



# Historical Essays on the First 50 Years of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1973-2023



## Table of Contents

2	Why a TRADOC?
4	Active Defense Gives Way to AirLand Battle
6	AirLand Battle Emerges: Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, 1982 and 1986 Editions
12	TRADOC's Training Revolution
10	TRADOC and the Development of a New Generation of Weapons
12	Gender-Integrated Basic Combat Training
14	TRADOC and the Release of FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency
17	TRADOC and Educating Army Professionals
19	Opening All Army Military Occupational Specialties to Women
22	A Resilient TRADOC Changes with the Times

## Historical Essays on the First 50 Years of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command 1973-2023

### Preface

What follows—in pamphlet form—are ten short, interpretive, and illustrated essays on the first 50 years of the history of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). This publication is one of TRADOC's 50th anniversary series of commemorative efforts. While the publisher is TRADOC, its Military History and Heritage Office (MHHO)—one of the command's Headquarters Special Staff offices—researched, wrote, and edited all the essays for publication. Each essay is self-contained in terms of using the past tense to emphasize the historical nature of the information and presenting acronyms often peculiar to the American military. Collectively, the essays take the reader through critical periods and topics in TRADOC's history, from its 1973 establishment to its 2023 tackling of the post COVID-19 junior-enlisted recruitment challenge. As the last essay points out, TRADOC's first 50 years as an Army Command proved its agility, adaptability, and resilience as a military organization, while it made numerous original and vital contributions to American defense and the history of the U.S. Army.

The TRADOC MHHO's three professional Historians—Dr. J. Britt McCarley, TRADOC Chief Historian; Dr. Joseph T. Rainer, TRADOC Deputy Chief Historian and Chief of the TRADOC Military History and Heritage Program's (MHHP) Field History Operations; and Dr. Gregory S. Hospodor, the TRADOC MHHP's Chief of Military History Education and Curriculum—authored all the essays, which build upon 50 years of previous MHHO historical scholarship. The TRADOC MHHO will gladly accept input from this pamphlet's readers.

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## Why a TRADOC?

The United States (U.S.) Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) reached its Golden Jubilee, 50 years since its establishment, on 1 July 2023.

So, the question pertains: Why did the U.S. Army establish TRADOC in the first place?

To answer that fundamental question, one must first go back decades in Army history to get a running start. During and after World War II, the Army conducted several institutional reorganizations, looking for balance in the continental U.S. between maintaining readiness among active duty and reserve units on the one hand and conducting their training and education functions on the other. Institutional manifestations of that ongoing effort were the wartime General Headquarters (GHQ), U.S. Army and the Army Ground Forces (AGF), as well as the post-war Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces (OCAFF). In 1955, yet another Army reorganization recombined almost all the service's U.S.-based activities into the Continental Army Command (CONARC), which continued throughout American involvement in the Vietnam War and demonstrated again the cumbersomeness of too much institutional responsibility and mission activity compressed into only one command.

Restarting in the late 1960s from unfinished reform efforts earlier in that decade and continuing through U.S. military withdrawal from Vietnam in spring 1973, still another Army reorganization began. This time, the endeavor finally produced significant results in trying to resolve CONARC's overlarge organizational and mission span of control by once more looking for institutional balance between U.S.-based units' readiness and their training and education functions. That effort, which the Army eventually called Operation STEADFAST, culminated on 1 July 1973 with the service's disestablishment of CONARC, and from its constituent parts the establishment of Forces Command (FORSCOM) and Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). Simultaneously, the Army disestablished the Combat Developments Command (CDC) and incorporated its mission into the newly established TRADOC.



General William E. DePuy, TRADOC's first Commanding General, speaking at the command's activation ceremony on 1 July 1973 at Ft. Monroe, VA. Beyond the General is then-Secretary of the Army Howard H. 'Bo' Callaway of Georgia. (U.S. Army photo)

Afterward, FORSCOM handled active duty and reserve units and their collective training to be ready for war, while TRADOC accessioned the Army's Soldiers and their leaders into the service, individually trained and educated both groups, formulated the doctrine by which they fought, designed the units in which they served, and—until the 2018 establishment of the U.S. Army Futures Command (AFC)—developed the requirements for the equipment that all Soldiers used to achieve their tactical and operational missions. Before the 2006 full establishment of the U.S. Army Installation Management Command (IMCOM), TRADOC also operated the Army's posts, camps, and stations on which it performed the command's duties.

After its completion in 1834, Ft. Monroe, VA, became one of the Army's principal installations, along the way witnessing the birth of the service's school system in 1824 with the establishment there of the Artillery School of Practice.



