### **Principles of Employment of GF Capabilities in Support of Operations**

The following principles of employment of the GF in support of operations are compiled from FM 1-01, operational experience during OIF and OEF, and implications derived from this study.

a. GF organizations derive their operational utility from the performance of primary functions, but must also possess the inherent organizational versatility and agility to tailor capabilities to support unique operational requirements. GF capabilities are normally configured to meet primary missions, but can be reconfigured to meet and support operations.

b. GF organizations perform the same sort of missions in support of operating forces as they do in generating and sustaining Army capabilities, but under different conditions.

c. GF capabilities will often support and enable other U.S. non-DOD governmental activities; a significant example is assisting in building partner capacity.

d. GF organizations will deliberately adopt an expeditionary mindset and establish an inherent capability for rapid, timely support to operations, encompassing reachback, virtual presence, and exportable and deployable capabilities. GF organizations will design a tiered approach to generating these responsive capabilities.

e. The GF will employ capabilities in support of operating forces that are both standing (institutionalized by TDA) and ad hoc in nature; however, limiting the degree of reliance on the ad hoc formation of capabilities will improve timeliness, reduce internal disruption and risk to primary missions, and better enable anticipatory rather than reactive support.

f. If needed, a common regional framework will be adopted and applied to GF organizations as a means of improving adaptation to the operational environment.

g. Although the GF's primary missions determine its overall capacity, the requirements of the future OE place a premium on processes and measures that will enable the generation of a surge capacity for support to no-notice/short-notice contingency operations.

h. Under certain conditions, the operational Army will support GF tasks and missions. GF capabilities will not be applied to perform security functions and are normally not capable of independent (self-sustaining) operations.

i. ASCCs are the nexus where GF capabilities are incorporated into military planning and from where requirements for GF support emerge, but effective employment of GF capabilities further requires visibility of and planning for GF capabilities above and below the level of the ASCC.

j. GF capabilities must be balanced between the active Army and RC based upon deliberate metrics (such as responsiveness, scale, capacity, uniqueness, level of demand, cost, risk, and others).

k. Operational significance represents the foundational metric for judging the need for DOTMLPF change within the GF to support operations.

l. An overarching joint GF construct may emerge to better illuminate, rationalize, prioritize, monitor, and direct employment of GF capabilities to support joint operations.

## **Appendix C Assumptions**

### **C-1. Introduction**

The following assumptions form an informed foundation, not a prediction, of the conditions that will affect the future employment of the GF in support of operations.

### **C-2. DOD and joint strategic level**

- a. Although an era of persistent conflict will characterize the next 10 to 20 years, the requirement to maintain a full spectrum, capable joint force will continue.
- b. Operations will continue to be executed within a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environment, but the ongoing failure of the U.S. government interagency to provide critical capabilities across the other elements of national power at a time and on a scale required for operational support will not be resolved.
- c. U.S. forces will largely be CONUS-based, with some forward deployed and forward presence forces.
- d. Current trends toward increasing joint and multinational integration, interoperability, and interdependence will continue.
- e. BPC capability and capacity, and potentially nation-building, will comprise new joint and Army core competencies, with significant implications for change across the DOTMLPF domains.
- f. Joint and Army capability for stability operations will rise to a level of significance for force planning and development equal to that of major combat operations.
- g. The joint network envisioned in current developmental and conceptual documents as the backbone for network-enabled operations will exist and work as forecasted.
- h. The DOD budget will follow a line of slow growth and not increase significantly.

### **C-3. Army Level**

- a. The Army will remain a hybrid force of light, medium, heavy, and special purpose forces that continues to be organized around the principle of full spectrum capability and readiness.
- b. Modularization of combat, combat support, and sustainment units will be complete; the basic building block of the operational Army for tactical operations will be the BCT. However, the actual mix of forces and size of the Army may be subject to significant change due to any number of unforeseen factors.

- c. Army end-strength will not increase beyond 600,000, will remain an all-volunteer force, and will retain its current share of total operating authority.
- d. ARFORGEN will be fully implemented and the Army will continue with a cyclical readiness paradigm.
- e. The operational tempo that has characterized Army deployments abroad since 2002 will not exceed its current rate and may fall as Army forces withdraw from Iraq and Afghanistan. Even relatively near-term trends can be difficult to predict, however. Possible emphasis on BPC in the future could keep demand high.
- f. The blurring of the line between the GF and operating forces will continue, and may increase. HQDA will continue to categorize GF and operational Army assets in the Army global force pool with the evolution of force designs and assigned missions.
- g. The trend of hybrid forces where operating force and GF units and HQs are interleaved will continue. The driver will remain the desire to establish integrated functional capabilities from national strategic to tactical levels.

#### **C-4. Generating force**

- a. The demands of the era of persistent conflict and the continuation of high operational tempo will require improvement in the manner in which GF capabilities are employed to support full spectrum joint operations.
- b. The GF will continue to be comprised of military, civilian, and contractor personnel, with increasing reliance on government civilians to serve in an expeditionary posture for deployment as individuals or in teams. Dependence on the private sector to support future joint operations in-theater, ranging from individual contracted augmentees to theater-level functions provided primarily by contractors, will continue, especially when a surge in a capability is required.
- c. Some GF organizations will be best served by establishing a regional orientation to carry out primary missions and/or support to operations.
- d. Technology advances will change the way the GF trains, educates, and employs "reach to" capabilities to support its primary missions and joint operations.
- e. The GF will both support and be subject to the ARFORGEN process.

## **Appendix D**

### **Review of Means to Enhance GF Support to Operations**

#### **D-1. Introduction**

a. The extreme diversity of GF organizations – with their wide range of assigned missions, capabilities, designs, and manning – call into question the realistic identification of all-encompassing "GF required capabilities" in support of operations, as opposed to identifying specific tasks for individual organizations.

b. In addition, applying GF capabilities in support of operations does not always readily align with the Army warfighting functions, especially when dealing with the national strategic through tactical links often enabled by applying GF assets. Instead, they more often align with mission and task sets, such as BPC and "expeditionary contracting," which in turn would either rely on identifying a specific task that would be most appropriate for a specific GF organization or on ensuring required capacity is available for a functionally-oriented operation. A review of the UJTL, Army universal task list, and joint capability areas would support a more detailed assessment of applicable tasks and functions that could apply to GF support to operations.

c. Some key capabilities that could be applied across a wide range of GF assets appear more as enablers, notably the establishment of manned and equipped operations centers that would support efficient reachback, or assignment of personnel to an expeditionary workforce.

d. Finally, some required capabilities for support to operations would overlap capabilities necessary for many GF organizations to conduct their primary missions and thus might be addressed outside of the JCIDS, CBA, and CNA processes that normally apply to operating forces. Many of these will translate into issues of policy and law as much as of resources; for example, developing institutional processes for accelerated materiel development, fielding, and life-cycle management. Support to civil authorities within the U.S. can take advantage of contingency-focused initiatives and may inspire unique GF efforts, but legal issues will also have to be addressed.

e. All of these considerations were reasons why this Generating Force Study focused on the seven identified themes, as opposed to another construct, such as the Army warfighting functions, the joint capability areas, or the Army core enterprises.

#### **D-2. Enhancing GF support**

a. With qualifiers in mind, a review of possible means to enhance GF support to operations would establish one framework for further assessment. Sources include FM 1-01, the 2009 TRADOC mini-CBA on doctrine for GF support to operations, and findings of TRADOC Pam 525-8-1. The themes of this study will serve to organize this discussion. There is no attempt to match the TRADOC CNA format for required capabilities, to create a thorough list, or to prioritize. Instead, this review is in line with the TRADOC commander's directive for TRADOC Pam 525-8-1 to identify desired ways and means of developing new capabilities, organizational

efficiencies, and improved processes that will enable more effective employment of GF capabilities in support of future joint operations.

b. Improving the expeditionary quality of the GF.

(1) Establish the means to identify and track skill sets of all civilian and military personnel beyond standard occupational specialty data.

