



U.S. Army Functional Concept for Engagement

24 February 2014



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Foreword


From the Director U.S. Army Capabilities Integration Center

The U.S. Army continues to answer the Nation's call, as it has for more than 237 years. As we look to the future, our Army faces a complex and uncertain operational environment that will challenge our Soldiers, leaders, and organizations in countless ways. To advance their objectives, future adversaries will likely amalgamate the lessons learned with emerging technologies and growing regional instabilities to counter military superiority enjoyed by the United States and its unified action partners. The challenges of future armed conflict require our Army to produce leaders and forces that exhibit a high degree of operational adaptability.

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet (TP) 525-8-5, The U.S. Army Functional Concept for Engagement, expands on the ideas presented in TP 525-3-0, The U.S. Army Capstone Concept (ACC), and TP 525-3-1, The U.S. Army Operating Concept (AOC), and introduces a new warfighting function. The complexity and uncertainty in the global environment means the Army must become more agile, flexible, and well-prepared to tackle a broad range of operations through the development of innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve U.S. security objectives.

The Army also must possess a broad range of capabilities to shape future operational environments, maintain its lethality on the battlefield, and be able to leverage unified action partners to reduce demands, prevent, and end conflict. The engagement warfighting function will institutionalize into Army doctrine, training, education, and leader development, the capabilities and skills necessary to work with host nations, regional partners, and indigenous populations in a culturally attuned manner that allows bridging language barriers, opening lines of communication and connections with key political and military leaders in a way that is both immediate and lasting. It enhances interdependence between special operations forces, conventional forces, and unified action partners while incorporating the tenets of the emerging idea of the human domain. As a result, this warfighting function will contribute to mission accomplishment by providing better, more synchronized lethal and nonlethal capabilities to assess, shape, deter, and influence the decisions and behavior of a nation's security forces, government, and people.

TP 525-8-5 effectively complements the six other warfighting functions and is fully nested in the broad vision outlined in both the ACC and AOC. This concept will lead force development and modernization efforts by establishing a common framework to capitalize on the integrative opportunities all of the warfighting functions provide to future land operations.



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*TRADOC Pamphlet 525-8-5

24 February 2014

Military Operations

THE U.S. ARMY FUNCTIONAL CONCEPT FOR ENGAGEMENT

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History. This is a new U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) pamphlet developed from an initiative by the Army's leadership to address engagement activities shortfalls within the existing Army Concept Framework (ACF). This concept is a component of the ACF, and is nested with and expands the central and supporting ideas of the TPs 525-3-0 and 525-3-1.

Summary. This concept describes broad capabilities the Army will require to enable engagement and its application in decisive action. The concept describes the need for Army forces to enter an area of operations on foreign soil; communicate with local leaders and populace; assess needs; understand the situation, and develop capacity-building programs; and direct efforts toward achieving outcomes consistent with U.S. interests. The concept will drive capability development across the domains of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) by establishing a common framework for conducting future unified land operations. This Army functional concept incorporates building partner capacity tenets and rescinds TP 525-8-4.

Applicability. This concept guides force development and serves as the foundation for future concepts, capability-based assessments, Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System documents, experimentation, and doctrine. It supports experimentation described in the Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) Campaign Plan and functions as the conceptual basis for developing solutions for the future force. This concept applies to TRADOC and Department of Army (DA) activities and units that develop DOTMLPF requirements.

*This pamphlet supersedes TP 525-8-4, dated 22 November 2011.

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Suggested improvements. Users are invited to submit comments and suggested improvements via The Army Suggestion Program online at <https://armysuggestions.army.mil> (Army Knowledge Online account required), or via DA Form 2028 to Director, ARCIC (ATFC-ED), 950 Jefferson Avenue, Fort Eustis, VA 23604-5763. Suggested improvements may also be submitted using DA Form 1045.

Availability. This publication is available on the TRADOC homepage at <http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/>

Summary of Change

TRADOC Pamphlet 525-8-5, The U.S. Army Functional Concept for Engagement

This new pamphlet, dated 24 February 2014-

- o Establishes and defines the Engagement warfighting function (chap 1).
- o Identifies the challenges and potential solutions for more effectively operating in the land domain while fully accounting for human aspects of conflict (chap 3).
- o Redefines interdependence to include unified action partners (chap 3).
- o Identifies the required capabilities that enable Army forces to work with unified action partners to maximize operational adaptability (app B).

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Chapter 1 Introduction

1-1. Purpose

a. TP 525-8-5 addresses engagement shortfalls within the existing Army Concept Framework (ACF).¹ The current ACF does not adequately reflect all the work done to advise and assist foreign security forces, governments, and peoples during the past decade of war. Creating an engagement warfighting function along with a functional concept leverages the Army's recent wartime experiences to help ensure the future Army is well-suited to perform its roles in prevent, shape, and win.

b. The concept recognizes the complex operational environment² and identifies the required capabilities that enable Army forces to work with unified action partners to maximize operational adaptability. It also describes how Army forces integrate, organize, and apply those capabilities seamlessly across the range of military operations as part of unified action.³

c. The concept poses and answers three questions.

(1) How do Army forces apply engagement warfighting function activities to influence people, security forces, and governments across the range of military operations to prevent, shape, and win in the future strategic environment?

(2) What must the Army do to provide the joint force increased operational effectiveness through interdependence and unified action?

(3) What are the required capabilities the Army must possess to succeed in the implementation of this concept?

d. The engagement warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that influence the behaviors of a people, security forces, and governments.

e. This warfighting function strengthens the current ACF by integrating, organizing, and configuring capabilities in the ACF better. It also stresses the importance of interdependence between Army forces and unified action partners. In pursuit of this purpose, there are two activities central to this warfighting function: partnership activities and special warfare activities.

f. Engagement tasks and systems focus on routine contact and interaction between U.S. Army forces and with unified action partners that build trust and confidence, share information, coordinate mutual activities, and maintain influence. Along with other warfighting functions, engagement enables the commander to identify and organize resources that develop relationships and capacity with key unified action partners through persistent activities.

g. This concept institutionalizes lessons learned from the past decade of conflict and outlines how future Army forces will conduct operations. It expands the intellectual foundation of TP 525-3-0's, Army Capstone Concept (ACC), idea of human aspects of conflict and war. This

concept addresses the physical, cultural, social, and political elements that influence human behavior to the extent that the success of any military operation depends on the application of unique capabilities designed to shape and, if necessary, fight and win conflicts.

h. The Army's recent experiences have reinforced the need for a high level of interaction between Army forces and unified action partners. This concept capitalizes on those experiences to ensure that future Army forces operate with greater effectiveness across the range of military operations and leverage all available resources to meet unique mission requirements. TP 525-8-5 considers and discusses four important activities described below.

(1) Future Army leaders at all levels consider and employ the applicable Army and partner capabilities to assess, shape, deter, and influence the global security environment better.

(2) Future Army forces understand the human aspects of an operational environment and determining the opportunities and resource requirements necessary to influence the solutions to achieve a suitable end state.

(3) Future Army units work with and through indigenous populations to establish relationships and other conditions for successful execution of unified action-enabled capacity building activities that influence human behavior and support prevent, shape, and win across a wide range of contingencies in defense of core national interests.

(4) Future Army conventional and special operations forces operate interdependently to provide the joint force commander with a balanced force that enhances operational effectiveness and consistency in the execution of unified land operations throughout all phases of operations.

i. TP 525-8-5 consists of five chapters. Chapter 1 establishes its purpose, linkage to the ACF, and assumptions. Chapter 2 presents an operational context for the concept. Chapter 3 explains the military problem, central idea, and components of the solution. Chapter 4 presents the future roles of the Army using the prevent, shape, and win construct.⁴ Chapter 5 summarizes the concept's major ideas. Appendix B lists the required capabilities needed to enable successful application of the systems and tasks within the engagement warfighting function. Appendix C discusses special operations and conventional forces activities.

1-2. References

Required and related publications are in appendix A.

1-3. Explanations of abbreviations and terms

Abbreviations and special terms used in this pamphlet are explained in the glossary.