Building 5 at Ft. Monroe, VA, photographed here during 1942, served as administrative space during the TRADOC years at the post. The structure started its life in 1879 as a new and badly needed barracks building, which the Army constructed atop the footprint of the old Artillery School of Practice, where the Army service school system got its practical start in 1824. (Photo courtesy of the Fort Monroe Authority)

Ft. Monroe also was home to several of TRADOC's predecessor commands, including CONARC. On a warm and rainy Sunday, 1 July 1973, right by the Chesapeake Bay's Hampton Roads and just outside the stone walls of old Ft. Monroe, the Army established TRADOC under its first commander, General William E. DePuy, who, as a lieutenant general, also figured large in the overall Operation STEADFAST effort that birthed TRADOC.

After all the details, why then a TRADOC? In short, the answer was to give the American military and thus the United States one Army command to take the new Soldier or leader from first handshake to first unit of assignment and beyond, and to provide him or her with the training, education, doctrine, units, and—until 2018—equipment requirements with which to fulfill the Army's part of providing the country's general-purpose land force to the overall joint forces' effort to win the nation's wars when called upon to do so.



The TRADOC Military History and Heritage Office (MHHO) preserves the historical record of Headquarters, TRADOC, and the command generally. Pictured here is of the 55 linear feet of historical archives from Operation STEADFAST and the old U.S. Army Combat Developments Command. Together, these documents constitute a copy of "TRADOC's Birth Certificate." (Photo courtesy of the TRADOC MHHO)



## Active Defense Gives Way to AirLand Battle

One of TRADOC's core responsibilities throughout its history was to research, write, and publish the U.S. Army's doctrine—its series of “how to fight” manuals and handbooks.

Among the newly established TRADOC's earliest and most significant tasks from 1973 on was to help the Army recover from the Vietnam War, which the command's establishment partly addressed. TRADOC was also responsible for responding to a reinvigorated Soviet and Warsaw Pact threat to NATO that arose especially in Central Europe while the Army had focused its attention on operations in Southeast Asia. Reimagining and refining the Army's tactical and operational ways of war after Vietnam demanded much time from General William E. DePuy, TRADOC's first Commanding General, and his next couple of successors as commander. Also occurring in 1973 was the short and extra lethal Yom Kippur War in October, known as the Fourth Arab-Israeli War, in the Middle East pitting Arab coalition armies using Soviet doctrine and weapons against the Israeli Defense Force using U.S. doctrine and weapons. Particularly concerning to the U.S. Army was the Yom Kippur War's high degree of materiel destruction of weaponry and supporting systems on the battlefield. To the American military, that war seemed to foreshadow what might occur should the numerically large Red Army and Soviet-bloc forces attack the less numerous NATO and U.S. Army forces in central West Germany.



U.S. Army M-60 Main Battle Tank in the Fulda Gap, West Germany, where the U.S. and NATO expected Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces to attack first if a “hot war” began during the Cold War in Europe. (U.S. Army photo)

One response to the Yom Kippur War was the U.S. Army's effort to recast its capstone operational doctrine in Field Manual (FM) 100-5, *Operations* to account for the likelihood that Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces would initially heavily outnumber U.S. and NATO forces in the event of a next European war. That FM traced its origins to the Army's publication of *Field Service Regulations (FSR) 100-5* in 1905 as part of the service's reform efforts following the 1898 Spanish-American War. From 1905 through 1968, the Army published eleven different versions of FSR/FM 100-5.

Starting soon after TRADOC's establishment, its commander, General DePuy, and his Deputy Chief of Staff for Training, Major General Paul F. Gorman—assisted by a small brain trust of mostly field-grade officers known informally as the “boathouse gang,” after a former Ft. Monroe, VA, yacht club building where they met—produced the July 1976 edition of FM 100-5, *Operations*, which also was part of an American military-wide doctrinal renaissance following the Vietnam War.



The informally named “boathouse gang,” the U.S. Army field grade officers and civilian staff who turned TRADOC Commander General DePuy's doctrinal vision into the 1976 edition of Field Manual 100-5, *Operations*, which began the short-lived and controversial period of Active Defense doctrine. (U.S. Army photo)

A creature as well of its Cold War context, this version of FM 100-5 posited that the U.S. Army and its NATO allies would surely “fight outnumbered” and still must “win the first battle of the next war” against an armor-heavy Soviet and Warsaw Pact thrust into central Europe by focusing on tactical maneuver and overwhelming battlefield firepower in what came to be known derisively as Active Defense.

From at least the time of Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant's command of the entire Union army during the last year of the American Civil War, the U.S. Army focused on the offensive and incapacitation of the enemy in decisive battle. Whether that vision of warfare proved achievable at tolerable cost on America's battlefields after the 1860s is another matter. Critics of Active Defense derided it as contrary to the primary historical strength of the U.S. Army—the offense!


Starting during the tenure of TRADOC's second Commander, General Donn A. Starry, and reaching completion under its third commander, General Glenn K. Otis, the Army, with TRADOC again leading, completed yet another doctrinal reform, this one to return the service once more to the kind of offensive mindedness that served it well on earlier European battlefields during the world wars. The product of that effort was the Army's storied AirLand Battle doctrine.