(2) Establish a tracking system with online access that provides current deployability readiness data (medical, dental, family care plans, wills, and others) for selected civilian personnel, similar to the information available for military personnel on Army Knowledge Online.

(3) Foster training regimes for identified civilian personnel to maintain skills required for deployment and operations in-theater.

(4) Expand the civilian expeditionary workforce concept to better enable no-notice and short-notice crisis response operations.

(5) Integrate some GF TDA organizations into the ARFORGEN cyclic process, based on applicability and need for enduring deployed capabilities.

(6) Establish a regional focus for GF TDA and MTOE assets where resources allow and the conduct of primary mission or support to operations is improved.

(7) Create modular designs in selected GF TDA organizations for ease in rapid deployment, and/or to support the ARFORGEN cyclic process for enduring deployed capabilities. Such modular designs could include deployable augmentation cells assigned at parent GF HQs, with either a specific capability focus or flexible assets to carry out assessments or similar tasks.

(8) Expand the ARSC model to other applicable organizations in order to provide dedicated, modular augmenting elements for both GF and operating force organizations. These could be TDA or MTOE organizations.

(9) Establish approved on-the-shelf organizational designs that can be quickly activated, manned, equipped, and funded as needed. As appropriate for functioning organizations, maintain augmentation TDAs and mobilization TDAs. Where more rapid responses may be required, stand up cadre-style organizations that can be expanded as required; these organizations can also establish planning, training, and support relationships with operating forces and non-DOD entities.

(10) Develop flexible, standing contracts linked to funding lines that could be activated with short notice to provide an interim or surge capability. The need for specific contracts would be assessed against the utility of current constructs, such as LOGCAP.

(11) Enable a planning capability in GF organizations that allows for links with operating forces on developing support plans and identification of capabilities. This would include both planners to work with operational forces and technical staff, such as JOPES and JCRM operators, to ensure organizational data entries are current and direct links into the GFM process are maintained.

(12) Foster a capable planning and coordination capability at ASCC HQs, due to the critical role that ASCCs play in validating, prioritizing, and applying GF capabilities to support operations, as well as their ability to enable a regional focus for assets.

(13) Ensure a readiness reporting process for GF organizations that includes an assessment of both primary missions and support to operations.

(14) Refine deployment processes for both individual augmentees and teams from the GF, including the CONUS Replacement Centers and combat training centers for readiness exercises. Consider the utility of major GF organizations operating their own deployment centers, such as the USACE Deployment Center.

(15) Ensure that APS and theater equipment force pools have, where applicable, accounted for equipment necessary to deploy GF assets.

c. GF reachback support to operations.

(1) As appropriate, ensure GF organizations have operations centers to support reachback, enabled with the proper personnel and secure communications, and that can surge to the necessary operating hours with minimal notice. Specific capabilities depend on the GF organization.

(2) Not all reachback operations require or would benefit from centralized oversight, but develop a reasonable means to track workload generated by reachback support.

d. GF roles in BPC in support of operations.

(1) Establish a base design, with expandable options and derivative UICs, for a military-based, interagency organization that can conduct provincial reconstruction team-like operations in unsecure areas. Some number of these could be standing elements (including rapidly deployable components) in the GF, leveraging civilian and military skill sets, and trained in part through peacetime engagement activities.

(2) Maintain a funded program similar to the commander's emergency response program, and which can be applied across the spectrum from peacetime engagement to conflict to stability operations and applying to governance, construction/economy, and security.

e. GF support to improvement in strategic responsiveness of operating forces.

(1) Develop a theater design construct that more effectively applies certain GF capabilities by providing an organizational framework which would foster coordination and integration of support. The USACE model of forward deployed divisions and districts is a possible model. For certain theaters, such a construct could be in place and working with the combatant commander for peacetime engagement. Organizational entities able to be activated and rapidly deployed would be another facet of this construct. This framework might be a baseline support structure into which certain GF assets could plug into to ensure uninterrupted support.

(2) Enable a robust deployable, contingency installation management capability, with a consideration to link with early port opening activities. A tiered approach that coordinates GF and operating force assets for installation management would be most realistic.

(3) Ensure that prepositioned equipment stocks can support specified deployable GF assets, to include basic mobility, protection, and communications capabilities not otherwise resident in these TDA and MTOE organizations (including training support).

f. Accelerated materiel development and equipping the force.

(1) Institutionalize a flexible and rapid materiel development and fielding process, complementing mainstream JCIDS processes that ensures required capabilities needed to support new or evolving operations are provided. Ensure that the emerging BCT modernization strategy concept is applied as appropriate to other Army forces.

(2) For materiel developed under urgent need and outside the mainstream JCIDS process, actively assess the opportunity to bring materiel under standard life-cycle management and for wider fielding in the Army. Eliminate as quickly as possible the fielding of those items judged to have limited applications to the force following the urgent need.

(3) Expand the partnership of TRADOC capability managers, TRADOC Center and School Capabilities Development Integration Directorates, and operating forces as currently seen with the BCT warfighter forums.

g. Incorporating GF capabilities into the joint GFM process.

(1) Establish a reasonable reporting process that supports understanding of available force capabilities, readiness, and risk assessments if assets are diverted from primary missions.

(2) Augmentation or backfill requirements needed to reduce risk in the deployment of GF assets are identified beforehand.

(3) Applicable GF assets have load planning data and derivative UICs.

(4) Leverage the RC training and mobilization structure for innovative applications in the ARFORGEN process and to help to adapt or develop new capabilities in operating forces.

h. Mitigating strategies to reduce the impact on GF primary missions.

- (1) Establish out-of-cycle or compressed processes that allow for rapid creation or adaptation of TDA and MTOE organizational designs, personnel authorizations, and funding lines in order to reduce timeline gaps experienced with FDU, TAA, POM, and other mainstream processes.
- (2) Contingency-based funding lines should be available to support crisis response and rapid adaptability during extended operations, and should be properly overseen and audited from the very start of operations, using focused GF capabilities to maintain good management.
- (3) Have the capability to surge contractor personnel, either to backfill GF organizations at home station or to deploy to establish forward support, through ready contract and funding mechanisms.
- (4) Establish flexible concepts for reserves – GF organizations established in the active Army and RC specifically to augment or provide additional capabilities or capacities. Timelines for availability will be based on specific functions, scenarios, and standing plans.
- (5) Integrate GF efforts for support to operations with Army executive agent and Army support to other services responsibilities to improve force effectiveness and efficiencies.
- (6) Train joint and Army personnel on the GF to ensure that commanders and staffs at all echelons of the operating force understand the opportunities and challenges in applying GF support to operations. Planners at all echelons are high priority.
- (7) Leverage joint and other services' GF capabilities to provide the best mix of support to operations, and without an undue burden on Army GF organizations in cases where other capabilities are better postured.

## **Appendix E**

### **Glossary**

#### **Section I**

##### **Abbreviations**

AAB	advise and assist brigade
AAWO	Army Asymmetric Warfare Office
ACD	Accelerated Capabilities Division
ACC	Army Contracting Command
ACOM	Army command
ACSIM	Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management
ADT	agribusiness development team
AEC	Army Environmental Command
AFMS	Army Force Management School
AFSB	Army field support brigade
AFSBn	Army field support battalion
AMC	U.S. Army Materiel Command
AMDEO	accelerated materiel development and equipping organization
AMEDD	Army Medical Department
AMSA	Army Material Systems Analysis Agency
AOR	area of responsibility
APOD	air port of debarkation
APS	Army prepositioned stocks
AR	Army regulation
ARCENT	U.S. Army Central
ARCIC	Army Capabilities Integration Center
ARFORGEN	Army force generation
ARNG	Army National Guard
ARSC	Army Reserve Sustainment Command
ARSIC	Afghan Regional Security Integration Command
ASA(ALT)	Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology
ASC	Army Sustainment Command
ASCC	Army service component command
ATEC	U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command
AWD	Asymmetric Warfare Division
AWG	Asymmetric Warfare Group
BASOPS	base operations
BCT	brigade combat team
BDT	base development team
BLST	battalion logistics support team
BPC	building partner capacity
CAA	Center for Army Analysis
CAC	U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
CALL	Center for Army Lessons Learned