1-4. Background

a. In October 2011, the Army recognized the United States (U.S.) Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School as the Special Operations Center of Excellence to organizationally incorporate Army special operations into the Army's portfolio of

responsibilities across the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF), warfighting functions, and formations.

b. This Army functional concept is one step toward institutionalizing lessons learned from advising and assisting foreign security forces over 12 years of conflict. Some lessons capture the comprehensive work accomplished with governance, rule of law, economic development, provision of essential services, and development of critical government functions.

1-5. Assumptions

a. Future Army forces will execute unified land operations to prevent emerging challenges that threaten U.S. interests.⁵ Potential challenges include those involving security, governance, economic development, essential services, rule of law, and critical government functions.

b. Future Army forces will need to operate interdependently with unified action partners among indigenous populations to reassure allies and influence adversaries.

c. Future Army forces will need to capitalize on each other's strengths to increase capacity and capability to adapt, innovate, and implement creative solutions to complex problems.

d. Building partners' capacity for security, governance, and rule of law will remain a fundamental U.S. national security strategy objective and support diplomatic, informational, military and economic measures.

e. Future Army forces will need to possess language and cultural skill capabilities to support geographic combatant commanders.

1-6. Linkage to the Army Capstone concept (ACC)

a. The ACC states that to operate more effectively in the land domain, while fully accounting for the human aspects of conflict and war, the Army requires a warfighting function to capture the tasks and systems that provide lethal and nonlethal capabilities to assess, shape, deter, and influence the decisions and behavior of its security forces, government, and people. The development of the engagement warfighting function and this functional concept are comprehensive solutions to address this requirement.

b. In addition, the ACC retains and expands the idea of operational adaptability, describes the future Army's required capabilities, and how to make selective additional investments to succeed in the primary missions of the U.S. Armed Forces.⁶ This concept builds on the ACC and describes how future Army forces will become more interdependent, and employ partnership activities and special warfare capabilities, to support the commander in shaping and influencing an operational environment.

1-7. Linkage to the Army Operating Concept (AOC)

While the ACC describes what the Army must do in the future, the AOC describes how the Army will fight in the future. It also describes how combining the capability advantages of partners strengthen operations.

Chapter 2 Operational Context

2-1. The future operational environment

a. Future operational environments will be characterized by uncertainty, complexity, rapid change, and a range of potential threats. They will be marked by various levels of conflict among nations and groups competing for wealth, resources, political authority, sovereignty, and legitimacy. The distinctions between threats will blur for the U.S. These include, for example, the nature of enemies and adversaries, and the multiplicity of actors involved. In addition, friendly and unfriendly actors will attempt to adapt to an ever-changing environment, which may lack a system of governance or rule of law.

b. The 2011 National Military Strategy notes that to succeed, the U.S. military, working with unified action partners, must update, balance, and integrate all instruments of American power. The U.S. military must maintain its conventional superiority while the Nation must invest in diplomacy, development capabilities, and institutions in a way that complements and reinforces its global partners.

c. Regional conflicts, civil wars and transnational actors are likely to alter regional power structures. New global actors may emerge as a result of conflict and instability. Some emerging powers may attempt to form alliances that limit or hinder the global influence of the U.S. In addition, high population growth and migration, as well as cultural, ethnic and religious forces, have the potential to cause unrest.

d. The ability of Army and joint forces to affect outcomes around the world in accordance with national political objectives rests largely on their ability to project power from the continental U.S. Some adversaries may refine anti-access and area denial strategies to counter the U.S. and the abilities of its unified action partners to project military force into an operational area. Expected adversarial actions will include positioning forces and capabilities to support rapid attacks against air and sea ports of debarkation, land borders, other areas, and river boundaries to interrupt the flow of logistics or follow-on forces. In theater, adversaries may attack forward bases and sustainment facilities while preparing to oppose forcible entry operations. Adversaries also may employ inform and influence activities, counter-space, and cyber capabilities to preclude U.S. involvement and frustrate efforts to build a coalition and gain popular support.

e. Some state and non-state adversaries may also pursue development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD); specifically, nuclear, biological, and chemical weapon technologies to employ against the U.S. and its unified action partners. If successful, adversaries could

experience greater freedom of action and pose a major threat to the safety of the U.S. and its unified action partners, thus destabilizing entire regions.

2-2. Scientific, technological, and social advancements

a. Advances in science, technology, globalization, and other cultural trends also may shape the global environment and affect the forms of future warfare. Adversaries may develop lethal technologies capable of producing widespread chaos, thus making it more difficult to disrupt or counter these threats. These conflicts will be contests for influence and legitimacy over relevant populations and conducted via major operations or decentralized operations using asymmetric means.⁷

b. Social advancements, such as access to education and evolving roles of women, will continue to change society and its culture. Positive social advancements, however, may threaten fundamental elements of societies that seek to suppress advancements to maintain the status quo.

c. The Army will continue with capability development to meet these changes and counter threats capable of producing widespread chaos. A wide range of science and technology (communications, behavioral science, medicine, and others) will significantly enhance military operations. With proper training of Soldiers and solid understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of science and technology, future Army forces will have a powerful advantage.

2-3. The Army's responsibilities

a. Regionally aligned forces will routinely defend national interests by conducting civil-military operations and security cooperation operations. Future Army forces will compel enemies to submit to U.S. national will by defeating their land forces and seizing, occupying, and defending their land areas. Changing national priorities, evolving operational environments and budget constraints will require a smaller and leaner Army. As a result, future Army forces will need to strengthen relationships with unified action partners to respond decisively to global challenges.

b. Successful future Army engagements will depend on resilient Soldiers and cohesive teams of conventional and special operations forces training and working interdependently. Organizations will need to be flexible and adaptable to support a wide variety of missions simultaneously. Complex operational environments will require Army forces to regionally align and organize capabilities to adapt to immediate and emerging requirements. Soldiers must use training methods that enhance understanding and ability to succeed in various operational environments. This will require Soldiers to be sufficient in language, culture, customs, and regional orientation.

c. Engagement promotes operational readiness as it facilitates preventing, shaping, and winning conflicts by emphasizing critical capabilities available to commanders. Operational readiness, which is more than unit readiness, is enhanced by developing leaders practiced on rapid deployment to austere regions and on integrating into coalition organizations to conduct joint and multinational operations or exercises. To accomplish these objectives, Army leaders

and organizations across all echelons must understand, organize, and implement the capabilities articulated within all warfighting functions.

d. Recent global operations illustrate the need for future Army leaders to develop the capacity to assess diverse cultures, ethnicities, and vulnerable populations. Future Army leaders must develop means to formalize and synchronize special operations and conventional forces capabilities throughout the institutional force. Although unit leaders can help document some of the lessons from recent experiences, it is through the institutional force that the Army must incorporate lessons learned into the doctrinal framework with the tasks and systems in the engagement warfighting function.⁸

e. To assess, shape, deter, and influence the behavior of a people, foreign security forces, and governments, commanders must understand the operational environment. This allows commanders to visualize and describe the environment, make and articulate decisions, and direct, lead, and assess operations. Understanding the relationships between actors and influencers, their allegiances and behaviors, and trends that shape their interaction, will be critical to understanding the complexity of the operating environment.

f. Future challenges are too numerous and complex to be addressed solely by the U.S. military and civilian agencies. A significant portion of national unified action efforts must orient around building foreign partnerships and helping partners attend to their internal challenges. The Army, for example, must enhance partner activities. This approach establishes long-term relationships fostering mutual trust and confidence, promoting a more stable international security environment, and setting conditions to prevail during armed conflict. To prevail, future Army forces will collaborate with unified action partners to develop security capacity and support capacity-building of partners' efforts through security cooperation activities at the individual, institutional, and ministerial levels.

2-4. Implications for the future

a. Future leaders must understand the human aspects of conflict and war to achieve outcomes consistent with national interests. Inform and influence activities, military support to governance, development, and establishing rule of law will be central to achieving ends across the range of military operations.

b. The changing global economic and socio-cultural landscape requires the U.S. and its partners to build, maintain, and enhance foreign security environments in a responsible, cost-effective manner that follows U.S. and partner interests. The future environment in which the Army and its partners will operate requires the Army to generate, organize, and provide lethal and nonlethal capabilities to joint force commanders while capitalizing on the abilities and shared interests of partner security forces.

c. Because state or non-state actors will likely employ or threaten force to pursue their interests, future Army forces must be prepared to respond quickly and appropriately to prevent conflict, shape the environment, and win wars. These challenges emphasize the importance of Soldiers requiring the knowledge, skills, abilities, and other characteristics to work effectively

with indigenous partners and populations in a culturally attuned manner. Therefore, the Army's institutional and operational forces must train its Soldiers and units to work interdependently and understand which combination of partnership activities and special warfare activities is most effective.