The U.S. Army intended the camouflaged cover and notebook character of the 1976 edition of FM 100-5, *Operations* to emphasize its focus on “winning the land battle,” which the manual's first page stressed. (Photo courtesy of the TRADOC MHHO)

## AirLand Battle Emerges: Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, 1982 and 1986 Editions

In 1976, TRADOC distributed 176,000 copies of the new Field Manual (FM) 100-5, *Operations*. This massive publication and dissemination effort marked but one of TRADOC commander General William E. DePuy's purposes for the manual—to drive rapid change throughout an Army confronting an upgraded Soviet threat in Europe and contending with the aftermath of the long Vietnam War. Fresh doctrine, DePuy reasoned, would serve as a guidon for the Army, shaping everything it did, from training and education to developing leaders and new equipment. Another no less significant purpose was to provide Soldiers with clear and practical guidance on how to fight and win on the modern battlefield against a peer opponent.



Source: TRADOC Pam 525-5, *AirLand Battle and Corps Operations - 1986*, 25 March 1981, p. 6.

However, significant criticisms of General DePuy's brainchild emerged almost as soon as the last manual left the presses. First, many assessed that it prioritized defensive operations; the chapter on defense was indeed more robust than the one tackling the offense. Consequently, the term "Active Defense" quickly emerged as a shorthand reference for the manual. Second, the manual stressed the science of the application of modern firepower and force ratios, ignoring, some argued, the fundamental human element in warfare. Third, others contended that the doctrine focused too narrowly on the Western European battlefield to the detriment of other forms of conflict across the spectrum of war. Finally, operational commanders worried that, in concentrating on tactical combat at the forward edge of the battle area, the manual neglected a key element of Soviet doctrine—that of echeloning forces in depth to maintain the momentum of any attack. This emphasis might commit U.S. Army ground forces to an attritional fight they could not win. Whatever their specific objections, all critics agreed with General DePuy that future success started with 100-5, the Army's capstone field manual, and that 100-5 should direct the force in all that it did.

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General Donn A. Starry as TRADOC commander (1977-1981).  
(U.S. Army photo)

problem of Soviet offensive doctrine by emphasizing attacking throughout the depth of the battlespace through synchronized effort across the joint force. While the Army primarily managed the frontline fight, the Air Force (mainly), as well as Army attack aviation and long-range fires, would attrite and disrupt second echelon Soviet forces. Furthermore, the new doctrine highlighted the value of maneuver and aggressive action with both local and deep counterattacks serving to shock adversaries and enhance the morale of Soldiers, who would now hit back as well as defend.

Although thankfully never tested in Western Europe, the TRADOC-led effort to transform Army doctrine and the force in tandem with it contributed directly to success in the Gulf War of 1990-1991. Echoes continued to be heard in the Army's later multidomain operations concept.



The Offensive Framework from the 1986 edition of FM 100-5. (U.S. Army illustration)

A series of TRADOC commanders—General Donn A. Starry (1977-1981), General Glenn K. Otis (1981-1983), and General William R. Richardson (1983-1986)—took up the challenge and led the effort to revise the 1976 document, culminating in two new Operations manuals that appeared in 1982 and 1986, respectively. Their sustained, consistent, and collective efforts saw not just revised doctrine, but the development of training and the fielding of equipment to make the doctrine work in practice.

Taken together, the 1982 and 1986 editions of FM 100-5 addressed the perceived weaknesses of the earlier manual. For example, they introduced a concept—dubbed AirLand Battle—that dealt with the



## TRADOC's Training Revolution

Training was the cornerstone of the Army's ability to fight and win. Training developed cohesive, fit, and disciplined teams and instilled how the Army expected to fight. When the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) stood up on 1 July 1973, the Army still followed the Army Training Plan (ATP), which originated in World War I. By design, TRADOC's establishment initiated fundamental reform in how the Army approached training. While many of the changes were incremental, the combined result was a training revolution. The architects of the first phase of this revolution were General William E. DePuy, the first TRADOC commander, and his Deputy Chief of Staff for Training, Major General Paul F. Gorman. With the establishment of the all-volunteer Army in 1973, DePuy and Gorman realized that the ATP model of training a massive pool of conscripts over an extended period was no longer effective. Furthermore, the increased lethality and enhanced range of the weapons used in the 1973 Yom Kippur War brought home to DePuy and Gorman the imperative for well-trained crews and tactical commanders.



General William E. DePuy, Commanding General of TRADOC, with Major General Volney F. Warner, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, FORSCOM. (U.S. Army photo)

The Systems Approach to Training (SAT) was the vehicle for change. Whereas the ATP prescribed the hours for each training task, it did not set standards of performance. In contrast, the SAT required Soldiers to perform to established standards, as measured by Skill Qualification Tests. To complement the Officer Education System, DePuy and Gorman also established progressive and sequential training for the Noncommissioned Officer Education System.