CASCOM	U.S. Army Combined Arms Support Command
CBA	capabilities-based assessment
CCBn	contingency contracting battalion
CCT	contingency contracting team
CEAED	Corps of Engineers Afghanistan Engineer District
CEGRD	Corps of Engineers Gulf Region Division
CENTCOM	U.S. Central Command
CERP	Commander's Emergency Response Program
CETAD	Corps of Engineers Transatlantic Division
CETAC	Corps of Engineers Transatlantic Programs Center
CEW	civilian expeditionary workforce
CG	commanding general
CIDC	U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command
CITF	Criminal Investigation Task Force
CJCSI	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction
CJTF	combined joint task force
CMA	U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency
CNA	capabilities needs analysis
COCOM	combatant command
COIC	Counter-IED Operations Integration Center
COIN	counterinsurgency
COMPO	component
CONUS	continental United States
COTS	commercial off-the-shelf
CREST	contingency real estate support team
CSA	Chief of Staff of the Army
CSB	contracting support brigade
CSTC-A	Combined Security Transition Team-Afghanistan
DA	Department of the Army
DCMA	Defense Contracting Management Agency
DCP	deployable command post
DDST	deployment and distribution support team
DLA	Defense Logistics Agency
DOD	Department of Defense
DODD	Department of Defense Directive
DODI	Department of Defense Instruction
DOS	Department of State
DOTMLPF	doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities
DRU	direct reporting unit
ECC	Expeditionary Contracting Command
EI2RC	Engineering Infrastructure and Intelligence Reachback Center
EnvST	environmental support team
ERDC	U.S. Army Engineer Research and Development Center
ETT	embedded training team
FDU	force design update

FEST-A	forward engineer support team-advance
FEST-M	forward engineer support team-main
FFE	field force engineering
FM	field manual
FMS	foreign military sales
FMSO	Foreign Military Studies Office
FOA	field operating agency
FORSCOM	U.S. Army Forces Command
FSO	foreign service officers
FY	fiscal year
GF	generating force
GFGA	generating force, globally available
GFM	global force management
GFSA	generating force, strategic asset
GFTC	generating force, theater committed
GOTS	government off-the-shelf
GPF	general-purpose forces
HQ	headquarters
HQDA	Headquarters, Department of the Army
HTAT	human terrain and analysis team
HTS	human terrain system
HTT	human terrain team
IAG	Iraq Assistance Group
ICT	integrated concept team
IED	improvised explosive device
IMCOM	U.S. Army Installation Management Command
INSCOM	U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
ISF	Iraqi security forces
JACD	Joint and Army Concepts Division
JCAAMP	Joint Improvised Explosive Device Capability Approval and Acquisition Management Process
JCIDS	Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System
JCISFA	Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance
JCRM	joint capabilities requirements manager
JDDE	joint deployment and distribution enterprise
JDPO	joint deployment process owner
JEFF	joint expeditionary forensic facilities
JFC	joint force commander
JFCOM	Joint Forces Command
JIEDDO	joint IED defeat organization
JIEDTF	joint IED task force
JOA	joint operations area
JOPEX	joint operation planning and execution system
JRAC	joint rapid acquisition cell
JTCOIC	Joint Training Counter-IED Operations Integration Center

JTF	joint task force
JTF-PO	joint task force-port opening
JUONS	joint urgent operational needs statement
LAR	logistics assistance representatives
LCMC	life cycle management command
LOGCAP	Logistics Civil Augmentation Program
LSE	logistics support element
MANSCEN	U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center
MAP-HT	mapping the human terrain
MDW	Military District of Washington
MEDCOM	U.S. Army Medical Command
MIB	military intelligence brigade
MICC	Mission and Installation Contracting Command
MILDEP	military deputy
MNC-I	Multinational Corps–Iraq
MNF-I	Multinational Force–Iraq
MNSTC-I	Multinational Security Assistance Command–Iraq
MTOE	modified table of organization and equipment
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NETCOM	U.S. Army Network Enterprise Technology Command
NCO	noncommissioned officer
NGIC	National Ground Intelligence Center
NGO	non-governmental organization
NTM-A	NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan
NTP	notice to proceed
OCONUS	outside the continental United States
OE	operational environment
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OFGA	operating force, globally available
OFGL	operating force, globally available low density
OFTC	operating force, theater committed
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
OMLT	operational mentoring liaison team
ONS	operational needs statement
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OTSG	Office of the Surgeon General
PEO	program executive officer
PFI	personnel force innovation
PKSOI	Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute
PMT	police mentoring teams
POD	port of debarkation
POM	program objective memorandum
PRT	provincial reconstruction team
RC	reserve component(s)
RDECOM	Research, Development, and Engineering Command
REF	rapid equipping force

RFI	rapid fielding initiative
RPOE	rapid port opening element
RSG	regional support group
SATMO	Security Assistance Training Organization
SC(A)	signal command (Army)
SCCT	senior contingency contracting team
SDDC	Surface Deployment and Distribution Command
SFA	security force assistance
SGO	standard garrison organization
SOCOM	Special Operations Command
SPOD	sea port of debarkation
TAA	Total Army Analysis
TAD	Transatlantic Division
TCOIC	Training Counter-IED Operations Integration Center
TCM	TRADOC capability manager
TDA	table of distribution and allowances
TEC	theater engineer command
TEOC	Tele-engineering Operations Center
TF	task force
TMAAG	theater military advisor and assistance group
TPFDD	time-phased force and deployment data
TRAC	TRADOC Analysis Center
TRADOC	U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
TRISA	TRADOC Intelligence Support Activity
TTOE	transportation theater port opening element
U.S.	United States
UFMCS	University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies
UIC	unit identification code
UJTL	universal joint task list
UROC	U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Reachback Operations Center
UQ	Unified Quest
USAASC	U.S. Army Acquisition Support Center
USACE	U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
USACIL	U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Laboratory
USAES	U.S. Army Engineer School
USAFMSA	U.S. Army Force Management Support Activity
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
USAPHC	U.S. Army Public Health Command
USAR	U.S. Army Reserve
USARC	U.S. Army Reserve Command
USARSO	U.S. Army South
USASAC	U.S. Army Security Assistance Command
USD	Undersecretary of Defense
USD(AT&L)	Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
USF-I	U.S. Forces-Iraq

USG	U.S. government
USMA	U.S. Military Academy
USMC	U.S. Marine Corps
USTRANSCOM	U.S. Transportation Command
VCSA	Vice Chief of Staff of the Army
WRAP	warfighter rapid acquisition program

**Section II**  
**Terms**

No entries for this section.