Chapter 3

Military Problem and Components of the Solution

3-1. Military problem

How does the Army operate more effectively in the land domain while fully accounting for the human aspects of conflict and war by providing lethal and nonlethal capabilities to assess, shape, deter, and influence the decisions of security forces, governments, and people?

3-2. Central idea

Future Army forces must provide options for commanders to employ combinations of lethal and nonlethal capabilities in complex environments to support the achievement of outcomes consistent with U.S. interests. These options will require Soldiers and leaders to advise and assist security forces, influence key actors, develop capacity in governance and rule of law and, when necessary, fight alongside indigenous forces across the range of military operations. To consolidate gains and transition responsibility to sustainable governments, Army forces must achieve unity of effort with unified action partners based on a common understanding of security forces, governments, and people.

3-3. Solution synopsis

a. Army forces will provide dominant land power, not just through unilateral operations, but by connecting with its unified action partners, complementing capabilities and resources, adeptly shifting from one region of the world to another, and engaging security forces, governments, and people. Therefore, future Army forces require leaders, Soldiers, and Army Civilians trained and educated on the human aspects of conflict.

b. Future Army forces will perform partnership activities and conduct special warfare. Working with foreign counterparts from the individual to ministerial levels, future Army forces must excel in those environments and provide military support to governance and the rule of law. Additionally, the interdependence practiced between U.S. forces, and with unified action partners, will complement the capabilities and resources each partner has and provide stability and efficiency.

c. As the Army prepares for its future, the lessons and ideas offered in this Army functional concept must be collected, studied, tested, revised, expanded if necessary, and shared with unified action partners as appropriate. The Army's institutional force in particular will have the important task of incorporating them into doctrine, training, leader development, its educational system, and materiel development and acquisition processes. The institutional force must continue to develop and implement innovative and effective training solutions, such as the socio-cultural leader development initiatives, and expand opportunities to access and shape training support services and products, such as the culture, terrain, weather, infrastructure, demographics,

and human element information and analysis available from the operational environment enterprise. The Army's operating force also must ensure that leaders and Soldiers understand their importance and train them at home station, combat training centers, while deployed, and during self-development opportunities. Ensuring that future commanders and staffs excel in future operations starts with the introduction of ideas from this concept into the Army's culture.

3-4. Components of the solution

a. Two components of the solution are central to functional concept and warfighting function. These are partnership activities and special warfare activities.

b. Partnership activities. Future U.S. armed forces will support, train, advise, and equip and learn from partner security forces to counter insurgencies, terrorism, proliferation, and other threats. Partnership activities include civil military operations, Army support to security cooperation, security assistance, foreign internal defense, and security force assistance. Unified action will also require interorganizational efforts by governmental and nongovernmental entities to build the capacity of partners to secure populations, protect infrastructure, and strengthen institutions as a means of protecting common security interests. The contest for legitimacy ultimately rests with the host nation, which must provide security, sustainable governance, rule of law and economic development.

(1) Civil-military operations (CMO). CMO is the inherent responsibility of all Army commanders and comprise activities that establish collaborative relationships among military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational environment. At the strategic, operational, and tactical levels and across the range of military operations, CMO is a military instrument primary, used to synchronize military and nonmilitary instruments of national power, particularly in support of stability, counterinsurgency, developing governance and rule of law. Elements of CMO must be included in all collective training.

(2) Army support to security cooperation. Future Army forces will participate in Department of Defense (DOD) security cooperation activities that encourage and enable international partners to achieve mutual strategic objectives. These activities include DOD interactions with foreign defense and security establishments, including DOD-administered security assistance programs that build defense and security relationships which promote U.S. security interests. These interests include international armaments cooperation activities and security assistance activities to develop allied and friendly capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations. Security cooperation activities provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations that benefit local populations and governments by improving their security environment.

(a) Future Army forces will assist other countries in improving their capabilities through security cooperation activities. In doing this, Army forces will learn valuable skills and obtain information from other perspectives and partners that will help the forces better understand some of the complex challenges that multinational forces face when they operate interdependently. Joint force commanders will also partner with other U.S. government agencies to pursue theater

security cooperation to increase collective security skills. If U.S. partners are capable of securing themselves, the likelihood of armed conflict will be reduced. Partners also will be more likely to support U.S. military operations based on relationships the forces formed and sustained.

(b) Future Army forces will support combatant commanders' security cooperation efforts principally through security assistance, foreign internal defense (FID), security force assistance (SFA), and other efforts. These activities will build a partner's capacity to secure its own people and territory, stop, or limit recruiting by hostile organizations, support international efforts to counter WMDs, and prevent the use of its territory and telecommunications infrastructure by hostile organizations. These activities will also build lasting and meaningful relationships that promote access and cooperation for the U.S. and its unified action partners across the range of military operations.

(c) Security assistance. To further national policies and objectives, future Army forces will participate in security assistance efforts through which the U.S. provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, cash sales, or lease. DOD-administered security assistance programs are a subset of security cooperation and support U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives through specific programs. These programs include foreign military sales; foreign military construction services; foreign military sales credit; leases; military assistance program; international military education and training; drawdown; economic support fund; peace keeping operations; international narcotics control and law enforcement; nonproliferation, antiterrorism, demining, and related programs; and commercial export sales licensed under the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended. The U.S. embassy's country team normally administers these programs.

(d) FID. FID is defined as the participation by civilian and military agencies of a government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. The U.S. Department of State will normally be the lead agency for execution of FID programs with overall responsibility for the security assistance programs. FID efforts may involve all instruments of national power, diplomatic, information, military, and economic, to support host-nation internal defense and development programs. FID will be executed through unified action involving the synchronization, coordination, and integration of activities from governmental and nongovernmental entities to achieve unity of effort. The focus of assistance is on enabling a host nation to anticipate, preclude, and as a last resort, counter a threat. The lead military instrument in this collaborative environment may be a country team or a joint force commander. FID can also be conducted as part of special warfare.

(e) SFA. SFA activities by the U.S. contribute to unified action by supporting the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and supporting institutions. SFA consists of efforts to assess, generate, employ, sustain, and assist existing host-nation or regional security forces. Future Army forces will conduct SFA to build host-nation capacity to anticipate, preclude, and counter threats or potential threats, particularly when the host nation has not attained self-sufficiency and is faced with threats beyond its capability to handle them. It is essential to emphasize internal defense and development when organizing, planning, and executing SFA during FID. SFA activities will include organizing, training, equipping, rebuilding, and advising various components of security forces. Army forces performing SFA

will initially assess the capabilities of foreign security forces they will assist and then establish a shared and continual way of assessing them throughout their development.

c. Special warfare activities. Future Army forces will execute special warfare activities that involve combinations of lethal and nonlethal actions by conventional and specially trained and educated forces having a deep understanding of cultures and foreign languages, proficiency in small-unit tactics, and the ability to build and fight alongside indigenous combat formations in a permissive, uncertain, or hostile environment.⁹ Special warfare activities include unconventional warfare, counterinsurgency, civil affairs operations, and military information support operations (MISO). Special warfare capabilities will be developed and employed by Soldiers with the aptitude for working among diverse populations. These Soldiers will be trained with specific skills preparing them to work with host nation security forces, host nation governments, interagency, international government organizations, and nongovernmental organizations.

(1) Unconventional warfare. Future Army forces must be able to enable a resistance movement or insurgency that can coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, or insurgent force in a denied area. Future Army forces may engage in unconventional warfare as part of a major theater of war or limited regional contingency in support of an insurgency or resistance movement. Future Army forces' activities will influence an indigenous population to gain its support for the resistance movement or insurgency.

(2) Counterinsurgency. Future Army forces will conduct comprehensive civilian and military efforts to defeat an insurgency in a fragile state, protect the population, address any core grievances that may incite an insurgency, and build support and legitimacy for the fragile government and its programs.¹⁰ Counterinsurgency involves all elements of national power that can take place across the range of operations. Future Army forces will support and influence a host nation's internal defense and development program by providing: strategic and operational planning; intelligence development and analysis; training; materiel, technical, and organizational assistance; recommendations; infrastructure development; tactical-level operations; and elements of mission information support operations. Generally, preferred methods of Army forces support will be through assistance and development programs.