Moreover, TRADOC revolutionized training in the field. In 1976, Major General Gorman developed the concept for a National Training Center (NTC), where heavy armored and mechanized infantry units would train in live-fire exercises to support unit readiness, as well as to contribute to doctrine and combat development. In January 1982, the NTC at Ft. Irwin, CA, hosted its first force-on-force maneuvers. The Army judged NTC a stunning success, which led to the establishment of the Joint Readiness Training Center for the training of light forces at Ft. Chaffee, AR, and later at Ft. Polk/Johnson, LA.



M551 Sheridan light tanks cross the desert during an Opposing Forces exercise at the National Training Center. The tanks have visual modifications designed to make them resemble Soviet armor, 1986. (U.S. Army photo)

Additionally, technology rested at the heart of TRADOC's efforts to improve training. For example, DePuy and Gorman introduced training simulators to reduce the subjectivity of umpires and to increase realism, such as the Squad Combat Operations Exercise, Simulated (SCOPEs), and then advanced from telescopes to lasers with the Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES). The Simulation Network (SIMNET) linked over 200 simulators, which allowed units to participate in simulations without leaving home station. The family of simulations (FAMSIM) allowed for training from platoon level to echelons above corps.

In May 1987, the Training Revolution culminated with the publication of a long-range plan—*Army Training 1997*. It integrated Reserve Component training into a Total Army program and knitted training and combat developments together under the Concept-Based Requirements System. From 1988 to 1990, TRADOC published its capstone training philosophy in a trilogy of “train, fight, lead” manuals: FM 25-100, *Training the Force*; FM 100-5, *Operations*; and FM 22-100, *Military Leadership* for commanders above battalion level. The publication of FM 25-101, *Battle Focused Training*, guided commanders at the battalion and company echelons.



Private First Class Charles Liu and Specialist Jason Sneed from the New York Army National Guard's 69th Infantry Battalion attach MILES sensors to an armored tactical vehicle at the Joint Readiness Training Center, 2016. (U.S. Army photo)

TRADOC's training revolution provided tough, realistic combined arms and services training aligned with AirLand Battle doctrine for units from squad through corps levels. In concert with the Big Five weapon systems and new doctrine, TRADOC's training achievements were instrumental to victory during Operation Desert Storm in 1991.

## TRADOC and the Development of a New Generation of Weapons

A major mission assigned to the new U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) on 1 July 1973 was combat developments—the systematic development of new and improved organizations, equipment, weapons, and doctrine. The merger of the combat developments mission with the training mission in one command had been a guiding idea of the 1973 Army reorganization, and, consequently, TRADOC became the Army's principal combat developer. The goal was to reorient combat developments to the near future, and to provide new and improved materiel, organization, and doctrine to field units quickly.

Of the three combat developments concerns—materiel, organization, and doctrine—materiel was a key element. In this realm, TRADOC worked jointly with the U.S. Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command (DARCOM, 1976-1984) and the U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC, 1962-1976, 1984 onward). As combat developer, TRADOC determined a weapon's need and operational specifications, monitored its progress, and determined its ultimate issue to, training with, and use by the Army in the field. All this activity required an integrated and systematic approach, which spawned the idea of “the total weapon system” and a new process, the Concept-Based Requirements System (CBRS), that formalized efforts to convert concepts into reality.

Most famously, the fruits of TRADOC's labors garnered the so-called Big Five during the late 1970s and the 1980s—the AH-64 Apache attack helicopter, the M-1 Abrams main battle tank, the UH-60 Black Hawk utility and transport helicopter, the M-2 and M-3 Bradley fighting vehicles, and the Patriot air defense missile system. The Big Five represented the Army's first major weapons system acquisitions since before the Vietnam War.




Abrams main battle tank. (U.S. Army photo)



Bradley fighting vehicle. (U.S. Army photo)

Although the Big Five were certainly the most visible achievements in terms of materiel development, they were not TRADOC's only ones. Far from it. For example, the decade after 1975 saw the development and/or fielding of the squad automatic weapon, improvements to the M16 rifle, the Copperhead laser-guided artillery shell, TACFIRE artillery fire-direction system, a ground-emplaced mine-scattering system, modernization of the OH-58 Kiowa scout helicopter, and a multiple launch rocket system, to mention but a few.



The payoff for TRADOC's combat development work was victory in the 1990-1991 Gulf War. Furthermore, much of the equipment guided into existence during the 1970s and 1980s continued to be widely used by the U.S. Army and allied forces for decades to come, a lasting testament to the fundamental effectiveness of TRADOC's endeavors. The secret to success was the sound decision, executed in 1973, to combine the combat developments, doctrine, and training/leader-education missions under one banner, thereby assuring unity of purpose and effort.