- 
- <sup>1</sup> FM 1-01 was developed by the ARCIC-Forward Directorate; since then, proponenty for this doctrinal publication has been passed to the CAC.
- <sup>2</sup> Commanding General (CG) TRADOC Directive, TRADOC GF Study, 3 November 2008.
- <sup>3</sup> Primary Title 10 functions include: recruiting; organizing the force; manning; training; equipping and fielding; maintaining; supplying; administration; procurement; construction; and research and development. Title 5, Title 22, and Title 32 also apply to some GF organizations.
- <sup>4</sup> FM 1-01, pp iii, 1-01.
- <sup>5</sup> During the course of the Generating Force Study, HQDA realigned MDW as an operational Army organization.
- <sup>6</sup> Data provided by HQDA G-37. The totals include the combatant command ASCCs, as well as Space and Missile Defense Command and U.S. Army Special Operations Command.
- <sup>7</sup> HQDA G-37/FMP briefing, "Army Global Force Pool – Army Campaign Plan Decision Point #99," 16 September 2008. This presentation also underscores the state of flux in language and definitions presented in this paragraph.
- <sup>8</sup> The Army Force Management School (AFMS) now acknowledges the blended organization as a distinct organizational model in operating force/GF analysis. AFMS identifies these organizations as "blended:" Military District of Washington, Intelligence and Security Command, Criminal Investigation Command, Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, Army Materiel Command, Space and Missile Defense Command, and Corps of Engineers.
- <sup>9</sup> The ongoing Army Institutional Adaptation effort has identified these four Core Enterprises: readiness, materiel, human capital, and services and infrastructure.
- <sup>10</sup> The operational problem statement was defined during the course of the Unified Quest (UQ) 2008 capstone wargame in May 2008.
- <sup>11</sup> The ICT did not include representatives from ATEC, MDW, or USMA, based on their nominal involvement in support to operations.
- <sup>12</sup> GF organizations support ARFORGEN, but they do not participate as units in the ARFORGEN readiness cycle.
- <sup>13</sup> An additional 256 OFTC entities are Army Prepositioned Stock (APS) materiel, managed by AMC, the Office of the Surgeon General, and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). APS consists of protected go-to-war assets. Therefore, APS materiel can't be accounted for as a unit with personnel, but as equipment sets only. APS is accounted for by AMC, U.S. Army Medical Materiel Agency (USAMMA), and DLA.
- <sup>14</sup> Due to the high number of its personnel being deployed and redeployed, one major GF organization, USACE, has now established its own deployment center for active Army and RC military, government civilians, and contractors going to Iraq and Afghanistan, rather than sending them through the CONUS Replacement Centers. The USACE Deployment Center is operated by the Middle East District at Winchester, Virginia. See <http://www.tam.usace.army.mil/UDC/index.asp> and USACE Transatlantic Programs white paper, "Deployment Center opens at TAC for those headed to Iraq and Afghanistan," not dated. USACE had determined that benefit was worth the cost to operate this in-house capability; note that some Deployment Center tasks are contracted out.
- <sup>15</sup> The information on FEST-A/M is drawn primarily from the executive summary of the USACE concept plan to support USACE FFE.
- <sup>16</sup> ERDC's Tele-engineering Operations Center (TEOC) and Engineering Infrastructure and Intelligence Reachback Center (EI2RC) were recently merged to become the USACE Reachback Operations Center. The TEOC was one of the earliest formal GF reachback enablers, established in the 1990s to better support deployed forces, notably those operating in the former Yugoslavia.
- <sup>17</sup> The information in this section is drawn from the USACE executive summary for the CETAD concept plan (2008) and briefing materials associated with it.
- <sup>18</sup> USACE News Release, 29 September 2009, <http://www.tam.usace.army.mil/MED09-11-30-03.asp>.
- <sup>19</sup> Information on the IMCOM BASOPS concept is sourced from Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management (ACSIM)/IMCOM information papers and briefings.
- <sup>20</sup> RSGs are being formed through conversion of corps support groups and area support groups. As of 25 February 2009, 14 RSGs have deployed as units to fill requirements as corps support groups and rear area operations centers. The first request and sourcing of RSGs to fulfill their normal assigned mission in theaters of operations will occur in FY2010.
- <sup>21</sup> U.S. Army News Release, Army Public Affairs Office, 22 September 2006.
- <sup>22</sup> AMC briefing, "The Generating Force Forward," Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, March 2009.
- <sup>23</sup> Terminology has been in flux. LSE once was more generic, and applied to the concept of a forward-deployed sustainment asset that integrated logistics efforts for the deployed force; this has since largely evolved into the AFSBn. The term LSE is now reserved for the AMC logistics element that each supports a Corps at their home station (Fort Hood, Fort Lewis, and Fort Bragg). Note, for example, the transition from FM 63-11, *Logistics Support Element*, to FMI 4-93.41, *Army Field Support Brigade Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*.
- <sup>24</sup> The establishment of forward field maintenance and repair facilities is itself an example of GF organizational adaptation and expeditionary quality. Examples include several service centers in Balad, Iraq operated by Army Field Support Battalion-IZ; the Stryker repair facility in Qatar under AFSB-Southwest Asia; and the small arms and information operations support centers in Bagram, Afghanistan under AFSB-Afghanistan. Backup field maintenance in Afghanistan is also performed at Kandahar, Kabul, and Bagram under AFSB-Afghanistan direction.
- <sup>25</sup> Army field support battalions and LSEs generally number about 30 personnel and a variable number of augmentees, while BLSTs number between 9 and 14 personnel.
- <sup>26</sup> LOGCAP is governed by Army Regulation 700-137. "Combat service support" is now an obsolete term, replaced by the term "sustainment," but is still found in documentation published prior to this change.
- <sup>27</sup> LOGCAP is not just a contingency contracting vehicle; it is also used to exploit corporate commercial capabilities in support of current and future force development.
- <sup>28</sup> LOGCAP Executive Summary briefing, 25 April 2008.
- <sup>29</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>30</sup> Contingency Contracting Structure and Growth briefing, Mr. Jeffrey P. Parsons, Director of Contracting, ASC, 21 September 2007, with specific numbers updated by HQDA G-3/5/7, as of 27 August 2009, in order to reflect April 2009 Army structure approved totals. In August 2009, the VCSA approved these 256 authorizations in the Contract Administration FDU, which will be reflected in the next MTOE update: 158 active Army/74 ARNG/24 USAR. By this time, the ACC was established and contracting assets were realigned from ASC.
- <sup>31</sup> The 408<sup>th</sup>, 409<sup>th</sup>, 410<sup>th</sup>, 411<sup>th</sup>, 412<sup>d</sup>, and 413<sup>th</sup> Contracting Support Brigades are aligned to the AORs of Central Command, European Command, Southern Command, the subunified command in Korea, Northern Command, and Pacific Command, respectively.
- <sup>32</sup> The Army Contracting Agency merged into the ACC as these regional commands were being established.
- <sup>33</sup> "Army establishes new contracting units," *Army Logistician*, November-December 2006.

<sup>34</sup> The Army established contracting force structure with the approval and resourcing of an FDU package initiated by the commander of the ACC. AMC recommended expansion of this MTOE force structure based upon mission requirements and the recommendations of a task force jointly chaired by AMC and the office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology.

<sup>35</sup> Report of the Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations, 31 October 2007.

<sup>36</sup> In the 1990s, the Army had five general officers in key contracting positions, but none by the time that OIF began. The overall number of contracting personnel also dropped considerably in the 1990s as those elements within the institutional Army were taxed as billpayers for the Army reduction in force after Operation Desert Storm.

<sup>37</sup> "Panel sets course for Army contracting overhaul," Government Executive.com, Elizabeth Newell, 2 November 2007 (<http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/1107/110207e1.htm>).

<sup>38</sup> Prior to this decision, the Army Contracting Agency was a field operating agency reporting to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology.

<sup>39</sup> *Army Logistician*, November-December 2006.

<sup>40</sup> Executive Director, ACC.

<sup>41</sup> The first transfer of authority of CSBs from ASC to ACC took place just 3 months after the ACC activation, with a change of command ceremony of the 408<sup>th</sup> CSB in Kuwait.

<sup>42</sup> Formation and training of HTTs also take place at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

<sup>43</sup> Several factors inhibit recruiting and maintaining HTT personnel, but perhaps the most significant one is simply the dearth of qualified candidates who are interested in or willing to deploy to a theater of conflict to support military operations.

<sup>44</sup> 2009 Army Posture Statement.

<sup>45</sup> Effective 1 October 2009, the U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine and the U.S. Army Veterinary Command were combined to form the U.S. Public Health Command (USAPHC). The purpose of a unified USAPHC is to enhance and protect the health, fitness, and well-being of Soldiers, their families, and the Department of the Army.

<sup>46</sup> The discussions in chapter 6 of the rapid equipping force, rapid fielding initiative, and Task Force Odin are relevant examples of improvement in GF expeditionary quality.