(a) Engagement warfighting function activities will serve as key components of counterinsurgency efforts. These will include CMO, direct actions, and information operations. Future Army forces will conduct CMO including civil affairs activities, military information support operations, humanitarian assistance, support to civil administration, and military civic action.

(b) These efforts will enhance preventive measures, reconstruction efforts, and combat operations as part of efforts to stabilize or rebuild a host nation. Future Army forces will also use direct action to defeat insurgent organizations and establish an environment where political, social, and economic progress is possible.

(3) Civil affairs operations (CAO). CAO are those military operations conducted by civil affairs forces that enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in

localities where military forces are present. These operations may require coordination with other interagency organizations, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, indigenous populations and institutions, and the private sector; and, involve application of functional specialty skills that are normally the responsibility of civil government to enhance the conduct of CMO. In the conduct of CAO, future Army civil affairs forces will facilitate interaction among unified action partners and/or community of interest to eliminate, reduce, or mitigate civil vulnerabilities at the local, regional, and national levels. Successful CAO execution will identify the root causes of civil instability that may lead to social movement, violent extremism, and criminal activities.

(a) Across the range of military operations, civil considerations will remain a critical aspect of any future operational environment. Therefore, Army forces will establish, maintain, shape, and engage with foreign defense establishments, leaders, populations, and nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations. These efforts will build lasting partnerships, capacities, and trust; gain and maintain strategic and operational access, facilitate operational and tactical movement and maneuver, and shape the operational environment for successful unified land operations.¹¹

(b) Future Army commanders will convey their intent and expected end state as they guide the integration of capabilities and promote unity of effort among unified action partners and civilian stakeholders. Future civil affairs forces will assist Army commanders in planning and executing stability operations, transitional military authority, and the transition of administration and infrastructure responsibilities back to legitimate civilian authorities. Consequently, Army forces must be prepared to conduct detailed civil infrastructure assessments and, based on those assessments, assist in developing and executing appropriate remediation, including governance and rule of law tasks, to support the establishment or reestablishment of a stable, credible, and legitimate host nation government.

(4) MISO. MISO provides commanders an important nonlethal tool for influencing the behavior of humans and enabling unified action partnerships. Future Army leaders will plan, integrate, synchronize, and conduct MISO activities that inform and influence decisionmakers and relevant groups. The forces will have the capability to support targeted activities, both lethal and nonlethal. These actions will include expanded interaction with unified action partners and both public and social media to influence the behavior of key groups in ways that directly affect mission accomplishment.

(a) Directed inform and influence activities must be carefully integrated with unified action efforts to assist, secure, and persuade targeted audiences. Greater understanding of the human aspects and cultures will assist commanders in denying enemies support.

(b) Future leader development will be necessary to help Soldiers and leaders understand the combined effects of media, personal interactions, and unit tactical actions on populations. Future cultural training, education, and experience will enable leaders and Soldiers to determine key audiences and develop the most effective means of communicating with them.

3-5. Supporting ideas

a. Several additional capabilities are necessary to support and facilitate implementing the components of the solution and the central idea of the engagement functional concept throughout the Army. Supporting ideas include developmental areas, human aspects of war, interdependence that includes interdependence among conventional, special operations forces, and unified action partners, and surgical strike.

b. Developmental areas. Future Army forces require a developmental focus on the following domains to implement the components of the solution effectively.

(1) Doctrine and experiments. Future Army doctrine will incorporate the contributions of engagement and the emerging movement toward aligning forces regionally into its efforts. Future experiments also will incorporate activities that address the knowledge, skills, and experience of partnership activities and special warfare activities attained during the past decade of conflict.

(2) Organization and personnel. The Army will assess and ensure that its future force design reflects the capability to support national interest and the commander's missions.

(3) Training, leadership, and education. Training, leadership, and education of future Army forces will include events conducted with unified action partners as well as reflect the requirements of this concept's components of the solution and supporting ideas.

(a) Institutional training, training support, leader development, and education will be essential in preparing Soldiers and leaders to understand, prepare for, and implement partnership activities and special warfare missions. Tasks such as security force assistance and counterinsurgency missions will require Soldiers, leaders, and units to be highly trained and well equipped. Therefore, the institutional Army must provide a challenging and realistic training environment as part of its training mission, but also for export to support home station training. Live, virtual, and constructive training environments must be informed by the political, military, economic, socio-cultural, infrastructure, and information environments developed by and accessible from the operational environment enterprise.

(b) U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) will provide support to unit training that is implemented in various ways, such as through proponent development of combined arms training strategies that establish standards for units in the operational force and that also serve as the foundation for training enablers which facilitate training at home station and combat training centers. These institutional training and training support contributions are vital to supporting the components of the solution.

(c) Future Army leaders will require professional military education and experience in the public and private sectors. These include assignments to federal, state, or municipal agencies, industry, diplomatic posts, or advanced civilian education institutions. TRADOC will develop and implement institutional leadership, training, training support, and education initiatives.

These include, for example, TRADOC's socio-cultural leader development program and enduring capabilities, and the human terrain system effort.

c. Human aspects of conflict and war. Unified land operations must consider the context of conflict, such as cultural and social elements, as well as the traditional domains of land, maritime, air, space, and cyberspace. Therefore, future Army forces must develop critical capabilities and associated doctrine to prepare Soldiers to work among diverse populations in a culturally and regionally attuned manner. The success of any future military operation or campaign depends on the application of capabilities designed to influence the physical, cultural, psychological, and social elements of human behavior to prevent, shape and win in population-centric conflicts.¹²

(1) Trust and confidence. Future Army forces require an understanding of the regional operational environment consisting of cognitive, moral, physical, and socio-economic considerations. The insights provided by these considerations contribute to building the trust and confidence necessary to establish long-term relationships and ensure stability.

(2) People, culture, and socio-cultural aspects of conflict. Future Army forces must recognize political considerations, religious beliefs, and ethnic differences that may affect a mission's success. Knowing and respecting local customs, courtesies, and being able to explain how U.S. government policies and strategies align with the interests of the local population are delicate responsibilities. Understanding the power residing in human interaction, social constructs, language, culture, behavior, and other human variables will provide the construct for future Army forces to influence the operational environment.

d. Interdependence. Interdependence, as defined in the concept, is the deliberate and mutual reliance of one unified action partner on another's inherent capabilities to provide complementary and reinforcing effects. Integration and interoperability are subsets of interdependence. Interdependence is a broad and multifaceted concept that applies to both Army units working interdependently and to unified action partners working interdependently with those Army units. Future Army forces will operate as part of a larger joint, interagency and, frequently, multinational effort. Army capabilities will complement or supplement those of their unified action partners. Future operations will require collaboration with all elements of the friendly force. Commander emphasis on interdependence will facilitate effective coordination, synchronization, and integration during unified land operations.

(1) Future Army forces will require high levels of joint interoperability to ensure that technical, doctrinal, and cultural barriers do not limit the ability of commanders to achieve objectives.

(2) As a general trend, the elements that will make up joint forces will become increasingly interdependent in all military operations. Interdependence demands integration of requirements and capabilities across service and functional lines. Integrating these interdependent capabilities in training will improve operational synergy and effectiveness. Interdependence between different types of units will require coordination and synchronization of planning, enhanced by liaison elements supporting integrated distributed operations. Widespread interdependence will

ensure the lowest echelons have the ability to operate synergistically in the execution of assigned tasks. The goal is to design Army and joint force capabilities to work and fight efficiently.

(3) Conventional and special operations forces interdependence. The ultimate goal of conventional forces and special operations interdependence is to increase operational effectiveness. This will enable the joint force to be consistent in the execution of unified land operations and to present a seamless front to adversaries and a united face to friends and partners throughout the phases of operations.¹³ Future Army forces require the following.

(a) In certain conditions, special operations and conventional forces employ unilaterally. Nonetheless, military power achieves the greatest effects when employed in a coordinated combination with the other elements of national power. Whether in a supporting or supported role, special operations and conventional forces must have the capability to synchronize and coordinate various activities to achieve the commander's desired effects.