## Gender-Integrated Basic Combat Training

With the establishment of the all-volunteer force in 1973, the Army viewed increasing women's participation as critical to meeting recruitment goals. But questions arose about the breadth of roles women service members could and should play in the Army. Consequently, in 1975, General William E. DePuy, commander of the new Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), directed an analysis of the Army's personnel requirements to determine the impact of expanded female participation upon unit effectiveness. In conjunction with Forces Command, TRADOC ran a field exercise (titled MAX WAC) with support companies composed of 10 to 35 percent women. The October 1977 findings indicated that the number of women in the unit had far less effect (5 percent) on unit performance than such factors as leadership, training, morale, and personnel turnover. The study also concluded that women were not receiving adequate basic training. Accordingly, General DePuy ordered that Women's Army Corps (WAC) training include proficiency with weapons and defensive tactics. These changes meant that WAC basic training was now on a par with the basic course that men underwent.



Women on a BCT Confidence Course. (U.S. Army photo)

In anticipation of the abolishment of the WAC in 1978, TRADOC tested a successful gender-integrated Basic Combat Training (BCT) course at Ft. Jackson, SC, in the fall of 1976. TRADOC instituted the course at the same location on 2 October 1977. Women were integrated down to the company level. Four basic training companies had three male platoons and one female platoon, while one company had two male and two female platoons. Although the Women's Rights Movement was in full swing at the time, gender-integrated training was a culturally and politically contentious program. The Army discontinued coeducational basic training on 30 August 1982. The informal reasoning was that men were not being physically challenged enough in integrated training. While basic training would remain the same for both sexes, male and female recruits would be segregated at the company level and below.



Drill Sergeant Galen Grant, Ft. Jackson, SC. (U.S. Army photo)

Although social and political critics of gender-integrated training often raised the specter of women in combat, experience in the field drove home the effectiveness of gender-integrated units. For example, the largest deployment of military women to a war zone in U.S. history during Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm (1990-1991) spurred TRADOC to return to gender-integrated BCT, which resumed in October 1994 at Ft. Jackson, SC, and Ft. Leonard Wood, MO. TRADOC thereby maintained its principle to "train as you will fight."

However, just two years later, gender-integrated training faced serious challenges from the conviction of several Army drill sergeants for sexual assault. Secretary of the Army Togo D. West, Jr., announced that it was not gender-integrated training that should be blamed but, rather, some leaders' failure to uphold the code of conduct. The selection, training, and supervision of drill sergeants also had to improve. A September 1997 action plan tasked TRADOC with developing training that would establish an Army culture in which Soldiers treated one another with dignity and respect. TRADOC added a week to basic training that inculcated Army values, appropriate behavior, and team-building.

Later, gender-integrated training continued to prove its worth on the battlefield. Military technology and the nature of counterinsurgency fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan during the Global War on Terrorism blurred the lines between combat and noncombat duty. Necessity often forced military commanders to assign soldiers without regard to gender, and the resulting mixed units and crews bonded into cohesive, effective teams throughout operations in the Middle East and Southwest Asia.



Ft. Leonard Wood, MO, Reception Gender-Integrated Training. (U.S. Army photo)



## TRADOC and the Release of FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency


The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States were a watershed in U.S. history. Though such attacks on the American homeland and its global assets were not unique, they were neither common nor large scale. The 9/11 attacks prompted a U.S. counterattack in fall 2001 against Afghanistan, which was the haven and training ground for the 19 Al Qaeda terrorists who hijacked the four commercial airliners that claimed nearly 3,000 lives in New York, Virginia, and Pennsylvania. Next came the spring 2003 invasion of Iraq for numerous reasons, most of all for allegedly developing and possessing weapons of mass destruction. Though U.S.-led international military operations against Afghanistan and Iraq were initially successful and generally conventional in nature, occupation of both countries without full conquest of either one quickly inspired insurgency, often supported by international terrorist organizations. This shift from one form of warfare to another led the American military to develop counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine to guide its ground forces primarily. COIN required complex and nuanced operations directed at defeating the insurgents while rebuilding both countries as independent and secure states.

TRADOC's role in the ensuing roughly twenty years of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), which in time entailed operations well beyond just Afghanistan and Iraq, involved training Soldiers for duty principally in Southwest Asia and the Middle East, and convening the experts who produced the first formal Army doctrinal manual for conducting counterinsurgency operations since the Vietnam War. After Vietnam and TRADOC's establishment in July 1973, the U.S. Army largely abandoned its extended experience with insurgency and counterinsurgency (aka, unconventional and irregular warfare) dating all the way back to the American War of Independence. Especially after the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the Army focused instead on the activities and programs associated with the Europe-focused AirLand Battle and its supporting Big 5 materiel developments. Faced with the need from 2003 onward to defeat robust insurgencies, the Army, with TRADOC leading and with significant contributions from the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC), began to resurrect, revise, and reissue counterinsurgency doctrine. Along the way as a stopgap measure, the Ft. Leavenworth, KS-based U.S. Army Combined Arms Center (CAC) published Field Manual (FM)-Interim 3-07.22,

*Counterinsurgency Operations*, in October 2004, with a scheduled expiration two years hence. Then-Lieutenant General William S. (Scott) Wallace (later the 12th TRADOC Commanding General) commanded CAC, which oversaw most of the Army's service schools and wrote the bulk of the service's doctrine. The changes initiated by the new counterinsurgency manual ultimately resulted in a cascade of updated doctrinal publications, including capstone doctrine, all reflecting the experiences of recent combat operations.