<sup>47</sup> TRADOC originally described a center of excellence as "a premier organization that creates the highest standards of achievement in an assigned sphere of expertise by generating synergy through effective and efficient combination and integration of functions while reinforcing the unique requirements and capabilities of the branches." On 3 December 2009, CG TRADOC approved this definition for a Center of Excellence: "Designated command or organization within an assigned area of expertise that delivers current warfighting requirements, identifies future capabilities, integrates assigned DOTMLPF dimensions, and presents resource-informed, outcomes-based recommendations to the TRADOC Commanding General." Note that AR 5-22, *The Army Force Modernization Proponent System*, recognizes TRADOC centers of excellence, but continues to define the term as TRADOC once did, with a significant opening caveat: "Designated by HQDA, a center of excellence is a premier organization that creates the highest standards of achievement in an assigned sphere of expertise by generating synergy through effective and efficient combination and integration of functions while reinforcing unique requirements and capabilities." While quite a number of organizations are currently called Joint Centers of Excellence, Joint Publication 1-02, does not define the term.

<sup>48</sup> Of special note is JCISFA's recently released *SFA Planner's Guide – Foreign Security Force Development*, 1 December 2009.

<sup>49</sup> Network implementation and support from NETCOM/9<sup>th</sup> SC(A) is a continuous activity that supports all phases of operations. It includes network defense and information assurance. The degree to which NETCOM responds to specific requests for support from operating forces is not clear.

<sup>50</sup> This mission area is under constant review, to include ensuring that GF structure is right-sized in order to prepare GPF for BPC missions as needed for worldwide contingencies.

<sup>51</sup> *Quadrennial Defense Review BPC Execution Roadmap*, 2006, p 4. Building partnership capacity has been used in the past as a synonym for the activities involved in building partner capacity, whereas building partnership capability is considered to be a set of capabilities rather than activities or tasks.

<sup>52</sup> *Building Partnerships Framework and Lexicon*, presentation by the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations, 17 April 2009. This presentation notes that the terms widely used throughout DOD with respect to building partnerships and building partner capacity are not widely understood and are often confused.

<sup>53</sup> Stability Operations in an Era of Persistent Conflict, Army Policy Paper, HQDA G-3, 12 June 2008.

<sup>54</sup> Cited in *Building Partner Capacity/Security Force Assistance*, Scott G. Wuestner, LeTort Paper, U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, February 2009, pp 8-9.

<sup>55</sup> 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report.

<sup>56</sup> Cited in *Stability Operations*, Army Policy Paper, p 7.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, p 14.

<sup>58</sup> FM 3-07, *Stability Operations*. Note that these five tasks essentially align with the stability, security, transition, and reconstruction components of DODD 3000.05.

<sup>59</sup> USAID Civilian-Military Cooperation Policy Statement, July 2008, p 3.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>61</sup> Some recent assessments are calling into question the relative value of CERP, in part over the issue of second-order effects in local areas when limited reconstruction projects are not followed up on with other efforts. As with any initiative that is attempted during operations, regular assessments as to their effectiveness are necessary. In the case of CERP and the quick impact project program, a more thorough analysis of these two programs can help to determine their relative effectiveness in different operational environments. A major success of CERP was the very fact that significant funding was made available to commanders, along with wide latitude on how it was applied based on local conditions. A major shortfall was in the short-notice decisions required to designate projects when CERP was initially instituted. Lessons learned from this period were applied in how CERP was later administered.

<sup>62</sup> The FY2009 budget request for CERP funding amounted to \$1.7 billion.

<sup>63</sup> *Top Ten Strategic Lessons Learned of the War in Iraq*, PowerPoint presentation, BG Steve Anderson, HQDA G-43 Director, with the assistance of the Reverse Collection and Analysis Team Program, Fort Lee, Virginia, 3 March 2008. Lesson #2 is the idea that logisticians can empower nation building.

<sup>64</sup> Chapter 2 describes the establishment and activities of USAEC engineer districts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

- <sup>65</sup> *Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan – An Interagency Assessment*, Office of the Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction/DOS, Joint Center for Operational Analysis/U.S. Joint Forces Command, Bureau of Policy and Program Coordination/U.S. Agency for International Development, 5 April 2006, pp 5, 11. At the time of this assessment, 22 PRTs were operating in-country.
- <sup>66</sup> *Provincial Reconstruction Teams*, Pre-Doctrinal Research White Paper No 07-01, JFCOM Joint Warfighting Center, 21 November 2007.
- <sup>67</sup> *Provincial Reconstruction Teams: How Do We Know They Work?*, Carter Malkasian and Gerald Meyerle. LeTort Paper, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, March 2009, p vii.
- <sup>68</sup> Malkasian and Meyerle, p 32, provide data on three "unsafe" provinces in the south that shows that PRT project funding exceeded that USAID and the ANSP in size by factors of from 5 to 15 in those areas.
- <sup>69</sup> In 2008, USAID personnel included about 1,000 foreign service officers (FSO) and 6,000 contract and foreign national personnel. DOS FSOs numbered about 6,000 FSOs. Wuestner, p 7.
- <sup>70</sup> *Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan*, p 9.
- <sup>71</sup> The Italian, German, Canadian, and British PRTs also exceed 100 personnel in size and generally include considerably more civilians. The German team in Kunduz numbers nearly 500 personnel. Malkasian and Meyerle, p 6. Other U.S. government agencies may also participate in PRTs.
- <sup>72</sup> *Provincial Reconstruction Teams*, Pre-Doctrinal Research White Paper No. 07-01, FORSCOM Joint Warfighting Center, 21 November 2007, p 8; *Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan – An Interagency Assessment*, p 31.
- <sup>73</sup> Malkasian and Meyerle, p 1.
- <sup>74</sup> The best discussion of PRT shortfalls is found in the S/CRS report, *An Interagency Assessment*. The discussion above only covers the most significant problem areas.
- <sup>75</sup> The CALL also produced a PRT handbook for Iraq.
- <sup>76</sup> JFCOM White Paper, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams*, pp 12-13.
- <sup>77</sup> The 189<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade is a First Army TDA organization that has active Army and RC Soldiers assigned to allow it to perform its assigned mission.
- <sup>78</sup> MNSTC-I Web site, <http://www.mnstci.iraq.centcom.mil/>.
- <sup>79</sup> *Transition Teams and Provincial Reconstruction Teams Enduring Training Capabilities*, Collective Training Directorate, U.S. Army CAC, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 27 May 2008.
- <sup>80</sup> The transition of this training capability is an interesting case study in the application of time, funds, facilities, units, and Soldiers. In March 2008, Fort Polk was notified that it would be taking over the mission of training Army, Navy, and Air Force combat advisors. The 162<sup>d</sup> Infantry Brigade, activated on 1 May 2009 for this specific mission, had less than a year to prepare for the mission before the arrival of the first combat advisors at Fort Polk on 29 August. The 162<sup>d</sup> had the same amount of cadre as 1<sup>st</sup> Brigade/1<sup>st</sup> Infantry Division. By 9 September, the brigade was manned to 97%, with more than 70% of its Soldiers having combat experience and 19% of the cadre having combat advisor experience. To support the transition of the mission, more than 100 Soldiers from 1<sup>st</sup> Brigade/1<sup>st</sup> Infantry Division at Fort Riley were assigned to the 162<sup>d</sup>. Most of the equipment used to train combat advisors at Fort Riley was transferred to Fort Polk – more than 12,000 pieces of equipment, ranging from vehicles to weapons to night vision devices, sent in eight force packages from April to November. Upon receipt of the mission, the construction of facilities began on North Fort Polk. The Army spent about \$168 million on unit headquarters, barracks, and other amenities that are essential to the operation of the training mission. In addition to personnel trained at Fort Polk, the 162<sup>d</sup> is responsible for training combat advisors that are organic to their deploying brigades. Mobile teams from the 162<sup>d</sup> will be responsible for training active-duty Soldiers at their brigade's home station. This training will take place in three phases prior to deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan.
- <sup>81</sup> Initially, transition teams operated under the direction of the IAG, but operational experience proved that attaching them to BCTs partnered with Iraqi units was a more effective way of employing and supporting the transition teams. Thus, attachment to a specified BCT has been the desired approach for command and control of transition teams, and military transition teams in particular, since 2007.
- <sup>82</sup> *Iraq Assistance Group Supports the Feature Performance*, SFC Jennifer Schwind, U.S. Central Command Public Affairs Office, 17 May 2007
- <sup>83</sup> Operational data from 2008 suggest that approximately 75-80 percent of deployed transition teams were military transition teams, border transition teams, and national police transition teams. *Transition Teams and Provincial Reconstruction Teams*, p 7.
- <sup>84</sup> *Mosul Security Force Assistance Case Study*, MAJ Robert Thornton, JCISFA, Fort Leavenworth, KS, April 2008.
- <sup>85</sup> U.S. military police brigades have often been charged with manning national police and police transition teams. An example cited in August 2006 by the DOS described how U.S. military police were embedded at 100 police stations in Baghdad and augmented by 150 international police observers for a particular operation. See also *Iraqi Police Learn Rule of Law, Concept of Tolerance*, Gerry J. Gilmore, Armed Forces Press service, 26 January 2007.
- <sup>86</sup> Some military transition teams were as much as three times larger than this standard size, owing to their particular scope or level of focus.
- <sup>87</sup> The U.S. Army Military Police School runs its own SFA course at Fort Leonard Wood, MO, to train military police soldiers in the skills needed for police transition teams.
- <sup>88</sup> An interesting case study on how one BCT support battalion handled its multiple responsibilities can be found in *Sustaining the Military Transition Teams*, MAJ Andrew Hotaling and MAJ Jason McGuire, unpublished manuscript, JCISFA, June 2008.
- <sup>89</sup> An excellent source for these observations is the *SFA Case Study – Mosul, Iraq*, by MAJ Robert Thornton, JCISFA, undated, but released in December 2008.
- <sup>90</sup> Per the Army's *Stability Operations* White Paper (p 14), published in June 2008, the Army was then contributing "over 8,700 personnel in support of capacity building missions in Iraq and Afghanistan." In April 2009, the total number of Army individual augmentees to support operations in OEF and OIF exceeded 10,000 for the first time. The majority of these personnel perform duties as members of transition teams or PRTs. LTG Gerald Cribb, HQDA G-3/5/7, in oral comments at the U.S. Army annual Title 10 wargame, UQ 2009, Carlisle Barracks, PA. For comparison, the Army employed 300 advisors in South Korea in 1953 and thereafter to help create the 20-division Republic of Korea Army. At the peak of the Vietnam War in 1970, the Army committed 14,000 regular and 1,800 special operations forces advisors. Wuestner, p 5.
- <sup>91</sup> MNSTC-I Web site, [http://www.mnstci.iraq.centcom.mil/history\\_of\\_mnstci.aspx](http://www.mnstci.iraq.centcom.mil/history_of_mnstci.aspx), accessed 2 July 2009.
- <sup>92</sup> *U.S. Army Transformation in Operational Context*, PowerPoint presentation, COL Robert Fix, Director, Army Transformation Office, HQDA G-3/5/7, 17 December 2008.
- <sup>93</sup> A reorganization of ISAF command structure in October 2009 established a new ISAF three-star command focused on training of Afghan military and police, from the national level on down – the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A). However, U.S. forces' CSTC-A also