(b) Synchronization of Army special and conventional operations often occurs too late in the planning process and becomes ad hoc in nature. Synchronization must be achieved prior to mission initiation and as a necessary precursor to shaping, influencing, or capability building efforts; this approach will increase the effectiveness of both special and conventional forces and set the conditions for rapid and effective employment of decisive actions. To ensure that future Army forces understand its importance and workings, synchronization must be embedded in doctrine, professional military education, and training events.

e. Surgical strike. As in the case of all Army missions, surgical strike incorporates all warfighting functions. It is highlighted in this concept as a supporting idea, because of its role within inform and influence operations. Surgical strike activities also include counterterrorism, counter-proliferation, and direct action. When surgical strike is executed unilaterally by special operations forces or collaboratively with unified action partners, it extends operational reach and influence by engaging global targets discriminately and precisely using nonstandard aviation and insertion capabilities. Future Army forces will execute surgical strike activities in a precise manner in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated targets, or influence threats.

Chapter 4

Future Roles of the Army: Prevent, Shape, and Win

4-1. Introduction

Future Army forces will prevail in future complex foreign security environments. They will prevent conflict by presenting a credible and ready force. They will shape operational environments and, when required, they will win the Nation's wars. Engagement contributes to these requirements by providing optimized foundational and supporting capabilities, including properly balanced, organized, and trained forces capable of achieving unity of effort with unified action partners in support of national objectives.

4-2. Prevent conflict

a. Future Army forces and unified action partners will comprise a force with the capacity to execute the full range of military operations. This will serve as a deterrent to prevent conflict. The Army will bolster the capabilities of its future forces and unified action partners through training, education, and experience to gain access, assess, and influence operational environments. This requires regionally, cognitively, and socio-culturally competent Soldiers. Presence with partners will enable prevention.

b. Future Army forces will be adaptive, versatile and able to task organize to provide scalable and discreet capabilities for politically sensitive, austere, and non-contiguous environments. This will require trained Soldiers who are culturally and regionally astute, proficient in foreign languages, and capable of establishing trust and confidence with the partners they advise and train.¹⁴

c. Future Army forces will establish global partnerships that contribute to a unified action network that shares information, enhances interoperability, and provides collaborative capabilities to resolve mutually beneficial security problems. Accomplishing this task will require a network that enhances situational understanding and extends U.S. operational reach and influence across the globe.

4-3. Shape

a. Future Army forces will support combatant command security cooperation activities across the range of military operations and conduct a wide variety of steady-state activities. Shaping the security environment requires more than providing military equipment or technology to partner nations. Instead, it will be a people-centric mission that requires building trust and sharing experiences to create stable and self-sufficient partner nations. Along these lines, Army forces will operate in and around the culture and politics of populations by offering methods that have the best chance of preventing conflicts and wars in ways that firepower alone cannot accomplish.

b. In the end, shaping the environment by building and strengthening partnerships will provide access. Building strong unified action partner relationships requires an intelligence-enabled, people-focused capability to develop regional stability, enhance global security, and facilitate access. When directed, future Army forces also provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

c. The activities associated with engagement support Army and DOD shaping operations. Because they are planned and have a purpose, the positioning of forces and capabilities for future operations will reduce the risk of conflict or its escalation by communicating the Nation's readiness to respond to provocations.

d. Future Army forces will require assessment capabilities to identify the strengths and deficiencies in a nation-state's ability for governance, economic development, essential services, rule of law, and other critical government functions. Trained and educated future Army forces

will lead or support efforts by unified action partners to build legitimacy of local governance and address the underlying conditions that lead people to support extremist organizations, their networks, and other destabilizing threats.¹⁵

e. Future Army forces will require the ability to adapt to an operational environment's human context. This will require a continuous learning environment in which Soldiers learn how to work with differing people and unified action partners.

f. During shaping operations, future Army forces will conduct analysis of or obtain access to political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information aspects of the operating environment. Commanders will use the integrated employment of information-related capabilities to influence directly or indirectly a host nation's ability to stabilize, secure, and strengthen bilateral and multilateral relations.¹⁶

g. Future Army forces will support a comprehensive approach focused on developing regional influence and enhancing options to conduct military operations to shape the future and win if conflict prevention fails.

4-4. Win the Nation's wars

a. As the Nation's principal land combat force, and a part of unified action, the Army will deploy forces rapidly, establish a theater framework, conduct unified land operations, and sustain military campaigns. Future Army forces will have the depth and resilience needed to conduct decisive action. While the Army can operate alone, implementing the solutions and supporting ideas described in this concept with unified action partners will enhance the Army's ability to achieve success.

b. Future Army operations will be dynamic, face challenges of change and complexity, and require special operations and conventional forces interdependence that enhances adjustments to the nature of the mission fluidly. The optimal relationship between Army special operations forces, conventional forces, and unified action partners will depend on varying requirements. During the shape and deter phases, for example, Army forces and their unified action partners will seek to prevent conflict while minimizing risk, which equates to winning if conflict can be prevented. Both special operations and conventional operations forces can lead operations to achieve national objectives.

c. Future Army forces will provide a flexible, integrated, adaptable, and tailored combined arms force capable of strategic impact across the range of military operations. This concept's tenets are critical elements in consolidating gains and effective transitioning of stabilization responsibilities to a host nation or other authority. Ultimately, the Army's capabilities and its ability to win wars build the credibility needed to prevent conflict and shape the operational environment.¹⁷

Chapter 5

Conclusion

a. TP 525-8-5 explains why engagement is a necessary addition to the ACF and how Army forces will apply engagement across the range of military operations. In addition, the concept discusses why knowledge, along with an understanding of the behavior of a security forces, governments, and people greatly increase opportunities for the Army to achieve its objectives of prevent, shape, and win. It highlights the importance of achieving interdependence among conventional forces, special operations forces, and unified action partners.

b. Addressing the tasks and systems associated with the engagement warfighting function requires trained and educated future Army leaders, Soldiers, and Army Civilians who can advise and assist, influence, build, and fight alongside indigenous populations in permissive, uncertain, or politically sensitive situations.

c. To operate successfully in the future, combatant commanders will require versatile, and sustainable land forces that display agility and flexibility, are regionally focused, and ready to face a broad range of contingencies. With thoughtful consideration and application, with unified action partners and other warfighting functions, engagement will provide commanders with an important means of attaining U.S. security objectives.

Appendix A

References

Army regulations, Department of the Army (DA) pamphlets, Army doctrine publications (ADPs), Army doctrine reference publications, field manuals (FM), and DA forms are available at www.apd.army.mil. TRADOC publications and forms are available at <http://www.tradoc.army.mil/publications.htm>. Joint publications are available at <http://www.dtic.mil>.

Section I

Required

TRADOC G-2, Operational Environments to 2028: The Strategic Environment for Unified Land Operations, August 2012

TP 525-3-0

The Army Capstone Concept

Section II

Related

ADP 1

The Army

ADP 3-05
Special Operations

Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020

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Appendix B

Required Capabilities

B-1. Introduction

This appendix reflects two levels of required capabilities (RCs). Level 1 RCs are generated from the components of the solution in this concept. The Level 2 RCs are dependencies on the other warfighting functions that reflect the capabilities those other capabilities based assessments

(CBAs) must address. The level 2 RCs provided by centers of excellence and other key organizational documents (such as those from Army special operations forces, space, and others) reflect the capabilities a CBA must address for the ideas in those other concepts to succeed.