In September 2005, then-Lieutenant General David H. Petraeus assumed the duties of CAC Commanding General. Petraeus possessed extensive counter-terrorism experience in Bosnia about the time of the 9/11 attacks and later while commanding the 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne Division during and after the Iraq invasion. Right away, Petraeus engaged both his USMC GWOT colleague, then-Lieutenant General James N. Mattis, commanding the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) at Marine Corps Base Quantico, VA, and his West Point classmate, retired Army Lieutenant Colonel, Dr. Conrad C. Crane, a Stanford University Ph.D. in History then serving as Senior Historian at the U.S. Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute. Starting in mid-February 2006 in a conference at CAC, Dr. Crane led the writing team composed of experts from the military, academia, and the private sector and served as the principal author for the Army's effort quickly to research, write, publish, and distribute the seminal December 2006 joint Army-USMC FM 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-33.5, *Counterinsurgency*.

The manual served for the next eight years as the Army's guidepost conveying the principles and imperatives by which to train and conduct GWOT counterinsurgencies with an intricate mixture of offensive, defensive, and stability operations, as well as intergovernmental, international, and host-nation activities.



The Joint U.S. Army/U.S. Marine Corps FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, *Counterinsurgency* doctrinal manual.  
(Photo courtesy of the TRADOC MHHO)



Rooted in both historical study and contemporary experience, the manual drew immediate worldwide attention for many reasons, including its counterintuitive yet utilitarian “Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency Operations,” which included such strictures as “Sometimes Doing Nothing Is the Best Reaction,” “Many Important Decisions Are Not Made by Generals,” and numerous others.

A U.S. Army Soldier, translator, and Iraqi army forces interact with Iraqi civilians in the kind of daily person-to-person exchanges typical of the non-kinetic aspects of counterinsurgency. (U.S. Army photo)

In May 2014, the Army and USMC released the next joint edition of FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, retitled *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies*, which built on the 2006 version and cast counterinsurgency within the larger context of a range of military operations and as but one of a host of manuals enabling commanders to conduct corollary efforts to defeat an insurgency.


One of the Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles with its characteristic V-shaped hull to deflect the blast energy from the GWOT’s distinguishing roadside Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) used extensively especially in Iraq during the height of counterinsurgency operations there. (U.S. Army photo)



## TRADOC and Educating Army Professionals

Throughout its history, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) recruited and trained Soldiers; supported unit training; developed adaptive Army leaders—both Soldier and Civilian; guided the Army through doctrine; and shaped the Army by building and integrating formations, capabilities, and materiel. All this activity occurred in service of the larger goal of providing the Republic with an Army prepared to succeed any time, any place to meet the nation’s military challenges. A commitment to learning—the acquisition of new knowledge or skills by experience, instruction, or study—was foundational to all TRADOC’s efforts.

From an Army institutional perspective, learning occurred during both training and education. While the training aspect of TRADOC’s mission manifested in its name, the educational aspect of the learning mission was no less important, if less readily apparent. Generally speaking, education developed habits of mind applicable to a broad spectrum of endeavors—a key to informing judgement and enhancing adaptability when confronting complex and ambiguous situations. Put another way, education honed the effectiveness of the Army by developing Soldiers and Army Civilians’ cognitive abilities progressively over the course of a career.



The Army University Enterprise. (U.S. Army illustration)

Following its establishment on 1 July 1973, TRADOC’s educational mission evolved and expanded. In 1973, TRADOC oversaw 24 military schools and colleges, branch schools, and specialist schools. As of 2023, General Gary M. Brito, 18th Commanding General of TRADOC, served as Chancellor of The Army University (AU), which was established on 7 July 2015. AU synchronized the efforts of 33 Army schools, organized under ten Centers of Excellence; provided professional military education for commissioned officer, warrant officer, and enlisted leaders; educated and developed



Department of the Army Civilians for responsibilities throughout the Army; and educated military, law enforcement, and interagency personnel from across the world. Also as of 2023, about 750,000 Soldiers, Army Civilians, and other students passed through AU classrooms every year.



U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy, Ft. Bliss, TX.  
(U.S. Army photo)

Significant educational milestones abounded over TRADOC's first 50 years. Beginning in 1982, captains were required to attend the Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS3) at Ft. Leavenworth, KS; the course produced officers capable of functioning as staff officers with the Army in the field. To meet a perceived need to prepare more capable staff officers for service at the division-, corps-, and army- or above echelons, the School for Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) appeared in 1982. TRADOC established an Aviation Logistics School at Ft. Eustis, VA, on 1 October 1983. TRADOC formally assumed responsibility for The U.S. Army School of the Americas (later redesignated as the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation—WHINSEC) on 16 April 1986. The Army Management Staff College opened its initial courses for Army Civilians in July 1986 in Baltimore, MD. TRADOC assumed proponentcy for the Army Logistics Management College from Army Materiel Command on 1 October 1991. Successive TRADOC commanders emphasized the growth of the Noncommissioned Officer Education System into a sequential and progressive educational program.