remained in place, creating a unique challenge in coordination between ISAF coalition training efforts, U.S. unilateral training efforts, the work of PRTs, and operations of other military forces. Partly to mitigate this coordination challenge, the commander of CSTC-A is dual-hatted as commander of NTM-A.

<sup>94</sup> NTM-A now oversees ISAF's police OMLTs, but dual-hatting the command of CSTC-A and NTM-A offers the chance for closer coordination between these ISAF assets and U.S. PMTs and ETTs.

<sup>95</sup> CSTC-A Web site, <http://www.cstc-a.com/mission/ARSIC.html>.

<sup>96</sup> Transition Teams and Provincial Reconstruction Teams, p 2.

<sup>97</sup> *Theater Military Advisory and Assistance Groups*, posting by BG(Ret) Thomas A. Jordan on the Small Wars Journal Web site, 20 March 2008. The TMAAG concept retains substantial interest and support from SFA experts outside the Army and often surfaces in commentary, analysis, and articles in the defense press. Notable advocates include LTC(Ret) John Nagl, COL(Ret) Robert Killebrew, and Andrew Krepenevich of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment.

<sup>98</sup> HQDA Memorandum, Subject: Interim Guidance for Enduring Advisor Training Capability, 4 April 2008.

<sup>99</sup> Terminology at the time was "advise and assist brigade (AAB)" for a BCT configured for the specific mission of advisory and assistance training, to include transition teams; however, the two most current official terms are "brigade combat team augmented for security force assistance" and "modular brigade augmented for security force assistance" (in the latter case, Army policy now is that any brigade HQ – BCT, functional, or multifunctional – may serve in this capacity, with proper preparation and augmentation). See, for example, "Advisor Training Shifts to Fort Polk: Army Establishes Enduring Mission," Dennis Steele, ARMY Magazine, September 2009, pp 49-50. Other references claim that there is a distinction between an AAB and a BCT augmented for SFA. The 4<sup>th</sup> BCT/1<sup>st</sup> Armored Division is serving as the proof of principle for the AAB concept in Iraq, to be followed by up to eight more BCTs also configured and trained as AABs. These BCTs are assigned areas of operations and conduct conventional operations, as well as advise and assist tasks, often in concert with the PRTs operating in their area of operations (AO). Meanwhile, the BCT augmented for SFA is being implemented in Afghanistan, beginning with the 4<sup>th</sup> BCT/82d Airborne Division. Note that this BCT is specifically designated as an "advise and assist brigade." This BCT is not assigned an AO, but instead the majority of the force is broken up into transition teams and aligned with various ANA and ANP forces. This highlights the occasional confusion in terminology and definitions as concepts rapidly evolve. Other labels for the AAB have been Security Cooperation BCT, BCT-A (BCT-Advise), and BCT-S (BCT-Stability). For the remainder of the discussion in this study, the focus will be on the AAB as presented through Summer 2009.

<sup>100</sup> Transition Teams and Provincial Reconstruction Teams, p 3.

<sup>101</sup> *Army Position on SFA*, presentation by HQDA, DAMO-SS, undated but released after August 2008.

<sup>102</sup> General Martin E. Dempsey, 5 May 2009, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/05/security-force-assistance/>, "Announcement of Release of FM 3-07.1, Security Force Assistance."

<sup>103</sup> *Ibid.* This statement of policy that the Army will rely on general-purpose forces for SFA highlights the decision to develop capabilities within the Army's modular brigades. At the operational level, however, different organizations would be relied upon. As General Dempsey noted, SFA "at the Institutional Level will be accomplished by a Security Transition Headquarters organized under the Joint Task Force. This Security Transition Headquarters partners with the U.S. Embassy Country Team and evolves over time into an Office of Security Cooperation."

<sup>104</sup> Gary Sheftick, Army News Service, 1 May 2009.

<sup>105</sup> According to a 17 June 2009 news release, the 21 transition teams are advising an Iraqi division, national police, three provincial police forces, a border enforcement brigade, and a logistics hub. The support role to PRTs was often emphasized in various news releases regarding the 4<sup>th</sup> BCT deploying to Iraq. Although the brigade is focused primarily on SFA, its support to the PRTs may involve both enhanced security and involvement in PRT reconstruction activities.

<sup>106</sup> Comments by LTG William Caldwell, Commander, CAC, reported by Kate Brannen, Inside the Army, 28 March 2009.

<sup>107</sup> The desirability of introducing transition teams into BCTs augmented for SFA during the ARFORGEN cycle and prior to deployment can be traced to post-operations interviews of transition team chiefs and members, who stressed the benefits that can be achieved by associating transition teams with the BCTs with which they will partner during the ARFORGEN train-up cycle.

<sup>108</sup> *Stability Operations*, pp 19, 22.