B-2. ACC required capabilities (RCs)

a. The future Army requires the capability to provide leaders, Soldiers, and organizations grounded in military tactical and technical competencies, skilled in applying the principles of mission command, and capable of employing the mission command system within the operational environment in support of unified land operations.

b. Future Army forces require the capability to synchronize themes, messages, and actions in operations to inform U.S. and global audiences, influence foreign audiences, and affect adversary and enemy decisionmaking within the operational environment to succeed in unified land operations.

c. The future Army requires the capability to achieve special operations and conventional force interdependence through a range of personnel, educational, training, command, and support relationships across all activities and operations within the operational environment to support unified land operations.

d. Future Army forces require the capability to conduct intelligence analysis of requirements and collected information at all echelons down to company level and below using all available data, information, and products in home station and complex environments to assist commanders in understanding the operational environment and decisionmaking in support of unified land operations.

e. Future Army forces require the capability to execute technical and human collection across the doctrinal intelligence disciplines, interagency and nongovernmental organizations as result of the conduct of combined arms, air and ground reconnaissance, surveillance, security, and intelligence operations within the operational environment to support commanders' situational understanding and decisionmaking in support of unified land operations.

f. Future Army forces require the capability to conduct security force assistance and civil military operations in a multinational environment with partners and among diverse populations to support allies and partners, protect and reassure populations, and isolate and defeat enemies within the operational environment in support of unified action.

g. The future Army requires the capability to provide decentralized sustainment in anti-access and area denial environments to all echelons of conventional and unconventional forces that enables decisive action by leaders at lower echelons to provide commanders with operational adaptability in support of unified land operations.

h. The future Army requires the capability to manage the tasks and systems that provide lethal and nonlethal capabilities, to assess, shape, deter, and influence people, governments, militaries and the operational environment in support of unified action.

i. The future Army requires closer interdependence of special operations and conventional forces focused on engagement, capacity building, and other shaping activities to support unified land operations.

j. Future Army forces require the capability to work through and with host nations, regional partners, and indigenous populations in a culturally attuned manner within the operational environment in support of unified action.

k. Future Army forces require the capability and capacities to engage with partners on a sustained basis to address shared interests and enhance partners' security, governance, economic development, essential services, rule of law, and other critical functions as part of unified action.

l. Future Army forces require the capability to train and educate leaders, Soldiers, and Army Civilians using a continuous adaptive learning model that develops the initial, functional and professional skills, knowledge and attributes to provide the fundamental technical and tactical competence necessary to conduct decisive action in support of unified land operations.

m. The future Army requires the capability to provide leaders at all echelons who are critical and creative thinkers with highly refined problem solving skills that can process data and information into usable knowledge to develop strategic thinkers in decisive action in support of unified land operations.

n. The future Army requires the capability to train units in a tough realistic environment, adapting training as the mission, threat, or operational environment changes, to provide trained and ready forces capable of conducting missions across the range of military operations in support of unified land operations.

o. The Army requires versatile organizations and units that exhibit operational adaptability, support a wide variety of missions, and adjust focus rapidly to prevent conflict, shape the operational environment, and win the Nation's wars.

p. The future Army requires increased military and social competence by its leaders and Soldiers, raising physical and cognitive excellence to gain advantage and maximize investments in them within the context of greater efficiency in support of unified land operations.

B-3. AOC RCs

a. Future Army forces require the capability to develop leaders and staffs with expertise in design and the other components of the operations process to operate decentralized in uncertain, complex, and dynamic unified action environment.

b. Future Army forces require the capability to ensure effective communication and coordination of enemy, friendly, civilian intelligence and information as well as political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information variables across all Army echelons and external organizations to achieve unity of effort in unified action.

c. Future Army forces require the capability to engage and communicate via multiple means (face-to-face, print, broadcast media, text messages, social, and other emerging collaboration technology) to influence the perceptions, attitudes, sentiments, and behavior of key actors and publics in a unified action environment critical to mission success.

d. Future Army forces require the capability to integrate knowledge of the theater environment, such as culture, terrain, weather, infrastructure, demographics, and neutral entities, in particular, understanding the perceptions of partners and other human elements of the environment to develop the situation through action and exert psychological and technical influence.

e. Future Army forces require the capability to conduct analysis of political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information aspects of the operating at all echelons to allow commanders at all levels to conduct operations in a decentralized manner in cooperation with partners.

f. Future Army forces require the capability to engage and control populations to ensure freedom of movement and uninterrupted maneuver, and to reduce noncombatant casualties.

g. Future Army forces require the capability to detect, locate, identify, track, and engage individual leadership figures and high value targets while conducting combined arms operations in all operational environments to exert technical and psychological influence while employing a combination of defeat and stability mechanisms.

h. Future Army forces require the capability to sense, monitor, and record activity (behaviors, characteristics, and others) about persons, places, or things to maintain freedom of action.

i. Future Army forces require the capability to integrate gathered data and previously produced intelligence, including threat, military and physical environments, and social, political, and economic factors to provide commander(s) decisionmakers possible courses of action.

j. Future Army forces require the capability to determine enemy and friendly capabilities, hostile intent, and enemy likely courses of action to preserve the force.

k. Future sustainment forces require the capability to support decentralized force elements during operations for extended periods of time, over extended distances to enable commanders to exploit opportunities, control the tempo of operations, and maintain freedom of action.

l. Future Army forces require the capability to conduct sustainment operations in concert with diplomatic, informational, and economic efforts as part of a comprehensive, or whole of government, approach across the joint logistics enterprise to enhance the unity of effort and reduce complexity.

m. Future Army forces require the capability to incorporate joint and multinational sustainment information, assets, processes, personnel, and commodities into operations to achieve unity of effort and economy of force.

n. Future Army forces require the capability to deliver, manage, and track the location, movement, configuration, and condition of people, supplies, equipment, and unit information in near-real-time to achieve unity of effort and economy of force.

o. Future Army forces require the capability to establish relationships and synchronize operations between general purpose forces and special operations elements.

B-4. Level 1 RCs

a. The following Level 1 RCs are generated from the key ideas found in chapters 3 and 4 of this concept.

b. Future Army forces require the capability to work with unified action partners as a means of protecting common security interests.

c. Future Army forces require the capability to enhance partners' unit proficiency to synchronize and sustain security operations.

d. Future Army forces require the capability to enhance partners' individual proficiency to synchronize and sustain security operations.

e. Future Army forces require the capability to sustain engagements with partners beyond the near-term sourcing and budgeting process to co-develop security capacity, improve visibility of current and emerging threats, and contribute to combatant command security cooperation efforts.

f. Future Army forces require the capability to support the joint force commander in achieving unity of effort in shared security objectives with unified action partners.

g. Future Army forces require the capability to foster trust and cohesion with unified partners required to conduct security operations.

h. Future Army forces require the ability to build partners' leaders capacity to conduct security operations that adhere to international standards and principles and are able to support regional or global coalition operations.

i. Future Army forces require the capability to build the institutional capacity of partners to train forces in order to support shared security objectives.

j.–Future Army forces require the capability to advance shared global security interests

k. Future Army forces require the capability to support efforts led by other U.S. government agencies to enhance a partner's capability for governance, economic development, essential services, rule of law, and other critical government functions.

l. Future Army forces require the capability to select the best combination of lethal and nonlethal capabilities in a foreign security environment to advise and assist, influence, build, and fight alongside indigenous populations in permissive, uncertain, or politically sensitive situations.

m. Future Army forces require the authority to direct unified action partners while conducting operations.

n. Future Army forces require Soldiers and leaders to effectively work alongside indigenous populations in permissive, uncertain, or politically sensitive situations.

o. Future Army forces require the capability to establish long-term relationships with unified action partners to set conditions for future operations.

p. Future Army forces require the capability to understand regional considerations (cognitive, moral, physical, and socio-economic) of the operational environment in order to have scalable options.

q. Future Army forces require the capability to incorporate the human aspects of conflict and war into operations planning and execution in order to enable scalable options.

r. Future Army forces require the capability to operate interdependently with unified action partners to improve operational efficacy and efficiency.

s. Future Army forces require the capability to conduct counter-proliferation activities to defeat a threat and or use of weapons of mass destruction against unified action partners.

t. Future Army forces require the capability to develop global partnerships and networks that enable the full range of options in support of strategic objectives.

u. Future Army forces require the capability to conduct a wide variety of steady-state activities to support combatant command security cooperation activities across the range of military operations.

B-5. Level 2 RCs

a. The following Level 2 RCs are dependencies to or from another Army functional concept. Level 2 RCs are generated from the functional concepts and related CBAs. Level 2 RCs reflect the tasks, conditions, and standards a CBA must address for the ideas in those other concepts to succeed. To assess, influence, deter, shape, disrupt and provide access in support of preventing emerging threats and rendering harmless imminent threats in complex foreign security environments future Army forces require the following.

b. Mission command

(1) Future Army forces require the capability to assess a nation-state's ability for governance, economic development, essential services, rule of law, and other critical government functions to identify strengths and deficiencies.