Staff Group at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. (Author's photo)

Warrant officer candidate schooling consolidated at the Warrant Officer Career Center at Ft. Rucker/Novosel in 1993. A Department of Military History was established in the Command and General Staff College at Ft. Leavenworth in 2004. These were but a few examples of TRADOC's achievements in the education realm, but by no means the only noteworthy ones.

For fifty years, TRADOC served as the Army's primary educator. As such, its efforts increased the abilities of the Army's people, who were, in the final measure, the institution's true competitive advantage.

## Opening All Army Military Occupational Specialties to Women

The history of American women's military service was as old as the U.S. Army itself. During the American War for Independence, women mainly supported Soldiers by washing and mending uniforms, chopping firewood, preparing meals, and caring for the wounded. Such service by women for the Army continued throughout the nineteenth century, perhaps most notably as nurses and arsenal workers in the American Civil War. During World War I, over 200 "Hello Girls" served a vital communications role as switchboard operators in France. Although women's military service waned between the world wars, it ballooned to over 400,000 women who served in the Women's Army Corps during World War II. Such diverse contributions by women in the Army continued into 2023.

While American women always played a vital role in national defense, combat remained almost exclusively the preserve of men for much of Army history. For example, though the Women's Armed Services Integration Act of 1948 enshrined women's right to serve in the armed forces, this legislation also restricted the assignment of women to positions that would not expose them to direct combat. As the Women's Rights Movement gained momentum in the 1960s and 1970s, the Army opened more and more Military Occupation Specialties (MOS) to women, primarily to make more efficient use of the talent pool, yet the limitation of women to noncombat MOSs continued. The big question was how to differentiate between combat, combat-support, and combat-service-support MOSs. Consequently, in August 1977, the Army tasked the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) both to evaluate the combat roles from which women should be excluded and to provide a definition of combat. TRADOC's analysis led to the recommendation to exclude women "from positions that have the primary function of engaging in sustained combat in units with the primary mission of closing with and destroying the enemy or seizing and holding ground." TRADOC developed the Direct Combat Probability Coding (DCPC) System, which evaluated each MOS with a complicated set of criteria and resulted in some noncombat MOSs being closed off to women. Furthermore, in 1988, the Department of Defense developed a "risk rule," which barred women from MOSs that were at risk of exposing them to combat.

In the early 1990s, combat exclusions for women in the Army began to slowly roll back. Nearly 31,000 women deployed to Iraq during the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War, a conflict in which noncombat units were often as exposed to attacks as were those on the front lines. Compounding commanders' deployment of troops on the ground, the DCPC system greatly complicated the management of Army personnel in theater. In 1994, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, Jr., began to push for the opening of more job opportunities for women. Aspin rescinded the "risk rule" of 1988, which opened 32,000 Army jobs to women. However, women were still prohibited from serving in Armor, Infantry, Combat Engineer, Field Artillery, forward-area Air Defense Artillery, and Special Operations units.

It would be another 20 years before Secretary of Defense Leon E. Panetta lifted the last restrictions on women's service in the Army. On 24 January 2013, Panetta ordered the armed services to lift the ban on women serving in combat jobs in the military. The Department of Defense ordered the armed services to study the issue



Specialist Jess Wolmuth from the Nevada Army National Guard gets ready to hurl a practice grenade during a training session at a November 2020 Cavalry Scout course. (U.S. Army photo)

and develop an implementation plan within three years. In conjunction with the U.S. Army Research Institute of Environmental Medicine, TRADOC began a Physical Demands Study in January 2014 to develop gender neutral physical standards. TRADOC conducted a feasibility study with the 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team "Spartans" of the 3rd Infantry Division, addressing four MOSs—11B Infantryman, 11C Indirect Fire Infantryman, 19K Armor Crewman, and 19D Cavalry Scout.

TRADOC concluded that women could serve in these units, and subsequently opened its Ranger School to women in April 2015. After Captain Kristen Griest and First Lieutenant Shaye Haver graduated in August 2015, the Ranger school was permanently opened to women.



Ft. Benning/Moore, GA., April 20, 2015. Captain Kristen Griest, one of two women who became the first female Soldiers to graduate from Army Ranger School, is at center carrying another soldier and holding a knife. (U.S. Army photo)

On 3 December 2015, Secretary of Defense Ashton B. Carter opened all combat arms jobs to women, to be implemented within 30 days. TRADOC developed a "leader first" approach to integrating its combat arms schools to women, training female officers and NCOs before bringing female junior enlisted Soldiers into combat arms schools and units. With the full integration of women into the combat arms in January 2016, nearly 220,000 military positions across the armed services opened to women. Due in large part to the efforts of TRADOC, all Soldiers could reach their full potential, regardless of gender.