<sup>109</sup> The 162<sup>d</sup> Infantry Brigade heritage includes combat operations in World Wars I and II.

<sup>110</sup> HQDA G-3/5/7 Memorandum, Subject: Army Force Modernization Proponency for Stability Operations and Security Force Assistance, 22 January 2009. SOCOM is the joint proponent for SFA.

<sup>111</sup> *Stability Operations*, p 13. Although this citation speaks directly to stability operations, it is appropriate to view BPC as being a fundamental element within that form of operations, although it is not limited to stability operations.

<sup>112</sup> *Ibid.*, pp 15-16.

<sup>113</sup> TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-6, proposed future deployment goals that were based on OSD goals promulgated in a variety of documents. The draft Army Power Projection Program Master Plan currently under development by HQDA G-3/5/7 and G-4 has adopted these goals and proposed a plan to achieve them. Army Power Projection Management Plan, 20 May 2009, pp 15-24. If implemented, the master plan has wide-ranging consequences for Army installations and the deployment process.

<sup>114</sup> DPMO briefing, "Standardizing Installation Deployment Support Functions," 2009.

<sup>115</sup> JFCOM JDPO briefing, "Joint Deployment Process Owner Information Briefing," February 2008.

<sup>116</sup> TRANSCOM briefing, "U.S. Transportation Command Initiatives," 28 April 2008.

<sup>117</sup> It has been suggested that this chapter should expand its scope to deal with the larger issue of accelerated capability development. This suggestion was declined on the grounds that capability development is a primary mission for many GF organizations and that it does not necessarily translate into support of operations. The study proponent agrees that accelerated capability development that includes all DOTMLPF domains should be a high priority for future study.

<sup>118</sup> AR 71-9, Materiel Requirements.

<sup>119</sup> This section relies heavily on COL Bennett Dickson's historical report on the REF.

<sup>120</sup> The Army employed teams of Army ground force observers. Their reports constitute one of the most interesting historical records of air and ground operations during World War II.

<sup>121</sup> President Franklin Roosevelt projected the need for the U.S. to become the Arsenal of Democracy for the Allies in his fireside speech of 29 December 1940, almost 1 year before Pearl Harbor.

<sup>122</sup> Christopher R. Gabel, *Leavenworth Paper 12: Seek, Strike, and Destroy: U.S. Army Tank Destroyer Doctrine in World War II*, September, 1985. This brief example is cited here primarily to illustrate errors that can easily occur, but must be avoided in rapid equipping. Dr. Gabel characterizes the tank destroyer as a failure for three primary reasons: the doctrine underpinning the system was invalid; the Army failed to anticipate advances in armor protection and armaments (armor got better, but guns got bigger); and branch parochialism resisted the integration of the weapon system into a combined arms structure.

<sup>123</sup> Dickson, p 5. Dickson also notes that the Army established the Limited War Laboratory at Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, during the war, achieving some success in accelerating development and delivery of selected new materiel capabilities to units in-theater.

<sup>124</sup> Dickson, pp 7-9.

<sup>125</sup> In general, discussion of the REF often cited a 90-day standard for project fielding, perhaps owing to a memorandum in August 2004 from then-VCSA GEN Richard Cody to LTG Joseph Yakovac, then the Military Deputy to the ASA(ALT), in which GEN Cody noted 90 days as the target (as cited in Dickson, p 42). A recent REF briefing posits a 180-day goal from requirement determination to delivery. In contrast, the DOD joint rapid acquisition cell adopted a 120-day standard for capability delivery.

<sup>126</sup> Secretary of Defense Gates has iterated his concern about over optimizing solutions during a time of persistent conflict, and has suggested that an "80% solution" to materiel requirements needed by deployed forces is a reasonable metric. ". . . I concluded we needed to shift away from the 99-percent exquisite service-centric platforms that are so costly and so complex that they take forever to build, and only then in very limited quantities. With the pace of technological and geopolitical change and the range of possible contingencies, we must look more to the 80-percent solution, the multi-service solution that can be produced on time, on budget and in significant numbers. As Stalin once said, "Quantity has a quality all of its own." Remarks by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates at the Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 16 April 2009 (<http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=4404>).

<sup>127</sup> Dickson.

<sup>128</sup> This mission statement continues to characterize REF activities to the present day. However, its current purview extends beyond lethality, survivability, and force protection to include communications, alternative power sources, medical capabilities, and training aids.

<sup>129</sup> Dickson, pp 55-56.

<sup>130</sup> Dickson, p 58.

<sup>131</sup> As of the end of 2008, the JIEDDO organization comprised 3,600 people, of which 2,600 to 3,000 are contractors.

<sup>132</sup> JIEDDO Annual Report, FY2007, undated, p 15. The Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG) tactical advisory teams perform a similar predeployment function.

<sup>133</sup> JIEDDO Annual Report, FY2007, p 6.

<sup>134</sup> JIEDDO Annual Report, FY2007, p 7.

<sup>135</sup> JIEDDO Fact Sheet, JIEDDO Web site, <https://www.jieddo.dod.mil/ABOUTJIEDDO/AJFAQ.ASPX>, 13 January 2009.

<sup>136</sup> This COIC, focused on "attack the network," is not to be confused with JIEDDO's Joint Training C-IED Operations Integration Center (JTCOIC), charged with "train the force"; the JTCOIC is currently operated in Newport News, Virginia, by the TRADOC G-2.

<sup>137</sup> JTCOIC overview briefing.

<sup>138</sup> Marjorie Censer, "DOD Says JIEDDO Has 'Enduring Value', Should Be Institutionalized," *Inside the Army*, 22 September 2008. Pressure to reduce supplemental funding may result in less reliance on supplementals in the future and instead increasing the baseline budget for JIEDDO.

<sup>139</sup> JIEDDO Fact Sheet. Although the activities listed in this short paragraph were carried out under JIEDDO's purview, it should be noted that some of them are service initiatives funded by JIEDDO; an example of this is the HTT effort, originated under Army auspices.

<sup>140</sup> Marjorie Censer, "House Investigators: Measuring JIEDDO's Performance 'Impossible'," *Inside the Army*, 24 November 2008. A key quote from this document: "In general, it is difficult to relate any of JIEDDO's specific initiatives to the measures it uses to demonstrate success."

<sup>141</sup> The rapidity in which the AWG was established stands in stark contrast to the delays experienced by the REF, perhaps owing primarily to the fact that the REF deliberately blended operational, combat development, and acquisition functions, thereby introducing a level of complexity and inherently antagonistic functions that had to be reconciled.

<sup>142</sup> Equipment includes items like four-season clothing, knee pads, modular lightweight load-carrying equipment, other protective gear, improved first aid kits, ballistic spectacles, spotting scopes, miniature binoculars, and laser target location systems.

<sup>143</sup> Information Paper, *Rapid Fielding Initiative Pre-Mobilization Equipping for Reserve Components*, PEO Soldier Web site, <https://peosoldier.army.mil/RFI/index.asp>.

<sup>144</sup> Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Subject: Meeting Immediate Warfighter Needs, 15 November 2004.

<sup>145</sup> Robert J. Buhrkuhl, "When the Warfighter Needs It Now," *Defense Acquisition Technology and Logistics*, November-December 2006, p 29. Dr. Buhrkuhl was the first director of the JRAC.

<sup>146</sup> CJCSI 3470.01, signed out on 15 July 2005, amplifies the Deputy Secretary of Defense memo cited above and provides additional guidance on joint and service responsibilities for responding to JUONS.

<sup>147</sup> Members of the JRAC core group include experts in acquisition, law, funding, logistics, contracting, and technology and who also have the authority to make decisions on behalf of their parent organizations.

<sup>148</sup> Buhrkuhl, p 29.

<sup>149</sup> *Ibid.*, p 31.

<sup>150</sup> CJCSI 3170.01E.

<sup>151</sup> The JRAC can also be viewed as having "four-star sponsorship," given the role of the USD(AT&L) in the JRAC process, its direct reporting requirements to the Secretary of Defense, and the CJCS role in validating immediate warfighter needs.