(2) Future Army forces require the capability to ensure effective communication, collaboration, and exchange of relevant intelligence and information to enable shared understanding and unity of effort across all Army echelons and appropriate external organizations during unified land operations.

(3) Future Army forces require the capability for scalable, modular, Soldier-operated and maintained, deployable, and mobile command posts that enable leaders to understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, assess, and control the full range of military operations to succeed in unified land operations.

(4) Future Army forces require the capability to continuously synchronize themes, messages, and actions and conduct a sustained campaign of engagements and activities to inform U.S. and global audiences, influence foreign audiences, and affect adversary and enemy decision-making to succeed in unified land operations.

(5) Future Army forces require the capability to establish, maintain, and shape relations with foreign defense establishments, leaders, populations, and nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations to gain and maintain access, facilitate maneuver, and succeed in unified land operations.

(6) Future Army forces require the capability to provide adaptive, flexible, and tailorable teams that are regionally responsive to geographic combatant commanders' and Army institutional requirements and able to succeed across the range of military operations conducted during unified land operations.

c. Intelligence

(1) Future Army forces require the capability to conduct information collection to support the commander's issuing of mission commands and specifically to answer the commander's priority intelligence requirements and commander's critical information requirements across the range of military operations.

(2) Future Army forces require the capability to manage and employ information and intelligence collection capabilities including technical and non technical, persistent and non-persistent, manned and unmanned collection methods across the terrestrial, aerial, and space layers with sufficient capacity and flexibility to adapt to situational awareness and understanding information requirements during all phases of unified land operations.

(3) Future Army forces require the capability to generate intelligence products and actionable intelligence with the integrated knowledge of the adversary and of the operational

environment to include terrain, weather, infrastructure, culture, demographics, and neutral entities as well as analysis of political, military, economic, sociological, infrastructure and information to support the commander's situational awareness and understanding for all phases of unified land operations.

d. Movement and maneuver.

(1) Future Army forces require Soldiers and leaders trained to advise, assist, influence, build, and fight alongside indigenous populations in permissive uncertain or politically sensitive situations during unified land operations.

(2) Future Army forces require the capability to conduct SFA during unified land operations.

(3) Future Army forces require the capability to train with special operations forces to meet all contingencies during unified land operations.

(4) Future Army formations require effective mechanisms to synchronize conventional and special operations at tactical and operational levels during unified land operations.

(5) Future Army leaders require the capability to synchronize conventional force efforts with special operations force elements in their area of operations effectively during unified land operations.

(6) Future Army forces require the capability to build partnerships and capacity with indigenous forces to set conditions for future operations during unified action.

(7) Future Army forces require the capability to support combatant command security cooperation activities during unified land operations.

e. Fires

(1) Future Army forces require the capability to collaboratively plan, prepare, execute, assess, and integrate with Army and unified action partner capabilities to provide fires at all echelons.

(2) Future Army forces require interoperable fire support systems to plan, coordinate, and synchronize joint and multinational fires from theater to squad level.

f. Maneuver support and protection

(1) Future Army forces require the capability to conduct operations security to eliminate the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation.

(2) Future Army forces require the capability to protect civilians from the effects of combat operations to reduce collateral damage effects, influence the local population, deny the enemy popular support, and preserve freedom of action.

(3) Future Army forces require the capability to conduct internment operations to protect U.S. military prisoners, enemy prisoners and detainees, support the rule of law, and retain freedom of action.

(4) Future Army forces require the capability to plan and design, construct, operate, transfer and close contingency base camps with integrated protection to provide a protected location from which to project and sustain combat power.

(5) Future Army forces require the capability to conduct general engineering in order to assure mobility, enhance protection, enable expeditionary logistics, and build capacity.

(6) Future Army forces require the capability to conduct police operations to protect the population and preserve the rule of law.

(7) Future Army forces require the capability to conduct explosive ordnance disposal operations in order to protect personnel and maintain freedom of movement.

(8) Future Army forces require the capability to conduct personnel recovery operations to prevent the capture and exploitation of U.S. Army Soldiers, Army civilians, and contractors by adversaries.

(9) Future Army forces require the capability to conduct nonlethal operations to incapacitate enemy combatants, minimize non-combatant casualties, or influence populations.

g. Sustainment

(1) Future Army forces require the capability to conduct distribution of personnel, equipment, and supplies with surface and air transportation platform functionality that integrates into sustainment information and mission command systems, enhances protection and energy efficiency, has greater reliability and maintainability, and is interoperable with unified action partners to support distribution operations during unified land operations to extend operational reach, prolong endurance, and increase freedom of action at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.

(2) Future Army forces require the capability to procure, requisition, distribute, maintain, store, account, issue, salvage, and dispose of all classes of throughout the operational environment during unified land operations to extend operational reach and prolong endurance at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels under all network conditions.

(3) Future Army forces require the capability to plan, integrate, and manage contract support actions (to include both requiring activity and contracting related tasks), in a joint operational environment, to enable prompt and sustained operational contract support during unified land operations so the joint force commander (JFC) has freedom of action.

(4) Future Army forces require an increased medical capability to provide trauma care at the point of need in a joint interdependent trauma system in a unified action environment during unified land operations to provide the JFC with freedom of action and extended operational reach.

(5) Future Army forces require the capability to provide expeditionary health service support that enhances medical capability and improves patient care at the point of need in a unified action partner environment during unified land operations to provide the JFC with freedom of action and extended operational reach.

(6) Future Army forces require an integrated capability to accurately assess, predict, and fill manpower requirements, assess and identify a Soldier's personnel readiness and account for the force in near real time to ensure commanders have the right Soldier, with the right skill sets, at the right time during unified land operations so the JFC has freedom of action.

(7) Future Army forces require the capability to understand fully international, national, and host nation authorities and caveats to include formal and informal legal practices to the specific operating environment to execute operations successfully, including rule of law and governance missions, during unified land operations so the JFC has freedom of action.

(8) Future Army forces require the capability to understand fully the applicable status of forces agreement, or equivalent, and the applicable rules of engagement to inform commanders during unified land operations so the JFC has freedom of action.

(9) Future Army forces require the capability to advise commanders on the impact of religion on all aspects of unified land operations.

(10) Future Army forces require the capability to rapidly support Army special operations forces sustainment operations to widely distributed force elements and unified action, partners, during all phases of joint operations, that enables decisive action at the lowest practical level, and includes the capability, and authorities to provide sustainment functions to critical partner nation's forces to advance the geographic combatant commander's objectives.

(11) Future Army forces require the capability to integrate processes and capabilities into the joint logistics enterprise to improve efficiency; achieve unity of effort with unified action partners across the end-to-end logistics processes; and deliver, position, and sustain joint forces from any point of origin to any point of employment on behalf of the JFC.

(12) Future Army forces require the capability to equip allies and friendly partners rapidly through capacity-building programs in support of unified action.

h. Special operations. Future Army forces require the capability to execute surgical strike activities in a precise manner using special operations forces in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover or damage designated targets, or influence threats to shape and influence an operational environment or influence selected target audiences in support of larger strategic interests.

i. Human dimension

(1) Future Army forces require improved integration, communications, and transparency of institutional efforts to develop professional Soldiers and Army Civilians across and between the various actions and agencies dealing with the Army's human capital from accession to departure from service.

(2) Future Army forces require senior officers with accredited and certified foreign language proficiency to promote understanding and respect for the importance of culture and socio-cultural awareness and adaptability as an essential element of 21st century operations.

(3) Future Army forces require Soldiers with the capability to understand and address the human aspects of social, cultural, historical, political, economic, population, and geography of the area of operations.

(4) Future Army forces require the ability assess individual and unit physical readiness in terms of each Soldier's military occupational specialty and the unit's mission essential tasks using tests that predict a Soldier's ability to perform mission essential tasks.

(5) Future Army forces require precise assignment methodologies that closely match assignments to schooling, thereby increasing the synergy between learning in operational assignments and learning gained in formal schooling.

j. Learning training, and education

(1) Future Army forces require the capability to provide strategic joint-interagency civil-military planners who can shape and influence unified action partners throughout the entire range of unified land operations.

(2) Future Army forces require the ability for unit commanders, and military and Army Civilian leaders to identify and communicate training enabler and training resource needs directly to the appropriate training support provider for scheduling and distribution to enable planning and preparing of training.