A graduation ceremony from 11 March 2016 at Ft. Sill, OK, for the 13B cannon crew member MOS. Private First Class Katherine Beatty, the distinguished honor graduate, stands toward the back of the formation. (U.S. Army photo)



Private Gorgeous Wilson completes an obstacle conditioning course during One Station Unit Training in August 2021 at Ft. Benning/Moore, GA. (U.S. Army photo)



## A Resilient TRADOC Changes with the Times

Following its 1 July 1973 activation at Ft. Monroe, VA, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) served the Army, the defense community, and the nation as an example of organizational adaptability and resilience. Well before there was a TRADOC, its future headquarters location at Ft. Monroe endured two hurricanes in 1936 and barely avoided shutting down from the 1979 Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC, with the letters rearranged) study. However, the combination of Hurricane Isabel in 2003 and BRAC 2005 sounded Ft. Monroe's death knell as an Army installation. The hurricane caused \$100 million in damage to the post, and BRAC singled out non-operational "administrative installations," such as Ft. Monroe, for closure and relocation of their functions elsewhere. Despite the double blow from nature's wrath and Department of Defense (DoD) reform efforts, TRADOC soldiered on.

The September 2003 Hurricane Isabel caused \$100 million in damage to Ft. Monroe, VA, home to Headquarters TRADOC from 1973 to 2011. Pictured here inundated with hurricane flood water was the old Post Office at Ft. Monroe, which TRADOC used as an office building and which became the headquarters of the Fort Monroe Authority (FMA), the Virginia state agency that managed the former Army post from 2011 onward. (Photo courtesy of the FMA)



During the next six years from September 2005 to September 2011, the whole of DoD underwent its fifth round of BRAC, with this iteration focusing as much on transforming the services organizationally as reducing their real estate footprint. For TRADOC, its Maneuver Support Center (MANSCEN) served as the command's model for establishing, in time, a total of 10 Centers of Excellence (CoE). Located at Ft. Leonard Wood, MO, and the product of the 1995 BRAC, MANSCEN was composed of three branch service schools with an overarching command structure. Organized primarily around DoD's warfighting functions—such as Maneuver, Fires, Sustainment, etc.—the CoEs provided command and control for TRADOC's 33 Army schools. Apart from Ft. Monroe, no Army installation on which TRADOC performed a portion of its functions closed altogether, though moves of some iconic activities occurred, including the relocation of the U.S. Army Armor School from Ft. Knox, KY, to Ft. Benning/Moore, GA, and the transfer of the U.S. Army Ordnance School from Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, to Ft. Lee/Gregg-Adams, VA.



General Robert W. Cone, TRADOC's 14th Commanding General, who moved Headquarters TRADOC from Ft. Monroe, VA, to nearby Ft. Eustis. (U.S. Army photo)

After 2011, TRADOC's organizational landscape—with one major exception discussed below—remained steady and consisted of its Headquarters, relocated from Ft. Monroe to nearby Ft. Eustis, VA; the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center at Ft. Leavenworth, KS; the U.S. Army Center for Initial Military Training, also at Ft. Eustis; all the CoEs; and numerous supporting centers and commands. Throughout, TRADOC operated 24 hours a day, 7 days a week to train and educate, by 2023, about 750,000 Soldiers and civilians annually for initial or continued service in the Army and for the nation.

During the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and after, TRADOC confronted and weathered other institutional challenges while it also capitalized on new opportunities. After the

unsuccessful fielding of the Future Combat System by 2009 to bring new units and materiel into the force, the Army implemented several organizational changes, including establishing a new Army Command—the U.S. Army Futures Command (AFC) in 2018—to assist the service's transition back to more conventional combined-arms warfare by focusing on the combat developments process for such service-wide priorities as air and missile defense, the next-generation combat vehicle, long-range precision fires, and others. To do so, the Army realigned TRADOC's Army Capabilities Integration Center to AFC, which partially reversed the Operation STEADFAST reforms that created TRADOC to begin with. The 2020-2023 COVID-19 public health emergency contributed to the Army's junior-enlisted recruitment challenge, which TRADOC began addressing through numerous enlistment initiatives. For example, the innovative Future Soldier Preparatory Course, which started in August 2022 at Ft. Jackson, SC, and expanded in early 2023 to Ft. Moore, GA, got Army enlistees ready for instruction in the service's ten-week Basic Combat Training at one of four locations. Lastly, TRADOC achieved three personnel firsts starting in spring 2021 with its first African American Commanding General; its first female Lieutenant General, who served as the command's Deputy Commanding General/Chief of Staff; and its first Tier 3 Senior Executive Service, lieutenant general-equivalent civilian Executive Deputy to the Commanding General.

In the end, training and education were only two of TRADOC's primary missions. Another enduring major mission was writing and publishing the Army's doctrine, which described how the service conducted operations and fought on the battlefield. The start of what became the GWOT in September 2001 led the Army, in time and with TRADOC leading, to write and publish the counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine by which the service conducted the GWOT for about the next two decades.