<sup>152</sup> The AMDEO should also resist any trend to expand its purview beyond materiel to encompass other major responsibilities for non-materiel capabilities.

<sup>153</sup> Kate Brannen, "Army Eyes Slate of Promising Efforts for 'Program of Record' Status," *Inside the Army*, 6 October 2008. Qualifying criteria for consideration of a capability as a program of record include: use in operational conditions for 120 days; operationally mature; evaluated in an operational assessment; capable of production with major modification; and clear relevance to an existing or future capability gap. As of September 2008, the rapid transition process had considered 417 capabilities, 32 of which were determined to warrant program-of-record status.

<sup>154</sup> It is noteworthy that insurgents and terrorists in both OEF and OIF have used methods and devices first used in the Soviet-Afghan War.

<sup>155</sup> An analogous situation has been the Army's experience with liaison detachments to coalition partners. Composed of people, transport, and communications capabilities, these detachments are always required in multinational operations, but are either not authorized in unit MTOEs or

are documented but not sourced. Historically, liaison detachments are always created on an ad hoc basis, out of existing organizational resources. Initiatives to institutionalize them at division and corps levels have come to naught.

<sup>156</sup> One example of an earlier attempt to establish a reporting process by a major GF organization in order to identify the ability of its subordinate assets to perform Title 10 missions was the "TRADOC Status Report," an internal report used in the early 2000s.

<sup>157</sup> Recent work by HQDA G-37/FM classifies more than 30,000 positions within the Army as "generating force, globally available." Whether or not all of those positions and the capabilities that they represent would need to be incorporated into JCRM or how they might be incorporated are open questions.

<sup>158</sup> This entire section is drawn from documents and briefing materials produced by the JCRM program office within JFCOM J-3/4. Updates are available online at [https://JCRM\\_240.jefcom.smil.mil/JCRM](https://JCRM_240.jefcom.smil.mil/JCRM).

<sup>159</sup> Composed of the Deputy USD for Readiness, the Director of the Joint Staff, and the Deputy Commander of JFCOM.

<sup>160</sup> These events were the GF Seminar in March 2009, the Staff Exercise in April 2009, and the capstone wargame in May 2009.

<sup>161</sup> The JFCOM J-3/4 endorsed the initiative during a presentation in October 2008, but declined to take it for action, instead recommending that the Army take the action.

<sup>162</sup> The desire to have DOD reduce reliance on contractors regularly emerges as an issue, both at home station and in-theater, for a variety of reasons. Concerns over deploying contractors extend to whether they can be subject to military orders and discipline, and the possible second-order strategic effects if a contractor commits a criminal act in-theater but cannot be prosecuted. In addition, there are certain tasks that are not necessarily appropriate for contractors, such as the care and custody of detainees.

<sup>163</sup> Establishing the All Volunteer Force beginning in the 1970s, making decisions on where to take risk following reduction in forces (especially after Operation Desert Storm), and focusing military personnel on combat-related duties all led to the realignment of missions and tasks assigned to military assets over the past decades. This resulted in a significant evolution as to what capabilities remained resident in U.S. Armed Forces. Before such changes, many of the functions performed today by contractors in-theater or in GF organizations were carried out by military units. One driver in adopting LOGCAP was to divest military forces of such support requirements.

<sup>164</sup> With the ongoing drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq, there are now cases of using contractors – U.S., third nation, and host nation – to fill temporary manning requirements during transition periods of force reduction. See, for example, "Ali Base drawdown in full swing" by Master Sergeant Darrell Habisch, 407th Air Expeditionary Group Public Affairs press release, 9 January 2010: "To ensure mission success and continuity, positions vacated by departing airmen will be filled by contractors, many of whom will be Iraqi nationals." These include both service support and operational personnel.

<sup>165</sup> DODI 3020.37, with Change 1, 26 January 1996, p 2.

<sup>166</sup> Statement of Administration Policy re s.3001 (National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009), Office of Management and Budget, Executive Office of the President, 9 September 2008, p 1.

<sup>167</sup> Acquisition and Contracting Improvement Plans and Policies: Saving Money and Improving Government, Office of Management and Budget, Executive Office of the President, December 2009.

<sup>168</sup> [http://pfi.dod.mil/PFI\\_Online.html](http://pfi.dod.mil/PFI_Online.html).

<sup>169</sup> *Stability Operations*, p 26. The numbers quoted here are for DOD civilians, not just DA civilians.

<sup>170</sup> DODD 1404.10, DOD Civilian Expeditionary Workforce, 23 January 2009.

<sup>171</sup> *Civilian Expeditionary Workforce*, PowerPoint presentation by Mr. Tony Whitehouse, Deputy Assistant G-1 for Civilian Personnel, HQDA, 5 May 2009.

<sup>172</sup> For example, it is not often publicly recognized that the functions performed by the large body of contractors that have continuously sustained and supported deployed Army forces in-theater, encompassing both operational and generating force tasks, and without which large-scale operations today would be nearly impossible, were performed in major conflicts in the past primarily by uniformed personnel.

<sup>173</sup> As Gen. Dempsey, CG TRADOC, noted on 5 May 2009 with the release of FM 3-07.1, "It's important to note that SFA occurs under a variety of conditions, and it is the conditions that will determine how and what organizations we use to accomplish the mission." Posted at <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/05/security-force-assistance/>.

<sup>174</sup> The future status of the RC as an "operation reserve" may itself be in question. At issue is whether the expected drawdown of deployed forces in Iraq and Afghanistan over the next several years will return the RC to a pre-2001 philosophy, or if future initiatives applying the capabilities of the RC in an "era of persistent conflict" will leverage the efforts and lessons gleaned from RC support since the start of OEF and OIF. "With the drawdown of U.S. forces under way in Iraq and plans announced to begin reducing forces in Afghanistan after July 2011, LTG Jack C. Stultz, the Army Reserve chief, is facing [the] big question: 'How do you keep the Army Reserve relevant, and its soldiers motivated, if it's allowed to revert from an operational reserve to its pre-war strategic-reserve status?'" Donna Miles, "Army Reserve Prepares for Post-Conflict Requirements," 12 January 2010, American Forces Press service (<http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=57471>).

<sup>175</sup> Consider the USAR. Current USAR GF assets encompass a wide range of organizations and capabilities: (1) institutional training commands; (2) collective training divisions and commands; (3) medical (installation medical support units, TDA hospitals, medical command augmentation units, medical readiness support groups); (4) military intelligence (intelligence groups, Army Reserve Intelligence Support Centers, augmentation to the National Security Agency and Defense Intelligence Agency, technical intelligence companies); (5) transportation (assets under the operational control of SDDC, TRANSCOM augmentation); (6) other augmentation and supporting elements (regional support commands, USACE, CIDC, SOCOM, DOD and HQDA staffs, OCONUS commands); and (7) individual mobilization augmentees. Some highlights of recent support to operations by USAR GF include establishment and conduct of the Afghan Drill Sergeant School; support to the stand-up of the Afghan National Military Academy; filling institutional training staff positions in HQ MNSTC-I; supporting in-theater military transition teams in Iraq and ETTs in Afghanistan; providing intelligence analysis and support; supporting SDDC port operations; providing AMEDD Professional Filler System medical rotational staff; and backfilling TRADOC and other organizations who have deployed capabilities. Despite this expanded support to operations, the USAR GF is projected to be reduced by 17%, from 56K to 49K personnel over the period FY2007-2015. Along with reductions in the Trainees, Transients, Holdees, and Students account and IMA account, this is being done to increase USAR operating force strength, similar to efforts underway in the active Army. Source of information is *United States Army Reserve Generating Force Information Briefing*, 29 February 2009, Mr. John Schultz, USARC G-3/5/7 IT Division.

<sup>176</sup> Just one example is the continuing evolution of the ARNG concept for chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high yield explosive enhanced response force packages, which are aligned to ensure support within each Federal Emergency Management Agency region.