(3) Future Army forces require the ability to discover, validate, assess, and integrate lessons learned and learner feedback to update rapidly and interactively DOTMLPF products.

(4) Future Army forces require the capability to develop critical and creative thinkers with highly refined problem solving skills to meet the expected challenges of the future operational environment.

(5) Future Army forces require the capability to train, monitor, and guide development activities of leaders, Soldiers, and Army Civilians possessing language skills and other aspects of cultural literacy to facilitate expeditionary operations.

(6) Future Army forces require learning of functional and professional attributes, skills, and knowledge for individual and collective training developed under and trained within tough realistic conditions to give leaders, Soldiers, and Army Civilians, fundamental tactical and technical competence.

(7) Future Army forces require the capability for leaders, Soldiers, and Army Civilians to gain experience working and training with commercial industry, civic or government organizations, or other service providers in order to develop and build skills for engagement, capacity building, and other shaping activities to support unified land operations.

(8) Future Army forces must develop capability to leverage existing private and public sector expertise within the Reserve component in support of the engagement warfighting function.

(9) Future Army forces require the capability to conduct training of cohesive combined arms teams able to employ the full range of joint and Army capabilities, distributed across echelons and home station when required, in a realistic training environment that approximates the complex operating environment in order to fight and win across the spectrum of conflict.

Appendix C

Special Operations and Conventional Forces Activities

C-1. Special operations forces capabilities

a. Civil affairs, MISO, Army Rangers, special forces, and Army special operations aviation forces are assigned to the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, which provides special warfare and surgical strike capabilities across all phases of operation. These capabilities are particularly effective (force of choice) in small-scale, low-footprint operations in phases 0 and 1.

b. Special operations Soldiers with proven, mature decisionmaking and problem-solving skills are specially trained to operate in ambiguous, high-risk environments around the world. Their principal mission sets include unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, direct action, special reconnaissance, counterproliferation of WMD, counterterrorism, civil affairs operations, and MISO.

c. Collateral mission sets include humanitarian assistance, security assistance, personnel recovery, search and rescue, combat search and rescue, counter-drug, special activities, and coalition support.

d. Versatile special forces teams are highly trained, theater-oriented, and have language and cultural expertise, and refined skills in weapons, communications, engineering, and medical care.

e. Ranger units are highly trained with expertise in special operations raids, non-combatant evacuations, airfield seizures, and special reconnaissance.

f. Special operations units have specialized equipment, specialized techniques, and access to non-standard fire support assets, including specialized aviation assets.

g. Civil affairs teams are highly trained, theater-oriented, rapidly deployable with language and cultural expertise and skills to work by, with, and through other special operations forces, non-military organizations, and indigenous partners to plan, prioritize, and execute populace and resource control, foreign humanitarian assistance, civil information management, nation assistance, and support to civil administration.

h. Military information support operations teams are highly trained, theater-oriented, and rapidly deployable. They are supported by a state-of-the-art media operations center, which disseminates information to foreign audiences via various print and broadcast media, including leaflets, posters, handbills, newspapers, radio, and television broadcasts.

C-2. Conventional forces capabilities

a. Conventional forces consist of Army units that are organized, or tasked, to execute offensive, defensive, and either stability or defense support to civil authorities tasks to meet combatant commander land force requirements. Conventional forces provide the majority of land power assets employed in unified land operations. Conventional forces are accessible across all phases of operations, and are particularly effective as the force of first choice in large-scale operations in phases 3, 4, and 5.

b. Army forces are structured as formations such as army, corps and division headquarters, brigade combat team, functional and multifunctional brigade, and enabler units.

c. Principal mission sets include offense, defense, stability operations, defense and stability or defensive support to civil authorities. Conventional forces maintain the ability to commit large or small formations of combat power, often for extended periods, to execute combined arms operations.

d. Conventional forces have extensive ability to conduct the full array of MISO, civil affairs, electronic warfare, cyber-electromagnetic activities, public affairs, and operations security. They can install, operate, and maintain the network, conduct airspace and space control, and conduct information protection.

e. Conventional forces have extensive ability to deploy, move, and maneuver; conduct operations through; employ direct fires; occupy an area, conduct mobility and counter-mobility operations; conduct reconnaissance; surveillance; and employ battlefield obscuration.

f. Conventional forces have extensive and varied assets to support operational understanding; provide intelligence support to targeting and information capabilities; and collect information.

g. Conventional forces have extensive assets and ability to locate targets; decide on attack method and timing as appropriate; provide scalable fire support; assess effectiveness; conduct air and missile defense.

h. Conventional forces have extensive assets and ability to conduct logistics; provide personnel services; provide health service support.

i. Conventional units have extensive ability to conduct operations, including personnel recovery; fratricide avoidance; operational area security; antiterrorism; survivability; policing; force health protection; internment, resettlement, and detainee operations; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear operations; safety; operations security; explosive ordnance disposal; and risk management.

j. Reserve component civil affairs units provide first-hand experience and expertise in civilian specialties related to civil security, support to governance, provision of essential services, support to economic development and infrastructure, and civil control. Army foreign area officers also provide cultural capabilities, interpersonal communications, and foreign language skills to the Army and services.

Glossary

Section I Abbreviations

ACC	Army Capstone Concept
ACF	Army Concept Framework
ADP	Army doctrine publication
AOC	Army Operating Concept
CAO	civil affairs operations
CBA	capability based assessment
CMO	civil-military operations
DA	Department of the Army
DOD	Department of Defense
DOTMLPF	doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities
FID	foreign internal defense
FM	field manual
JFC	joint force commander
MISO	military information support operations
RC	required capability
SFA	security force assistance
TRADOC	U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
U.S.	United States
WMD	weapons of mass destruction

Section II

Terms

special warfare

The execution of activities that involve a combination of lethal and nonlethal actions taken by a specially trained and educated force that has a deep understanding of cultures and foreign language, proficiency in small-unit tactics, and the ability to build and fight alongside indigenous combat formations in a permissive, uncertain, or hostile environment.

unified action

Synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort.

unified action partners

Unified action partners are those military forces, governmental and nongovernmental organizations, and elements of the private sector with which Army forces plan, coordinate, synchronize, and integrate during the conduct of operations.

Section III

Special terms

human domain

The totality of the physical, cultural, psychological, and social environments that influence human behavior to the extent that the success of any military operation or campaign depends on the application of unique capabilities that are designed to influence, fight, and win in population-centric conflicts.

global commons

the earth's un-owned natural resources, such as the oceans, the atmosphere, and space.

interdependence

The purposeful reliance by one on another's capabilities to maximize complementary and reinforcing effects of both; the degree of interdependence varying with specific circumstances.

surgical strike

The execution of activities in a precise manner that employ special operations forces in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover or damage designated targets, or influence threats.

Endnotes

¹ Documents within the ACF may be found on the TRADOC homepage at <http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/>

² For a detailed description of the future OE, refer to TRADOC *Operational Environments to 2028: The Strategic Environment for Unified Land Operations*.

³ Unified action includes a wide scope of actions (including the synchronization of activities with other government agencies [OGAs],

intergovernmental organizations, and coordination with nongovernmental organizations and the private sector) taking place within unified commands, subordinate unified commands, or JTFs to achieve unity of effort. Joint Pub 1, p. xiii.

⁴ *Marching Orders*, January 2012.

⁵ Robert Chesney, *The Fragmenting Conflict with al Qaeda and the Law of the Second Post-9/11 Decade*.

⁶ ACC, iii, p. 11.

⁷ *Irregular Warfare*, p. 4.

⁸ Sacolick and Grigsby, p. 39.

⁹ ADP 3-05, p. 9.

¹⁰ Joint Pub 3-24, p. I-2, III-4, and VIII-10.

¹¹ Primary information related capabilities for inform and influence activities include civil affairs operations.

¹² Sacolick and Grigsby, Jr., p. 40, and ACC, p. 15-16.

¹³ Sacolick and Grigsby, Jr., p. 42.

¹⁴ ADP 3-05, p. 13; ACC, pp. 12 and 16.

¹⁵ FM 3-57, p. 3-26.

¹⁶ FM 3-57, p. 3-27.

¹⁷ ADP 3-05, p. 6-7.